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 This project explores how conditions of material scarcity and the potential for 
profit thrust both foreign and Spanish coastal inhabitants into vast networks of illegal, yet 
essential, commerce.  Based on extensive archival investigations in Venezuela and Spain 
as well as shorter research trips to archives in England, Colombia, and the United States, 
I probe the specific dynamics of the largest portion of eighteenth-century Atlantic trade, 
illicit commerce, as a series of practices imbued with moral economy concerns, political 
meanings, and legal consequences.  The first half of my manuscript uses a 
prosopographical, collective biography approach to profile the largely unexplored actors 
in the Spanish Empire’s underground economy off the Venezuelan coast: non-Spanish 
contrabandists, Spanish American merchants, and corrupt Spanish officials.  These 
ordinary folk participated in quotidian transnational trade in basic goods that violated 
mercantile Spanish law.  The second half examines the social impact that smuggling 
wrought on Venezuela.  I focus specifically on the illicit slave trade and Afro-Caribbean 
contrabandists, the material culture of smuggled goods in Venezuelan daily life, and 
violent colonial opposition to anti-contraband strictures through several mid-eighteenth 
viii 
 
century trade uprisings.  Smugglers’ shadowy existence between empires revises our 
understanding of interimperial contact, local identity formation, commercial autonomy, 
and popular protest in the early modern world.  In its complicated and criminal nature, 
covert commerce also connects large structural shifts in the burgeoning eighteenth-
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I.  Introduction 
 
To study accounts of covert commerce in coastal Venezuela is to glimpse an illicit 
and shadowy world that sustained the economy of this neglected Spanish American 
colony.  Smuggling brought subjects of rival early modern empires into daily contact 
with one another.  The documentation of Venezuela’s flourishing black market also 
illuminates its unintended consequences for commerce, communication, legal 
understandings, imperial loyalties, and colonial identity formation in the province. 
Consider the cases of two captured smugglers that demonstrate the social impact 
of this economic practice.  A Flemish trader named Wilhelm Brundenbrug (identified as 
Guillermo Brundenbrug in the documents) left from nearby Curaҫao in 1731 with a cargo 
of flour, liquor, and other sundries.
1
  His crew of German, Swiss, and Dutch mariners 
hopscotched between several Venezuelan ports on the central coast, unloading this 
merchandise and picking up raw chocolate beans (cacao).  Along with its cargo, 
Brundenbrug’s ship carried an array of cannons, mortars, and small arms for defense in 
case the dangerous and unregulated business of underground exchange became violent.   
Brundenbrug claimed not to know any of the Venezuelans he dealt with on shore.  
Contrabandists frequently made this statement to examining officials.  He admitted to 
leaving a member of his crew with the Venezuelans as collateral assurance of his good 
intentions and probably had never met his fellow traders.  For other smugglers, denying 
                                                 
     
1
 For clarity with the nationalities of historical subjects, I have tried to transcribe Hispanicized names 
from the documents into their appropriate counterparts.  In this example, the smuggler Brundenbrug 
showed up in the documents as “Guillermo Brundenbrug.”  
2 
 
previous contact served as a rhetorical flourish meant to protect merchant networks.  
From the evidence, it is difficult to determine whether the presence of intricate smuggling 
rings or the spontaneous exchange of goods between a plethora of willing trading 
partners more neatly reflected reality along the coast.  Either possibility underscored the 
extent to which contraband trade infiltrated Venezuela in the eighteenth century.     
Brundenbrug’s case also emphasizes the extent to which clandestine commerce 
was a commonplace and necessary practice for both buyer and seller.  He described trade 
between Dutch and Spanish subjects as a “daily” occurrence.  Echoing the words of so 
many other illicit merchants, Brundenbrug confessed that he realized the illegality of his 
actions under Spanish law, but entered into the trade anyway “to make a living” (ganar la 
vida).  Several unlucky zambos (men of mixed African and Indian ancestry) whom 
Spanish coastguard officials captured for trading with Brundenbrug’s men mirrored his 
words with their purchases.  Too poor to afford the fine manufactures of Europe that a 
petty trader like Brundenbrug would not carry anyhow, the zambos bought simple hats to 
shade them from the fierce tropical sun.
 2
     
Like Wilhelm Brundenbrug, Captain Fernando Francisco set off from Curaҫao in 
1730 to turn a profit through the uncertain and mutable profession of smuggling.  
Francisco’s motley crew included an Indian from Bonaire, a Frenchman from Martinique, 
and both white and black Curaҫaoans.  Crew compositions like this were by no means 
abnormal in the early modern Caribbean.  Yet, the transimperial nature of contraband 
                                                 
     
2
 Declaración de Guillermo Brundenbrug, Capitán de la balandra Gullermo Joven.  Puerto de Patanemo, 
abordo el navio San Ygnacio.  July 9, 1731.  Archivo General de Indias (hereafter AGI), Audiencia de 
Santo Domingo, 781. 
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trade probably made for especially varied personnel aboard smuggling ships.  Like 
Brandenbrug’s crew, Francisco’s men traded liquor and small arms in exchange for 
cacao.   
Additionally, the smugglers ferried less-prosaic merchandise to the South 
American mainland: African slaves.  Francisco listed six men and one woman as 
enslaved in his testimony.  All belonged to Curaҫaoan residents.  Aside from the female 
slave, whom the traders clearly brought to sell in Venezuela, the intended destinations of 
the slaves and their legal status under Spanish law once confiscated remained uncertain.  
Francisco noted that the slaves’ owners intended an unspecified number to be sold, 
whereas others were to “be loaned out and earn wages for their masters who permit them 
to sail.” This gray area in distinguishing between enslaved cargo and crew was common 
in Caribbean smuggling.  It nonetheless made for difficult deliberations as to the status of 
slaves in Spanish prize courts.
 3
 
The Spanish American legal system intervened not only in the fates of slaves, but 
also in the lives of clandestine trade’s quotidian participants.  Francisco, Brundenbrug, 
and other captured smugglers in Venezuela and the Spanish Atlantic experienced 
punishments that contradicted the fluidity of on-the-ground commercial relations between 
subjects of different empires.  Spanish officials sentenced Brundenbrug and his crew to 
work without pay on coastguard ships in Spain and transported them across the Atlantic.  
In doing so, authorities ironically put contrabandists to work for the primary operatives of 
                                                 
     
3
 Testimonio de Fernando Francisco, Capitán de la balandra holandesa.  Puerto Cabello. September 6, 





  While prize court judges did not include Francisco and his 
fellow sailors’ punishment in existing court records, sentences for similar offenses over 
the course of the eighteenth century suggest that it was common for smugglers to be 
turned over to massive Spanish convict labor programs on either side of the Atlantic.
 5
  
Some contrabandists built and manned forts in defensive outposts of the New World such 
as Havana, Cartagena, Pensacola or Veracruz.  Others worked in coastguard services in 
Spain or the Caribbean.  Some labored away in the confines of Spain’s arsenals and 
North African presidios.  In all of these occupations, life expectancies were bleak.
6
    
As these two examples illustrate, smuggling touches upon many nodes of 
Atlantic, early-modern, and Caribbean history.  The Brundenbrug and Francisco cases 
alone raise issues of market economics, material culture, the economy of makeshifts, 
inter-imperial violence, race relations and slavery, international law, and criminal justice.  
Still, scholars have conducted surprisingly few serious inquiries into contraband trade.
7
   
 
Sources, Historiographical Currents, and Methodologies  
 
                                                 
     
4
 Auto de Sebastian Garcia de la Torre, Governor of Venezuela.  Caracas.  December 17, 1731.  AGI, 
Santo Domingo, 781. 
     
5
 Expediente sobre prisión de holandeses y penas que se debían imponer a los extrangeros por ilícito 
comercio.  Visto en el Consejo de Indias.  1736-1739.  AGI, Indiferente General, 1829. 
     
6
 Ruth Pike, “Penal Servitude in the Spanish Empire: Presidio Labor in the Eighteenth Century,”  The 
Hispanic American Historical Review 58:1 (Feb., 1978): 29. 
     
7
 Several recent publications have focused specifically on smuggling and contributed much to our 
understanding of the topic.  See Alan L. Karras, Smuggling: Contraband and Corruption in World History 
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010); Thomas M. Truxes, Defying Empire: 
Trading with the Enemy in Colonial New York (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Wim Klooster, 
“Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800,” in Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent 
Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830, ed.  Bernard Bailyn and Patricia L. Denault (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), 141-180; Christian J. Koot, Empire at the Periphery: British Colonists, 
Anglo-Dutch Trade, and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621-1713 (New York: New York 
University Press, 2011). 
5 
 
Understanding the dimensions of “contraband trade” or “smuggling” first requires 
a definition of these murky words.  Wim Klooster’s provides perhaps the clearest 
understanding of smuggling as “the illegal movement of goods across national 
boundaries to evade payment of taxes.”
8
  As Lauren Benton’s work has shown, legal 
pluralism in the early modern world made for different definitions of this socially-
constructed term.
9
  What was smuggling to one empire was simple trade to another.  This 
study focuses on the inter-imperial portion of what the commercial codes of the Spanish 
Empire identified as contraband trade: the movement of any goods back and forth 
between Spanish subjects and foreign traders unlicensed by the Spanish House of Trade 
(Casa de Contratación).  Among the imperial powers of the Americas, Spanish trade law 
figured among the most exclusionary in its stance toward outsiders.   
A reasonable consensus exists among historians of Spanish America that 
smuggling ate away at the fiscal foundations of the Spanish treasury even as it 
invigorated colonial economies and empowered Spain’s Atlantic rivals.
10
  However, 
many surveys of the Spanish commercial system have avoided substantial coverage of 
                                                 
     
8
 Klooster, “Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas,” 141.  
     
9
 Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3-6, 24. 
     
10
 A few major works of Spanish American commercial historiography that agree with this contention 
are Geoffrey J Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700-1789 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1979), ix, 14; Henry Kamen, Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763 (New York: 
Penguin, 2002), 436; John Robert Fisher, The Economic Aspects of Spanish Imperialism in America, 1492-
1810 (Liverpool: Liverpool University, 1997), 72-91; Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, Silver, Trade, 
and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2000), 3-40; Murdo J. MacLeod, Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520-1720  
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008 [1973]), xiii, 348-374; John Lynch, The Hispanic World in Crisis 
and Change, 1598-1700 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 242-264; Kenneth J. Andrien, Crisis and Decline: The 




contraband trade.  The basis for this omission is the difficulty in discerning the volume of 
an illegal practice that was, by its nature, secretive and usually undetected.  Several 
valuable quantitative works have made projections based on records of captured goods or 
the bullion tallies from non-Spanish colonies to discuss smugglings impact on the 
political economy of empires.
11
  This scholarship is inevitably incomplete as it makes its 
estimates from the small number of smugglers caught in the act.  Nonetheless, studies of 
how smuggling altered individual colonial societies are few.
12
   
This dissertation grew out of the historiographical misinterpretation or outright 
exclusion of this lifeblood of the Spanish American economy.  In my initial archive trips, 
I expected to encounter nothing but dry lists of contrabandists and items captured.  
Instead, I found volumes upon volumes of documents cataloguing smugglers’ itineraries, 
contacts, opinions, and loyalties.  These records spoke of violent encounters, rebellion, 
bribery and corruption, but also of cooperation, subaltern agency, geographic mobility, 
and sustained contact across vast distances and empires.  Moreover, like inquisition 
documents, the prosecution of smugglers offered the palpable voice of common people 
                                                 
     
11
 See, for example, Lance Grahn,  The Political Economy of Smuggling: Regional Informal Economies 
in Early Bourbon New Granada (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); Nuala Zahedieh, “The Merchants 
of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655-1692,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 
3
rd
 Ser., 43/4, (Oct., 1986): 570-593; Ramon Aizpurua, Curazao y la costa de Caracas: Introducción al 
estudio del contrabando de la Provincia de Venezuela en tiempos de la Compañía Guipuzcoana, 1730-
1780 (Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1993); Celestino Andrés Araúz Monfante,  El 
contrabando holandes en el Caribe durante la primera mitad del siglo XVIII  2 Vols. (Caracas: Academia 
Nacional de la Historia, 1984); Sergio Villalobos R., Comercio y contrabando en el Río de la Plata y Chile 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1977) 
     
12
 For works that address individual colonial development through smuggling, see Wim Klooster, Illicit 
Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648-1795.  (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998); Linda M. Rupert, 
“Contraband Trade and the Shaping of Colonial Societies in Curaҫao and Tierra Firme.”  Itinerario 30:3 
(2006): 35-54; Zacarias Moutoukias, “Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The Making of the Local 
Administrative Structure in Seventeenth-Century Buenos Aires,” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review, 68:4 (Nov., 1988): 771-801; Maria del Carmen Mena-Garcia, “El contrabando en Santa Marta en 
los inicios del siglo XVIII,” in Homenaje a Dr. Muro Orejón vol. 1 (1979), 215-222. 
7 
 
usually overlooked in the historical record.  The study produced from these records 
examines prize court records of seized shipping, interrogations of contrabandists, 
governmental correspondence, and print material parsed from archives in Venezuela, 
Spain, Colombia, England, and the United States.
13
  It analyzes these sources on their 
own terms, not to determine how much contraband passed back and forth between 
empires, but rather to uncover the social history of ordinary Spanish and non-Spanish 
subjects involved in illicit trade.   
This project also bridges divides between methodological approaches used to 
survey the Caribbean basin.  Recently, historians of the Atlantic World have debated 
whether the history of the Caribbean fits more neatly into the paradigm of Atlantic or 
Imperial history.  Alison Games notes how strange a fit Imperial history is for Caribbean 
colonies that followed development patterns directed by empires, “even while sometimes 
sharing space with a rival power and participating in common regional 
transformations.”
14
  Philip Morgan argues that “it is difficult to think of a more 
appropriate place for a pan-Atlantic, pan-global approach than the Caribbean, since it was 
such a hub on this emerging Atlantic world.”
15
  However, later work by Morgan and Jack 
                                                 
     
13
 In Caracas, Venezuela, I looked at prize court records in the Archivo General de la Nación 
(Venezuela) and the Academia Nacional de la Historia.  In Seville, Spain, I investigated more prize court 
records and imperial correspondence at the Archivo General de Indias.  I took subsequent smaller research 
trips to look at documents pertaining to English smugglers in the National Archives and British Museum in 
London, England and regarding Venezuela’s western border in the Archivo General de la Nación 
(Colombia) in Bogotá, Colombia.  Finally, a one-semester fellowship at the John Carter Brown Library in 
Providence, Rhode Island allowed me to research interesting print sources of cacao and the Caracas 
Company. 
     
14
 Alison Games, “AHR Forum: Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities,” 
American Historical Review 111 (Jul., 2006): 744. 
     
15
 Philip D. Morgan, “The Caribbean Islands in Atlantic Context, circa 1500-1800,” in The Global 
Eighteenth Century, ed. Felicity Nussbaum (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 63. 
8 
 
Greene theorizes that an imperial framework might be better to analyze eighteenth-
century struggles between empires in the Caribbean.  The authors take this stance because 
“much activity occurred within a single imperial entity; illicit trade, smuggling, piracy, 
and venturing across imperial boundaries were the exception, not the norm.”
16
  This 
dissertation contradicts Morgan and Greene’s notions of imperial fixity by demonstrating 
the importance and frequency of transnational contraband trade in the region.  
Far from an exceptional practice, smuggling in the Caribbean offers new insights 
into both Atlantic and Imperial history.  On one hand, illicit trade demonstrated the 
porosity of boundaries separating subjects of the Caribbean basin.  Multinational, 
multiracial crews moved goods between way stations, negotiated local practices, and 
brought merchandise, information, and ideas across borders.  On the other hand, the 
unlucky smuggler’s experience with coastguards, prize courts, and criminal justice in a 




The methodology of this study builds upon Michael Jarvis’s Atlantic concept of 
seeing the world from the deck of a ship.  This metaphorical gaze shifts analysis of 
overarching patterns of transoceanic commerce away from the metropole and onto more 
peripheral shores where networks of traders bought and sold goods.  This perspective is 
valuable for two reasons: First, it privileges the actions of individual traders, who were 
                                                 
     
16
 Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, “Introduction: The Present State of Atlantic History,” in 
Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008): 9. 
     
17
 Trevor Burnard, “Empire Matters? The Historiography of Imperialism in Early America, 1492-1830,” 
History of European Ideas  33:1 (Mar., 2007): 87-107. 
9 
 
for the most part inarticulate and fleeting in the historical record.  The first part of my 
work creates collective biographies of foreign and domestic smugglers as well as corrupt 
officials from many ephemeral documents.  These prosopographies, or collective 
biographies, produce contoured pictures of illicit commerce’s participants that any single 
case would not reveal. Their actions are worthy of study because, as Jarvis acknowledges, 
“individuals, as much as corporations, nation-states, and imperial bureaucracies, 
expanded and integrated the various parts of the Atlantic world into a greater whole.”
18
 
Additionally, looking at maritime commerce and Atlantic history from the deck of 
a ship emphasizes the mechanics of how separate societies traded and overlapped with 
one another.  Records of smuggling reveal what a messy and intricate process extralegal 
commerce was, but also how it brought people of together around a common littoral 
identity separate from the nation-based ones that colonial authorities encouraged them to 
adopt.
19
  Early modern scholars often overlook the “social history of economic practice” 
as Jane Mangan refers to it, in order to understand broad trends in the political economies 
of empires.
20
   
Along the way, they fail to note connections between these far-reaching political 
developments and local contexts.  Kenneth Andrien observes that the historiography of 
Spanish America in particular produces excellent studies of common people at the town 
                                                 
     
18
 Michael J. Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 
1680-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 6. 
     
19
 Here I am borrowing from Michael Pearson’s concept of the “littoral society.”  Pearson makes a 
convincing theoretical case that “there is such a thing as littoral society, that is, that we can go around the 
shores of an ocean, or a sea, or indeed the whole world, and identify societies that have more in common 
with other littoral societies than they do with their inland neighbors.”  Michael N. Pearson, “Littoral 
Society: The Concept and the Problems.” Journal of World History 17:4 (Dec., 2006): 354. 
     
20
 Jane E. Mangan, Trading Roles: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 3. 
10 
 
and regional level that nevertheless struggle “to link their everyday lived experiences to 
broader structural changes occurring in the Atlantic world.”
21
  The second part of my 
study unites these courses of investigation by tracing the impact that smugglers had on 
the slave trade, material culture, and popular protest in Venezuela.   
Contrabandists reshaped global commerce.  Contrary to recent historiography, 
which envisions a progressively more rational and orderly transatlantic economy over the 
course of the eighteenth century, clandestine commerce demonstrates that the formation 
of free trade was a contested, bottom-up process that owed as much to the actions of 
illicit traders in the colonies as to the ideas of metropolitan reformers in Europe.
22
  Thus, 
by focusing on an individual colony and working from the Cis-Atlantic approach outlined 
by David Armitage, this project identifies Venezuela’s place in shaping wider 
developments in the circum-Caribbean.
23
   
  
                                                 
     
21
 Kenneth Andrien, “The Spanish Atlantic System,” in Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Jack 
P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008): 72-73.   
     
22
 For examples of this conception of the budding of an orderly transnational world, see David Hancock, 
Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2009) and Pierre Gervais, “Neither imperial, nor Atlantic: A merchant perspective on international 
trade in the eighteenth century,” History of European Ideas 34 (2008): 465-473. 
     
23
 David Armitage, “Three Concepts of Atlantic History,” in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1850, ed. 
David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 21.  For a monograph 
that uses the Cis-Atlantic perspective successfully see April Lee Hatfield, Atlantic Virginia: Intercolonial 




Figure 1: A Contemporary Map of Venezuela and its Surroundings 
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Map, 1993. 
12 
 
The Venezuelan Context 
 
Venezuela provides an ideal laboratory to study broad, structural shifts in Spanish 
colonial trade.  Paradoxically, Spanish officials allowed the province to grow up outside 
of Spanish trade circuits in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but then imposed 
rigid commercial control in the second quarter of the eighteenth century by making it 
essentially a company colony.  The sudden imperial interest in Venezuelan trade after a 
long period of disregard provides a rich body of documents to study smuggling, conflict, 
and colonial  
From the sixteenth century, imperial officials had written off Venezuela as an 
unproductive backwater with few discernible resources to exploit.  Though the fleet 
system proved to be a generally efficient and incredibly secure means to extract bullion 
from Mexico and Peru, it was entirely inadequate for supplying Spanish American 
inhabitants, particularly in peripheral regions such as Venezuela, with European 
commodities.  The South American galleons regularly bypassed Venezuela’s harbors on 
their way to Cartagena and Panama.  Licensed individual ships from Colombia, Panama, 
and Mexico sold merchants of Caracas second-run goods.  In the latter half of the 
seventeenth century, merchants sent fewer than five ships from Spain directly to 
Venezuela.  Fewer than six vessels embarked for Venezuela from Spain between 1700 
and 1728 and no ship made the return course directly between 1700 and 1721.
24
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With this neglect came an extraordinary degree of governmental self-sufficiency.  
The Council of the Indies shifted the Province of Venezuela (comprising Caracas and 
most of the central coast of the present-day nation) back and forth between the 
Audiencias of Santa Fe and Santo Domingo.  Neither judicial body shared economic 
interests with Venezuelans nor did they interfere much in its affairs.  For most of the 
colonial period, Venezuela did not formally belong to any viceroyalty.  Caracas’s cabildo 
(town council) and the province’s governor were the most powerful political forces in 
Venezuela.  Caracas was the province’s one true city of scale, although its population did 
not reach 20,000 inhabitants until 1800.
25
 
Commercially isolated and politically autonomous, traders in the province 
developed substantial relationships with foreign merchants as least as early as the mid-
seventeenth century.
26
  Just as it was ringed by islands off the coast, Venezuela was 
enmeshed in webs of trade with foreigners.  As much as half of the province’s trade came 
illegally from sources outside of the Spanish Empire.
27
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The growth of European chocolate consumption effectively ended the province’s 
isolation.  Venezuela’s central coast produced and still produces some of the finest cacao 
in the world.  By the last decades of the seventeenth century, chocolate had become a 
widely imported and consumed commodity in Europe.
28
  At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, the central coast experienced an extraordinary cacao boom.  
Haciendas sprang up in previously uninhabited areas.  Cacao producers’ foremost clients 
were not the Spanish, who had entered a period of commercial stagnation, but rather 
Venezuela’s non-Spanish Caribbean neighbors.  The province’s close proximity to Dutch 
Curaҫao (only forty miles separated the colonies) made the Dutch especially close trading 
partners.  Dutch smugglers followed Venezuela’s coastline as they traded European 
goods with materially-deprived locals in exchanged for their valuable cacao.  In the 
words of Pedro José de Olavarriaga, a special envoy of the king to Venezuela and the one 
of the Caracas Company’s first directors, the Dutch “could justly be called the merchants 
of Europe.  They have recognized for a long time that they can derive a handsome profit 
from the anemic trade conducted by the Spanish.”
29
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Venezuela’s cacao boom and the accompanying uptick in foreign smuggling on 
its coasts also spurred Spanish efforts to incorporate the province fiscally and 
administratively into the empire.  After the War of Spanish Succession, the Council of the 
Indies and the Bourbon King Philip V began to take notice of the economic opportunities 
presented by Venezuelan cacao and the increasing notoriety of local smuggling.  More 
than their Hapsburg predecessors, the Bourbon monarchs stressed the enforcement of 
smuggling prohibitions.
30
  A newly formed Basque stock company proposed its plan to 
make Venezuela economically productive to the empire and crackdown on contraband.  
In 1728, the Crown gave a monopoly over the Venezuelan cacao trade with Spain to the 
Real Compañía Guipuzcoana de Caracas (more colloquially known as the Caracas 
Company).  In return for this grant, the Crown expected the Company to supply the 
province with European goods, to provide coastguard patrols that would deter foreign 
interlopers to Venezuelan trade, and to ship
 
a fixed amount of cacao on Venezuelan 
planters’ private accounts (usually around one-third of a ship’s cargo).   
The Spanish prize courts of the central coast of Venezuela immediately witnessed 
a surge in the number of ship seizures for contraband commerce.  The swell in cases 
during these years owed more to the credible enforcement of Spanish trade law for the 
first time in the province than to an uptick in smuggling.  From 1728 until the Company’s 
demise in 1784, and to a lesser extent until independence from Spain, smugglers, 
governors, company employees, and coastguard officials battled and colluded over who 
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would control Venezuelan trade.  They also would do so with a new variety of legal 
merchants. 
The arrival in Venezuela in 1789 of imperial legislation allowing limited free 
trade (comercio libre) between Spanish and Spanish American ports reconfigured various 
aspects of the Venezuelan commercial world.  Legalized and largely unrestricted 
commerce with other regions of the Spanish Empire, as well as a handful of specific 
concessions to trade with foreign colonies, provided merchants with more options for 
conducting licit trade.  The chaotic patterns of late-eighteenth century warfare crippled 
transatlantic Spanish commerce and ensured the proliferation of new forms of smuggling 
in Venezuela.  This illicit commerce displayed a markedly different character than earlier 
illegal inter-imperial exchange in the province.  Comercio libre in 1789 thus forms the 
conclusion of this study. 
 
To a Social History of Contraband Trade 
 
 
 My dissertation will examine the unsettled character of this smuggling society 
through six chapters.  In the first of three prosopographical chapters, this study profiles 
foreign contrabandists trading on the Venezuelan coast.  An in-depth analysis of 
hundreds of cases finds that these shadowy figures came mostly from foreign colonies 
close to Venezuela including Curaҫao, Martinique, Barbados, and Jamaica, but also from 
farther afield in some cases.  Most traders were under thirty and part of multinational, 
multilingual, and sometimes multiracial crews composed of usually less than a dozen 
17 
 
men.  Part of this heterogeneous character sprung from the numerous colonies (some of 
them free ports) that vessels would visit in a single circuit through the region.   
Although they were outsiders to Venezuela, these contrabandists maintained close 
contacts on shore.  They were savvy to local market conditions, customs, languages, and 
coastguard operations.  Insider knowledge of this sort demonstrates the extent to which 
sailors exchanged information in port and formed mutually-beneficial bonds with 
habitual trading partners, but also the important presence of Sephardic Jewish trading 
networks well-versed in Iberian cultural traditions.   
Accounts of foreign merchants also demonstrate that most were petty traders 
looking to make a living.  The names of a few larger merchant houses turn up in 
smuggler interrogations.  Unlike the hierarchical drug smuggling businesses of today, 
illicit exchange in early-modern Venezuela offered egalitarian and entrepreneurial 
opportunities for small-time captains willing to trade on their own account.  
Counterbalancing potential profits were the inherent hazards of coastal violence, wartime 
privateering, coastguard patrols, exile and forced labor.   
 The second chapter of this dissertation considers the other half of illicit 
commercial partnerships: Venezuelan merchants.  Centuries of Crown neglect coupled 
with more recent exclusion from legal trade by Basque Caracas Company employees 
inadvertently encouraged creole traders to develop extralegal commercial relationships 
with foreigners.  Like foreign smugglers, domestic contrabandists were mostly small-time 
traders.  The existence of larger merchant and agricultural estates as well as the Caracas 
Company frequently precluded the participation of more humble businessmen in the 
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lucrative legal cacao trades with Spain and Mexico.  As a result, middling cacao 
producers often traded their harvest directly with outsiders or pooled it with the produce 
of other small planters to exchange with smugglers on the coast.  In return, producers 
received foreign goods that they marked for either personal consumption or introduction 
into Venezuelan markets.  Coastal Venezuelan smugglers of means frequently smoothed 
over legal troubles through their connections with local officials, whereas poorer and less 
influential contrabandists felt the brunt of anti-contraband law enforcement.   
 Chapter three details the role of Spanish colonial officials as facilitators in 
contraband trade.  The means by which these officials of all ranks bypassed trade 
restrictions were numerous and complex.  Authorities might actively smuggle goods 
themselves, participate as shareholders in contraband ventures, communicate directly 
with foreign merchants, or receive bribes to ignore the black market dealings of others.  
Crooked officials used kinship and professional connections to create and sustain 
intricate smuggling rings that spanned multiple empires.   
This chapter emphasizes that corrupt officials and colonial subjects reached a 
social compact regarding smuggling and corruption.  Residents tolerated administrative 
graft related to smuggling when, as a by-product, it served to open ports and markets to 
mutually beneficial trade from abroad.  When officials attempted to monopolize the black 
market or harmed community values in the process of defending their own interests, 
locals used all means at their disposal to expel offending officers.  Ultimately, informal 
agreements between governors and the governed aided smuggling’s diffusion throughout 
the province.   
19 
 
 The second part of this dissertation shifts course away from collective biography 
and toward smuggling’s overall influence on Venezuelan society.  Illicit commerce’s 
impact on the slave trade and Afro-Caribbean labor forms the subject matter of chapter 
four.  People of color were involved in smuggling not only as contraband cargo to 
Venezuela, but also often as active participants in illegal trade.  Venezuelan planters 
frequently sent their slaves to trade with unlicensed foreign merchants.  These traders, in 
turn, sometimes employed their slaves as sailors or porters on smuggling ventures.  For 
slaves and free people of color alike, contraband trade carried the prospects of wage 
earning and greater autonomy in labor, but also the risks of captivity and enslavement in 
Spanish dominions.  The embargo of foreign contraband vessels produced thorny 
questions regarding the freedom or bondage of the slaves aboard.  Illicit slave trading in 
eighteenth century Venezuela underscored the difficulties of determining citizenship and 
property rights across imperial boundaries. 
In chapter five, this study analyzes the material culture of the Venezuelan 
smuggling economy through surveys of both foreign demand for cacao and Venezuelan 
consumption of European goods.  Print sources from the eighteenth century demonstrate 
that Europeans coveted chocolate because of its associations with cultural practices of 
luxury and the Enlightenment and also because of its supposedly medicinal properties.  
For their cacao, Venezuelans received not the exotic items typically associated with illicit 
trade, but rather mundane wares and foodstuffs such as flour, course cloth, liquor, and 
firearms.  Inventories of confiscated contraband suggest both the tremendous inability of 
the Spanish Empire to supply its more marginal colonies with simple trade and the ways 
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that Venezuelans creatively used smuggling to deal with this dearth of subsistence goods.  
Furthermore, court cases of smuggling highlight the importance of women as retail 
distributors of contraband on land. 
 The study’s final chapter builds upon the theme of colonial moral economy in 
chapters three and five to discuss the Rebellion of Juan Francisco de León.  In 1749, 
León, a minor official led a multi-class, multi-racial uprising against the Caracas 
Company that lasted nearly three years and culminated with the temporary expulsion of 
both the governor of Venezuela and the Caracas Company from the capital.  Though this 
rebellion shook the colony’s government to its foundations, it has received little 
historiographical attention from either Hispanophone or Anglophone scholarship.  León’s 
rebellion was linked to dismally low prices paid by the Caracas Company to Venezuelan 
producers for their cacao and the company’s role in closing the colonial safety valve of 
smuggling.  Reacting to these affronts, Venezuelans, along with the military aid of Dutch 
smugglers who sympathized with them, defended communal concepts of economic 
justice and asserted their commercial autonomy nearly sixty years before the struggle for 
independence.  The rebellion illustrates the many ways that contraband trade was an 
integral political force in Venezuela and Spanish America.   
 As the preceding chapter summaries indicate, smugglers smashed open closed 
commercial systems governing the contested and entangled spaces that comprised much 
of the coastal Americas.
31
  In doing so, they also forced both colonies and metropoles to 
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reevaluate their understandings of the colonial relationship vis-à-vis trade.  As creolized 
societies began to create commercial connections that were not dependent on imperial 
Europe for sustenance, they came to understand their economic decisions as their own.  
Even as some members of the imperial chain of command participated in or allowed for 
illicit transactions, European commercial reformers still treated colonies as extractive 
investments.  They never quite grasped the extent to which economic independence had 
bled into the formation of communal and regional self-identities in the colonies.  These 
newfound mental geographies did not reflect the tidy imperial lines drawn on treaty 
maps.  The low-intensity warfare that developed between smugglers and law enforcement 
reflected the failure of locals and imperial bureaucrats to understand each other’s 
positions or to come to a consensus on colonial commercial rights and responsibilities.   
Certainly impediments existed to the free movement of extralegal traders.  The 
constraints of a Caribbean basin split along imperial lines imperiled smugglers who found 
themselves in the clutches of law enforcement officials.  Punishments for the daily 
business of black market exchange were commonly stiffer than the crime warranted.  For 
smugglers of color and enslaved cargos in particular, transcending imperial boundaries 
meant tossing their legal statuses up in the air.  Even when they evaded detection, 
smugglers frequently struggled with the violence inherent in illegal activities.   
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Despite these obstructions, it is remarkable how successful smugglers were as 
transnational brokers and socio-commercial integrators for the neglected communities in 
which they traded.  They crossed legal jurisdictions and entered into risky business 
relationships at a time of incredible warfare and unrest in the Caribbean. Both the 
voyages of interlopers and the punishments visited upon them caused diplomatic 
squabbles between empires.  Even as they infuriated Spanish metropolitan officials, illicit 
traders sated the material needs of the empire’s peripheral regions through their access to 
the broad Atlantic world of goods.  In trading with coastal societies, smugglers (of many 
races) challenged imperial assumptions about labor in the plantation-dominated 
Caribbean.  As a vocation, smuggling provided a mobility and fluidity that imperial 
bureaucrats found subversive.  In their minds, such transience suggested the undermining 
of imperial defense systems and confounded efficient extraction of wealth from the 
colonies.  Ultimately, smuggling in Venezuela deeply influenced the development of the 
colony’s commercial independence from the Spanish mercantile system.  In doing so, 
smugglers also forced colonial subjects to challenge the morality of Spanish trade law 
and ask a fundamental question: why was this vital and natural trade classified as 














Despite the laws and intentions of imperial bureaucrats, coastal Spanish America 
was an international marketplace.  Shoals, coves, and harbors teemed with foreign 
merchants buying the agricultural and mineral bounty of Spanish America in return for 
European finished products unavailable to many Spanish Americans through intra-
imperial trade.  Whereas the Spanish trade fleets provided for the centers of imperial 
power in the Americas (mainly Mexico and Peru), inhabitants of more far-flung imperial 
possessions like Venezuela depended on the illegally-imported wares provided by 
foreigners.  Regional, multi-point, contraband trade shaped the economies and social 
interactions of coastal Venezuelan towns and made their shores a transnational crossroads 
for a motley composition of maritime businessmen.  These smugglers tested the 
boundaries and barriers of mercantilism and internationalized commerce in an empire 
legally closed to outside business. 
 Consider the case of Manuel Michel, a French captain from Martinique accused 
of smuggling.  Spanish coastguard forces captured Michel and his eight crewmen in 
eastern Venezuela in 1768.  The French captain claimed his ship, the Saint Charles, had 
anchored on the coast to make essential repairs before continuing on to Dutch Curaҫao.  
He held licenses from the French colonial government to trade in the Indies, though not 
in Spanish territories.  His vessel transported mostly liquor and a few slaves bound for 
Curaҫao, but it had stopped off already in English Grenada to trade some of its cargo.  




Spanish shores, raised the suspicions of commercial officials that he intended to trade 
illegally with Spanish subjects.  Michel objected to these suppositions, claiming his 
goods never made landfall in the Spanish dominions.  Despite his complaints, Spanish 
authorities confiscated his ship and its cargo.  
The most fascinating part of Michel’s testimony was that he conceived of the 
Caribbean and its surrounding territories as a collection of commercial routes 
independent of national designations.  He argued that Spanish commercial law applied 
only “to the offenses of those subjects bound to the [Spanish] king.”  The Spanish 
coastguard’s liberal interpretation of what constituted Spanish territory impeded his basic 
ability as a businessman “to trade and transport cargo with ease.”  Michel stated that he 
had followed the rules of his sovereign and would be obedient to the laws of his 
destination.  He concluded that it was his compliance with these strictures, not those of 
the lands and seas he passed en route, that truly mattered.
 1
  Within the framework of an 
imperially-divided region, the French captain had asserted his right to navigate and trade 
freely.  The conflict inherent in Michel’s legally-pluralistic view of eighteenth-century 
Caribbean commerce echoes Lauren Benton’s contention that, “colonial rule magnified 
jurisdictional tensions and gave greater urgency and symbolic importance to the task of 
defining the interactions of various legal forums, sources, and personnel.”
2
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Caribbean and Atlantic scholarship still knows very little about men like Michel 
who, through their illicit voyages, blurred the neat cartographic lines demarcating 
empires.  Historians have explored the social and economic dimensions of fleet systems, 
large merchant firms, and transatlantic sailing.
3
  Yet, as Michael Jarvis points out for the 
English maritime historiography, “we know much more about British and Anglo-
American mariners involved in transatlantic trade than about the thousands of Anglo-
American mariners and entrepreneurs who animated the equally important coastal 
trades.”
4
  This statement also could be applied to a whole host of seafaring petty traders, 
peddlers, and inter-American merchants who dealt with the Spanish Empire.  Even more 
to the point, studies of contraband trade in Spanish America often subordinate the social 
history of smugglers themselves to the political and economic consequences of their 
actions.
5
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This chapter profiles foreign smugglers who served as the sinews and bone of 
coastal commerce in Venezuela and, by association, most of Spain’s maritime 
peripheries.  Their occupation sprung not only from Spanish American material want, but 
also their own socioeconomic circumstances.  Smuggling represented one of several 
maritime professions open to men who were neither masters nor slaves and who thus 
struggled to find their place within the plantation complex that came to dominate the 
Caribbean.  Contraband trade provided economic opportunity and occupational stability 
against marginalization.  Nevertheless, the inherent commercial contradictions between 
rapidly globalizing free trade and age-old mercantilism in eighteenth-century imperial 
economies left illicit traders in a legal no-man’s-land.   
To reconstruct the lives of notoriously secretive foreign smugglers, this study uses 
the methodological approach of a prosopography, or collective biography.  The dearth of 
documentation on contrabandists has caused historians to shy away from studying the 
trade in general.  Obviously, many clandestine traders moved through the Spanish Empire 
undetected and therefore never appeared in colonial records.  Even when captured, illicit 
traders often divulged as little as possible about themselves and their associates or 
cloaked their true circumstances and intentions in well-worn deceptions.  Political 
scientists Itty Abraham and Willem Van Schendel contend that highly mobile people like 
smugglers “often appear in social theory as obscure, fleeting figures, as peripheral social 




into neat representations of social reality.”
6
  Recovering the stories of individual 
smugglers proves challenging.   Examined as a group, however, their testimonies reveal 
patterns in the motivations, itineraries, working conditions, and socioeconomic statuses 
of crucial imperial go-betweens.   
This chapter breaks its investigation of foreign contrabandists into four analytical 
sections.  First, it dissects the practice of smuggling.  Contrabandists’ tricks, networks, 
and common procedures for carrying out their business reveal both their expertise and 
their understanding of Spanish commercial enforcement mechanisms in Venezuela.  The 
second section contemplates what sort of person became a smuggler.  Though clandestine 
foreign merchants maintained, at best, ambivalent relationships with the imperial goals of 
their home nations, they generally shared common bonds of religion, age, and class.  The 
smuggler’s trials and tribulations with the Spanish American criminal justice system 
comprise a third analysis.  Arrest, trial, sentencing, and a range of punishments for 
contrabandists dramatized the fact that, despite its ubiquity, inter-imperial commerce still 
constituted a highly illegal economic practice in the Spanish colonies.  Finally, a final 
section examines how illicit trade precipitated sporadic, but long-lasting violence in 
coastal waters as smugglers and coastguards sought to avenge each other’s raiding.         
More than a portrait of one occupational group in the early modern world, the 
social study of smugglers offers a different vantage point on colonial history.  Stories of 
multinational, polyglot crews and foreign prisoners shuttled all over the Spanish 
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dominions do not fit into the traditional historiographical narrative of separate, mutually 
exclusive imperial societies.  In such histories, smugglers and their deeds factor in only as 
poorly understood outliers.  As political scientists Itty Abraham and Willem Van 
Schendel contend, highly mobile people like smugglers “often appear in social theory as 
obscure, fleeting figures, as peripheral social actors with a lowly status in the world 
order, and as faceless outsiders who fit imperfectly into neat representations of social 
reality.”
7
  It is time to reevaluate these individuals’ contribution to colonial development 
and disintegration.  Beyond the reach of metropolitan policy makers, small-time but well-
connected contrabandists provided material comfort for themselves and Spanish 
America’s neglected provinces while they sewed together dominions that mercantilism 
sought to keep apart.  The common and ordinary maritime foundations of free trade arose 
from their voyages.     
 
The Practices and Networks of Smuggling 
 
 
A skilled smuggler tracing the coastlines of Spanish America had innumerable 
methods to bend and break Spanish commercial law.  The range of practices and routes 
employed by illicit traders was truly astounding.  The word “smuggler” brings to mind 
ingenious criminals slipping like cat burglars past border guards and customs officials.  
Certainly, covert activity of this kind comprised the lion’s share of unlicensed trade.  But 
these underground rendezvouses marked only one of many strategies concocted between 
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foreign sellers and Spanish American buyers to exchange goods in eighteenth-century 
Venezuela.  In addition to stealth, the art of smuggling relied on veniality, deception, 
necessity, and apathy.  Whether they trafficked their illegal merchandise furtively or with 
the discreet consent of law enforcement officers, foreign contrabandists in Venezuela 
relied on wide-ranging networks of foreign and Spanish commercial contacts in 
Venezuela and throughout the Caribbean to stock their inventories, facilitate safe 
passage, and serve as willing trading partners.     
No matter how many trusted associates they amassed, most contrabandists still 
sold their wares in quiet coves, out-of-the-way beaches, and shallow anchorages, often 
under the cover of night.  The experiences of Captain Louis Lagarene and his crew 
followed this example.  Lagarene led a trading expedition to Venezuela on behalf of an 
important Curaҫaoan merchant in 1763.  The trader, a Dutch Jew named Abraham 
Henrique Morón, furnished Lagarene with a passport from the governor of Curaҫao and a 
letter introducing him to a Venezuelan commercial contact named Miguel de Acosta 
Andrade.
8
  Captain Lagarene’s instructions called for him to bring the ship and European 
consumer goods belonging to Morón to the Venezuelan coast.  Lagarene would find 
Acosta Andrade, barter the goods for his mules, and then ship the mules to French 
Martinique.  When they returned to Curaҫao, the crew would divvy up profits from the 
sale of the mules with Morón.   
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Unfortunately for the crew, events did not go as planned.  Though they made the 
voyage safely from Curaҫao to the Venezuelan coast, they could not find Acosta 
Andrade.  They spent almost three months searching for their contact in vain.  
Nonetheless, they eventually managed to barter some of their cargo with two Spanish 
merchants for a handsome sum of cacao.  They returned to Curaҫao with the cacao only 
to be told by Morón that he would not receive them until they had made the agreed-upon 
transactions with Acosta Andrade.  Morón ordered them to pick up more consumer goods 
on the Dutch island of Bonaire and again go looking for the Venezuelan.  After the 
stopover in Bonaire, they ran short of fresh water and had to re-provision on shore in the 
small inlet of Unare in eastern Venezuela.  After three days there, the Spanish coastguard 
detected the Curaҫaoan smugglers and took their ship by force.
9
 
The Lagarene voyage emphasizes that covert operations were both vital to the 
fulfillment of daily trade in the Caribbean basin and fraught with potential legal conflict.  
The Dutchmen provided Venezuelan subjects with much needed material goods and a 
market for their cacao.  Their actions were also highly illegal.  According to Spanish 
commercial statutes, the Dutchmen were guilty of trespassing into Spanish territory, 
associating and bartering with Spanish subjects, and exporting Spanish cacao.  Though 
they held a Dutch passport, much of their trade took place outside of the protection of 
Dutch mercantile law.   
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Effective smugglers worked discretely to avoid these legal snafus and did so with 
a regularity that made their actions seem ordinary.  Lagarene’s crew might have 
continued their travels unimpeded had not the need for freshwater made them easy prey 
for coastguard boats.  After all, by the time of their arrest, they had made two trips to the 
Spanish mainland.  During the better part of three months, they had explored the coast for 
Acosta Andrade and surreptitiously traded without detection.  Avoiding capture required 
skills and elusiveness that Lagarene and his crew clearly possessed.  And yet, the 
mundane way in which the captured Dutch sailors discussed an itinerary that would have 
required them to navigate Dutch, Spanish, and French commercial conventions suggests 
that they perceived nothing uncommon in this type of shadowy, multi-imperial exchange.  
Even when their commercial contact failed to materialize, Lagarene confidently 
improvised.  He arranged substitute trading partners to salvage some profit from the 
voyage.  Only factors beyond his control led to the crew’s capture. 
The mix of hazard and ease embodied by this kind of smuggling astounded 
Franҫois DePons, an early nineteenth-century French traveler to Venezuela.  Breaking 
down the various modes of illicit exchange, DePons described the covert and unassisted 
smuggling practiced by men like Lagarene as the most difficult and demanding.  The 
practice required its participants “to unload the contraband on a part of the coast distant 
from frequented ports, and to carry the merchandises by land, to the place of their 
destination.  This method, more decided and direct…is also the most dangerous.  A risk is 
hazarded, not only of being taken by the guards, but of suffering damages more or less 




and came to view them “as prodigies.”
10
  As the traveler’s depictions made clear, some 
contrabandists either could not count on or chose not to accept the helping hand of 
corrupt officials.  Fearing the shifting fortunes of life in a coastal no-man’s-land, these 
men had good reason to aim for remote harbors.       
Of course, backwater trading comprised just one implement in the smuggler’s 
toolkit.  In many instances, commercial interlopers entered more-traveled ports with the 
tacit endorsement of local authorities.  Although officially-assisted smuggling involved 
an infinite number of variations, the three most common practices were: 1. allowing a 
smuggler to make landfall under the guise of maritime exigencies such as ship repairs, 
watering, and provisioning 2. ignoring a foreign merchant’s entrance into port (usually 
for a bribe or kickback)  3. pretending to detain a contrabandist, while at the same time 
arranging for the private sale of his merchandise.   
The practice of superfluously seeking provisions and repairs was often the easiest 
of the three ruses to carry out, since it could be employed with or without official 
cognizance and participation.  Captain Philip Jongh, a Dutchman, was among seven 
sailors who left Curaҫao in 1760 to trade in Grenada.  According to their testimonies, a 
broken rudder and navigational mishaps forced the men toward Margarita Island, off the 
coast of Venezuela, in search of fresh water and a place to repair their ship.  Had they not 
been pursued by the Spanish coastguard, the men testified that they would have sought 
permission from the governor of Margarita to unload goods, fix their ship and replenish 
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water supplies.  An inventory of the Dutch ship revealed it to be full of clothes, meat, 
bacon, butter, flour, and wine.
11
  Numerous declarations of smugglers caught in the 
Spanish net include similarly questionable and convenient emergencies.   
Though bribery and feigned capture were somewhat less common in the historical 
record (as these tactics tended to implicate the very Spanish bureaucrats who might be 
writing these accounts), smugglers still used them often enough.  The journal of Thomas 
Kinder, a British merchant in Buenos Aires in the first decade of the nineteenth century, 
offered a contrabandist’s point of view on bribery and other duplicitous interactions with 
Spanish officials.  Kinder confessed that “a prudent smuggler always carries twenty or 
thirty onza’s in his pocket to provide against unforeseen incidents.  When the expence of 
bribing all the nest of hornets is considered… it cannot be wondered that so few have 
escaped total loss.”
12
  Myriad investigations into corruption in the Spanish bureaucracy, 
which will be the focus of Chapter Four, reveal the similarities between Kinder’s 
observations and the practices of eighteenth-century smugglers on the Venezuelan coast.   
Administratively-assisted smuggling might even involve some mix of all three 
tactics.  Pére Labat, the French Jesuit chronicler who crisscrossed the Caribbean aboard 
numerous vessels in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries explained as much in 
his memoirs.  Labat instructed in his readership that,  
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if you wish to enter one of their ports to trade, you say that you are short of water, 
fuel, or victuals, or that you have a split mast, or a leak which cannot be plugged 
without removing the cargo.  An officer is sent to explain all these things to the 
Governor, and, by giving him a good present, makes him believe what you wish 
him to believe.  His officers can be made blind in the same way if necessary, and 
then permission is granted to enter the port and unload the ship in order to repair 
her.  All formalities are carefully observed.  A seal is placed on the door of the 
warehouse by which the cargo is brought in, but equal care is taken that there is 
another door left unsealed by which it is taken out at night, and replaced by cases 
of indigo, cochenille, vanilla, cacao, tobacco, etc., and silver in bars and specie.  
As soon as this has been done one finds the mast repaired, the leak plugged, and 
the ship ready to sail.
13
   
 
Clearly, as long as illicit traders and Spanish bureaucrats followed the minimum protocol 
to provide the latter with an air of plausible deniability, any number of creative 
deceptions could facilitate illegal trade.    
 Even without bureaucratic support, willing Spanish accomplices might help 
foreign smugglers to cloak illicit trade in the guise of legal commerce.  As many 
contrabandists were well-connected in the Spanish and Spanish-American merchant 
communities, they often piggybacked their illicit items on top of legitimate shipments or 
activities.  Foreigners bought a place for their goods aboard legal vessels.  Permits for 
cargo space aboard individually-licensed register ships typically were sold to the highest 
Spanish bidder in seventeenth-century Seville.  Dutch traders would then pay off Spanish 
merchants to take on fictitious ownership of the Dutch businessmen’s goods.  The 
merchandise made its way successfully across the Atlantic under the names of royally-
permitted Spanish traders, but most of the profits cycled back to the original foreign 
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  Both English and French interlopers successfully co-opted Spanish 
merchant activities aboard the great Spanish trade fleets as well.
15
  In the early eighteenth 
century, French privateers tasked with policing Spanish waters against pirates even used 




In Venezuelan coastal waters, this ambiguity between licit and illicit commerce 
took the form of foreign smugglers employing Spanish subjects as middlemen.  These 
prácticos as they were called often proved to be experienced coastal traders whose 
business coastguard patrols might construe as legal.  In the second half of the eighteenth 
century, Spanish free trade decrees, which allowed for limited licensed trade between 
Spanish colonies, provided additional cover for Spanish sailors and merchants to roam 
around the Caribbean basin.
17
  During this period, frequent shortages of basic provisions 
due to war also forced Venezuelan officials to send merchants to nearby foreign islands 
in search of foodstuffs.  Clandestine trade bloomed out of these missions of necessity. 
Spanish authorities suspected Salvador Rexat, a Catalan trader working out of 
Guyana, of committing such offenses.  Coastguard forces stopped Rexat’s vessel off the 
coast of Guyana to perform a routine inspection.  On board they found various 
unregistered goods in the hold including several barrels of gunpowder, two pairs of new 
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boots, and a few barrels of liquor cleverly hidden in the ship’s water stores.
18
  According 
to Rexat, he had left French Martinique with the intent of purchasing Venezuelan cattle 
for the French and bringing back salted meats and other sundry foodstuffs from 
Martinique for the Spanish residents of Guayana.  He defended the sparse and peculiar 
contents of his ship’s cargo by explaining that the French provisioning official with 
whom he worked required Venezuelan cattle before he would send any products to 
Guayana.  The French provided the gunpowder to ward off privateers, the boots as a 
personal gift from the provisioning official to his Spanish counterpart, and the liquor to 
sate the crew.  Rexat even claimed that he had hidden the spirits so that the crew would 
not abuse them.  Although Spanish authorities conceded that he had official permission to 
travel to the French colony, they doubted the sincerity of his intentions given that he had 
arrived in a French sloop, produced no papers of sale, and offered only a French letter of 
passage.
19
  Though he eventually released him, a prize court judge confiscated and 
auctioned off as contraband the contents of Rexat’s sloop.
20
   
Given their insider knowledge of coastal geography and Spanish coastguard 
tendencies, prácticos were valuable assets.  Foreign traders employed them to guide 
vessels passing anywhere near potentially-guarded Venezuelan shores.  Prácticos 
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sometimes made payments or bribes in advance of foreigners’ visits to the coast.
21
  Dutch 
traders recruited one práctico, a Havana native named Francisco Javier de Rosa, in 1763 
to ferry Venezuelan cacao and mules from a contested spit of land off the coast known as 
Isla de Aves to Curaҫao.
22
  Unlike the French who commissioned Salvador Rexat, Rosa’s 
employers could not claim the veneer of legitimate business.  Nevertheless, both trading 
interests depended on their Spanish middlemen for secure passage.   
For cautious and well-to-do smugglers and traders, a safer tactic than hiring a 
middleman was simply staying at home and waiting for Spanish merchants to come to 
them.  In the second half of the eighteenth century, a group of decrees opened up English, 
French, and Dutch ports in the Caribbean to regulated trade with foreign merchants who 
frequented them.  So as not to damage the shipping and mercantile systems of these 
empires, the laws permitted to varying degrees the importing and exporting of certain 
enumerated products in the free ports.
23
  The rise of such sanctioned trading entrepȏts led 
to an influx of Spanish buyers visiting from the South American mainland and Caribbean 
islands.  The frequent lack of Spanish imperial permission to anchor in these ports did not 
diminish the traders’ appetite for outside goods.   
Foreign colonial administrators nurtured this easy strategy for black-market 
commerce with Spanish subjects.  British overseas officials’ attempts to encourage 
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Spanish merchants to trade illegally by bypassing Spanish commercial law on their 
shores illustrate how profitable these transactions were for British merchants.  As early as 
1715, the governor of Barbados advocated opening the island to Spanish traders in order 
to pry Caracas cacao sales away from Martinique, where Spanish subjects arrived in 
droves.
24
  In 1734, royal officials continued to voice Barbadians’ demands to allow 
Spanish cacao merchants onto the island without hassle.
25
  Jamaica became a free port in 
1766 mostly to resuscitate trade with Spanish smugglers after the British capture of 
Havana in 1762 led to a ten-month trade fair that glutted Spanish markets with British 
goods.
26
  Further north, the island of Bermuda asked to be made a free port in 1783 so 
that Spanish merchants could openly purchase British slaves and goods in return for 
cacao, indigo, and cash.
27
   
By the end of the eighteenth century, one British admiral documented a practice 
carried out by British officials to help Spanish merchant interests trade in British 
Caribbean harbors.  British ships distributed letters of passage from British governors to 
La Guaira (Caracas’s port), Havana and other Spanish ports.  Though the documents bore 
the governors’ signatures, they left blank information about the vessels, crew, and 
captains.  After Spanish merchants filled in these carte blanche letters, the papers 
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protected them and their cargo from the risk of British seizure.
28
  For British colonial 
interests and increasingly those of the Dutch and French, the gains of commercial 
integration produced by their smugglers’ interaction with Spanish traders outweighed the 
security of isolationism.      
As the previous discussion of smuggling methods and tactics has elucidated, 
contrabandists lived and died based on the networks they cultivated.  Although the lone 
wolf smuggler could find occasional success in ferrying goods across imperial lines 
without much in the way of contacts, sustained success demanded an array of foreign and 
domestic allies.  Not all of a contrabandist’s acquaintances would be longstanding and 
familiar.  Smugglers met some of their fellow traders and corruptible Spanish 
administrators for the first time when bartering with or bribing them.  Yet even in these 
cases, buyers, sellers, and facilitators established trust relationships that encouraged 
future transactions.   
There is much the historian cannot know about these conglomerations.  
Particularly for illicit trade, the source material presents problems of brevity, omission, 
and credibility.  Still, the testimonies of captive merchants in a foreign land represent an 
entry point for reconstructing such webs of commerce.  The empire that judged these 
people saw them as common criminals to be processed through the legal system, not as 
subjects worthy of detailed and recurrent study.  Thus the vast majority of individual 
illicit peddlers appear just once in the historical record.  Moreover, unlike legitimate 
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businessmen, contrabandists kept few if any bills of sale or written correspondence, as 
these documents would be damning evidence in the event of their capture.  Smugglers 
were also understandably reticent to reveal their contacts.  Divulging this information 
engendered the perception that the accused were habitual smugglers and could increase 
the severity of their punishments.  Furthermore, offering details of the trade could 
endanger a smuggler’s acquaintances or future contrabandists plying the same routes.   
Notwithstanding the perceptual limitations posed by these court room 
proceedings, smugglers’ accounts allow for fleeting glimpses of criminalized commercial 
connections that sustained the economies of contested imperial spaces.  Sociologists Joel 
Podolny and Karen Page elegantly define a network as “any collection of actors…that 
pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same times, 
lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise 
during the exchange relationships.”
29
  A prosopographical approach to the brief and 
cagey declarations of inter-imperial contrabandists illuminates their networks with other 
foreign businessmen and with Spanish subjects in Venezuela.   
 For a foreign smuggler to thrive in the transnational Caribbean, he had to cultivate 
relationships with other non-Spanish merchants.  Attaining the right mix of goods for 
illicit importation into Spanish America sometimes required leaving one’s home port and 
ranging farther afield.  Even without the threat of Spanish coastguard forces, inter-
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imperial venturers confronted constraints on their freedom of movement posed by war, 
shifting imperial alliances, privateers, and pirates.  Contacts in foreign harbors helped to 
minimize risk.   
Securing passports and letters of passage from multiple empires and ports helped 
avoid harassment and testified to a smuggler’s influence over merchants and officials.  
One Canary Islander captured near Cumaná in eastern Venezuela in 1762 had passports 
from Dutch Curaҫao and what was then English Guadaloupe.  The smuggling captain and 
his multinational crew all confessed to undertaking the journey between the two islands 
multiple times on short trading voyages.  Their claims that the British had forced them 
into this trade after capturing them and holding their original papers hostage failed to 
convince Spanish officials.  The presence of English and Dutch papers implied the 
traders’ willingness and familiarity with transnational trade.
30
  
In other cases, a suspected smuggler’s personal ties to foreign dominions betrayed 
his guilt.  For Francisco Javier de Rosa, the Dutch-employed Spanish middleman 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, family relationships were particularly damning 
evidence.  Rosa, a sailor from Havana, had married a Dutch woman in Curaҫao.
31
  
Though the particular circumstances of Rosa’s marriage remain unknown, his legal 
attachment to his wife and the colony probably encouraged Dutch businessmen to trust 
his loyalty.  The governor of Venezuela seemed convinced of Rosa’s Dutch allegiances, 
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sentencing him to four years of service in the king’s fortifications at Puerto Cabello in 
Venezuela.
32
    
Once a smuggler had used his contacts in foreign and domestic ports to put 
together cargo and crew, he then turned to Venezuelan associates to mitigate the 
complications of Spanish mercantile restrictions.  Routine trading partners helped foreign 
contrabandists maximize the efficiency of their voyages.  While some ships trawled the 
coast haphazardly searching for willing buyers and sellers, this type of strategy increased 
exposure to coastguard ships and militias.
33
  The well-connected illicit merchant sought 
security by reaching out to his connections on land.  John Campbell, an English merchant 
who wrote of his experiences with clandestine commerce throughout Spanish America, 
described an orderly signaling process between ship and shore after which a “long-boat 
was sent off well manned, brought the merchants on board with their money, and carried 
them back with their goods.”
34
  In Venezuela, several smuggling cases referenced signals 
exchanged either by torchlight or by cannon blasts.
35
  This communication implied 
previous organization by parties that recognized each other.   
                                                 
     
32
 Sentencia por Gobernador y Capitán General Don José Solano.  Caracas.  May 26, 1764.  AGNV, 
Compañía Guipuzcoana, Tomo XIII, f. 194. 
     
33
 Linda Rupert writes that smuggling required “extensive preparations, a high degree of coordination 
and communication between all parties involved, clear planning as to the site and time of the encounter, 
and a certain degree of mutual confidence between the participants.”  My own sense is that contraband 
trade could be somewhat more spontaneous than Rupert concedes.  Numerous cases discuss smugglers 
following the coast aimlessly looking for buyers.  Linda M. Rupert, “Contraband Trade and the Shaping of 
Colonial Societies in Curaҫao and Tierra Firme.”  Itinerario 30:3 (2006): 39.   
     
34
 John Campbell, The Spanish Empire in America…By an English Merchant (London: Printed for M. 
Cooper, 1747 [1741]), 313-314, Found at The John Carter Brown Library (hereafter JCB). 
     
35
 Información de Gabriel Amengual.  Puerto Cabello.  September 17, 1733.  AGNV, Comisos, Tomo 
XIV, f. 155-156; Auto. de Louis Lagarene, Capt. de “La Catharina” 49, Abraham Pineda, Escribano, 45, 
marineros Juan Lorenzo Cristián y Jacobo de Varas, 22.  Caracas.  November 29, 1763.  AGNV, Compañía 




A desire to maintain plausible deniability with authorities meant that in many 
instances, contrabandists established recurring trading arrangements with Spanish 
subjects without learning much about them beyond their physical appearance.  When 
asked to reveal his Venezuelan accomplices, one illegal trader offered a few names, but 
also declared that all identities were kept secret unless a Venezuelan came aboard a 
foreign ship.  Thus, for the purposes of accountability, foreign businessmen might force 
Venezuelan middlemen actually performing transactions to identify themselves, but 
permit the owners of larger cargos, who employed these small peddlers, to remain 
unnamed.   
For a Dutchman known as Jan Bislick testified in 1761 to trading with 
Venezuelans “of all kinds (calidades) whom we did not know” in several locales around 
eastern Venezuela.
36
  If taken at face value, Bislick’s statement implies that coastal 
inhabitants were incredibly amenable to illicit trading, even with unconnected smugglers.  
However, given that Bislick found himself the captive of a prize court, his testimony may 
have been a concerted strategy to downplay his familiarity with the coast and keep his 
trading contacts away from further scrutiny.  Either possibility demonstrates that 
foreigners and Spanish subjects formed and renewed plentiful transnational connections 
in Venezuela.   
 This is not to say that all relationships between foreign and Venezuelan smugglers 
were friendly.  Conflicts arose from these business affiliations.  The criminal nature of 
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contraband partnerships added to their volatility.  In 1734, for example, one middleman 
working for the Dutch stabbed a Venezuelan merchant to death in his own home.  His 
impetus to murder the Venezuelan was an unpaid debt of twenty pesos.
37
  Close networks 
of trade and credit clearly had the capacity to endanger, as well as enrich, those involved 
in the black market.      
Acquaintances with corruptible Spanish imperial administrators also paralleled 
and enriched the connections that foreign smugglers developed with Venezuelan buyers.  
The entangled worlds of corrupt bureaucrats will be discussed more fully in Chapter 
Four.  Here though, it is important to note that royal officials represented yet another 
sphere of influence that the prosperous smuggler needed to cultivate.   
In studying contraband in eighteenth century Brazil, Ernst Pijning repositions the 
colonial officer not as a rigid boundary between legal and illegal trade, but rather as a 
permeable membrane that allowed some smuggling into his realms and rejected other 
ventures.  According to Pijning, “authority over ports was related to the opportunity for 
local administrators to act as intermediaries in commercial transactions.”  By the 
eighteenth century, illicit commerce had become so normalized in the overall patterns of 
exchange in the Americas that only the naïve or deluded official believed it could be 
completely halted.  Instead, Pijning believes most authorities separated illicit business 
into two groups: that which they informally-sanctioned and that which was completely 
outside of their control.
38
  Illicit traders operating in the former category got to know 
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local officials and paid for their administrative neglect.  In contrast, smugglers who did 
not curry favor with port authorities might encounter vigilant opposition.   
Though occasional imperial oversight could upset these arrangements 
temporarily, on the whole foreigners viewed many Spanish officials as dependable 
trading allies.  For example, the royal high court of appeals (audiencia) of New Granada 
prosecuted a local lieutenant of Maracaibo named Juan Gregorio de Oliveres in 1774 for 
abetting smuggling.  Oliveres’s specific crime involved, at the request of Spanish 
subjects, the distribution of captured foreign products among the community in return for 
cash.
39
  Oliveres’s actions not only disregarded official protocol regarding embargoed 
goods, they also performed the work of smugglers by proxy.  Despite Oliveres’s 
misfortune, bureaucratic prosecution of this sort occurred infrequently.  In general, 
foreign smugglers depended on reliably corruptible Spanish coastal authorities and 
followed the advice of British smuggler Thomas Kinder that, “to prevent your vessel 




Who Were the Smugglers?   
 
 
The identities of inter-imperial smugglers were every bit as intricate and 
enigmatic as the tactics and networks they deployed in practicing their trade.  As the 
above cases have implied, contrabandists came from a transnational, multi-racial, and 
multi-ethnic lot of seafarers.  In describing non-Spanish smugglers, legal records first 
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demarcated their nationality.  After all, their first crime involved being an unlicensed 
foreigner in the Spanish colonies.  Following this notation, Spanish American scribes 
often noted the race and religion of the defendants.  Yet, in many ways, the occupational 
identity of “smuggler” formed a more common denominator than any of these categories.  
Smuggling represented one of a series of maritime professions that sustained large 
populations of rootless sailors in the eighteenth-century Caribbean.  The interests of 
itinerant contrabandists sometimes overlapped with those of the large merchant houses 
and imperial projects of the Dutch, English, and French.  However, it would be difficult 
to label the truly international crews that plied the waters of coastal Venezuela as 
representatives of any empire or company.  Most entered the trade on their own account 
as a flexible way to make a living in the turbulent Caribbean basin  
Certainly, demarcated nationalities shaped the experiences and working routines 
of non-Spanish illicit traders.  Their business flourished because legal boundaries 
separated mutually willing merchant interests.  Furthermore, the conditions and 
circumstances of their profession changed with war, peace treaties, alliances, and trading 
agreements between empires.  In general, most Dutch, English, and French traders shared 
their nations’ desire to consolidate trading posts and toeholds in the Antilles that their 
seventeenth century predecessors had snatched from the Spanish.  Most clandestine 
merchants also hoped to break open, whether by legal or illegal means, the declared 
Spanish monopoly on trade with New Spain, Central America, and Tierra Firme.  Beyond 




Dutch participation in Venezuela’s black market provides some sense of where 
imperial and individual merchant aims overlapped.  The Dutch were indisputably the 
largest player in Venezuela’s clandestine economy due to Curaҫao’s proximity to the 
Spanish possession.
41
  Dutch legal permissiveness regarding smuggling and the 
proficiency of Dutch shipping also accounted for this dominance.
42
  As one mid-
eighteenth-century Spanish observer acknowledged, “the commercial genius of the Dutch 
is their entire means of subsistence.”
43
   
As there were few distinctions made in Dutch colonial law between legal and 
illegal trade, the activities of their smugglers tended to define their nation’s imperial 
agenda more than was the case with others.  From the beginning of its colonization of the 
Antilles, the Dutch West India Company (WIC) had set an aggressive, even warlike tone 
for its trading enterprises.  It licensed merchants going to the Spanish mainland, but also 
privateers, as an entry into territorial conquest.  When the first WIC disbanded in 1674, 
the Dutch Republic converted its approach in the Americas from one of colonial 
domination to an internationalist perspective on trade.  The Dutch became the 
Caribbean’s premier short-haul traders.
44
  One Dutch merchant in 1747 described this 
                                                 
     
41
 From ship seizures carried out by the Caracas Company that he has reviewed, Ramon Aizpurua 
concludes that 46% of contraband ships were Spanish, 41% were Dutch, 5% were English, 6% were 
French, and 2% were Danish.  Aizpurua, Curazao y la costa de Caracas, 221. 
     
42
 Wim Klooster, Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648-1795 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 
1998), 16. Wim Klooster, “Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800” in Soundings in Atlantic 
History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Patricia L. 
Denault (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009): 154-159 
     
43
 Joseph Jumilla, El Orinoco ilustrado, y defendido… por sus dichas missiones, y provincial (Madrid: 
Por Manuel Fernandez, Impressor de el Supremo Consejo de la Inquisicion, y de la Reverenda Camara 
Apostolica en la Caba Baxa, 1745), 383,  JCB. 
     
44
 Cornelius Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580-1680 (Gainesville: 




short-haul trade as the wedge that might pry open Spanish markets to international 
commerce.  Moreover, he reasoned that the Spanish imperial government should 
welcome the merchants they now called smugglers.  Without their commercial activities 
“the Spanish colonies would decay completely, whereas right now they are subsisting and 
even flourishing from this vigorous system.”
45
   
Dutch officials and smugglers alike shared the belief that by provisioning trade-
starved Venezuela and other neglected Spanish dominions, the Dutch Empire could 
function as these territories’ surrogate imperial parent.  The French traveler Franҫois 
Depons noted that whereas Spanish legitimate trade often ignored Venezuelan needs, 
Dutch smugglers were “careful to keep this market always well supplied with 
merchandise suitable to the Spaniards.”
46
  Dutch attention to Venezuelan commerce led 
Andrés Bello, the early nineteenth-century intellectual and historian of Venezuela, to 
describe Puerto Cabello, where the Dutch had been most active in the eighteenth century, 
as “condemned to appear for a long time as a dependency of Holland more than a Spanish 
property.”
47
    
Conversely, these designs for economic re-appropriation sometimes reached too 
far, splitting apart the interests of Dutch colonial administrators and clandestine 
traffickers.  The violence practiced by smugglers in the course of criminalized trading 
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and during retributive assaults on coastguard forces lacked official sanction and caused 
friction in Hispano-Dutch relations.  The establishment of an unofficial Dutch colony in 
Tucacas, a sparsely-inhabited spit of land in western Venezuela, added to this animosity.  
On their own accord, smugglers set up this entirely illegal settlement.  It became a way 
station from which sailors shipped newly-arrived Venezuelan cacao, tobacco, and hides 
to Curaҫao.
48
  According to one Spanish merchant, the smugglers exchanged goods in 
Tucacas “with such liberty that it was as if they were in their own dominions.”
49
   
Though Dutch officials did not wish to punish those who enriched imperial trade, 
they knew that the settlers could make no legal claim to rightful possession of a 
settlement that clearly existed on the Spanish mainland.  Additionally, they knew that 
such an illegal site ran counter to maintaining peace in the waterways separating the 
mainland from Dutch possessions.  Dutch authorities could only watch while successive 
Spanish raiding parties decimated the post during the mid-eighteenth century.
50
  Dutch 
smugglers also diverged from official objectives in their willingness to supply Dutch 
competitors with information about Venezuela.  The most notorious example of this 
independence occurred in 1743 when English Admiral Charles Knowles employed Dutch 
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guides who knew the Venezuelan coasts to help lead his unsuccessful invasion of the 
province.
51
   
  In contrast to the Dutch, British smugglers’ activities in Spanish America tended 
to clash more frequently with the projects of governors from Jamaica, Barbados and the 
British Lesser Antilles.  English commerce formed a much smaller percentage of illicit 
shipping in Venezuela than Dutch smuggling, as the trade winds and currents made it 
easier for English vessels to land in Colombia.  Nonetheless, British officials included 
Venezuela in discussions of the commercial riches to be gained from the coasts of 
Spanish South America.  Those familiar with the Caribbean spoke of contraband trade as 
a pivotal portion of the English imperial economy.  Jean Baptiste Dubos, who had a hand 
in negotiations with both the English and the Dutch during the War of Spanish 
Succession (1701-1714), declared in 1728 that Spanish commerce with the English in the 
Americas was to the British “what that of Peru or New Spain is to Spain itself.” 
52
 
Early eighteenth-century arrangements between the two governments benefitted 
contraband trade and closely aligned the interests of British smugglers and Spanish 
colonial administrators.  The asiento, a slave trading monopoly given by the Spanish 
Crown to the English South Sea Company in 1713, became an elaborate cover for a range 
of smuggling activities.  The Company rarely accomplished its stated mission of 
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adequately provisioning the Spanish colonies with African slaves.
53
  A proprietor of the 
South Sea Company admitted that after overhead costs, the organization made little 




The flagrancy of illicit trade under the asiento eventually irritated Spanish 
bureaucrats and uncoupled the business of contrabandists from British imperial ambitions 
in the Caribbean.  Widespread instances of smuggling and Spanish coastguard reprisals 
precipitated the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-1748).  During this conflict, British officials 
and smugglers united around their desire to destroy impediments to British navigation.  
Caracas Company ships became frequent targets of British naval operations in this 
period.
55
   
After the war, English governors began to discourage contraband trade in order to 
persuade the Spanish Crown to open legal trade through diplomatic channels.  The war 
had cost the English the asiento.  It had also demonstrated that even while contraband 
trade brought wealth to the British Empire, it made for instability in the Caribbean.  
Earlier English proposals to show the Spanish a good faith effort by policing English 
merchants and “detect all fraudulent Traders…to remove the Spaniards Jealousy at this 
Trade” now carried more weight.
56
  Robert Semple, an English traveler in Venezuela, 
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wrote that the crucial phrase in eighteenth-century British diplomatic relations with the 
Spanish had been “‘let us trade with you,’” since “all our negociations in South America 
may be reduced to this proposition.”
57
  Beginning in the 1750s, greater enforcement of 
the century-old British Navigations Acts, which prohibited the importation of any goods 
not on British ships and restricted the trade of certain enumerated goods, further alienated 
smugglers from their imperial governors.
58
  Contraband trade with Spanish America 
certainly continued from British ports, but its practitioners could no longer be said to 
represent the colonial state and its ambitions.     
French smuggling with Spanish America differed from its British and Dutch 
counterparts in that colonial government largely stayed out of debates on the subject.  
The state remained absent from these discussions mainly because it had little interest in 
inter-Caribbean trade with the Spanish.  Early French imperialism and trade in the 
Caribbean operated under the auspices of the Compagnie des Indes.  The French Crown 
imposed mercantile restrictions by way of the famous prohibitions begun by trade 
minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert in 1661.  Under Colbert’s laws, foreign ships visiting 
French colonies met with draconian punishments.  French subjects trading with these 
foreigners in French dominions could face prosecution as well.  However, French 
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officials lacked infrastructure to enforce these restrictions.  Furthermore, few prohibitions 
existed regarding Frenchmen trading in Spanish America.
59
   
Unlike the Dutch or English, French state involvement in Spanish American 
smuggling was muted, leaving smugglers disconnected from the empire’s wider goals.
60
  
The French Crown focused its attention on infiltrating Spanish American commerce 
through Spain’s trade fleets.  French products routinely went aboard ships bound for the 
Indies from Cádiz.  In the Americas, France’s most profitable illicit trading partners were 
the English, to whom they sold large quantities of sugar.
61
   
There were exceptions.  Louis and Jerome Phelypeaux, a father and son team in 
charge of the French Ministry of the Marine from 1660 to 1715, sought to foment 
smuggling in the Gulf of Mexico, northern South America and Peru.  This support, in 
combination with the alliance between France and Spain during the War of Spanish 
Succession (1701-1714), led to a temporary uptick in contraband trade with the Spanish 
Main.   
Beyond this period, French trading in northern South America lagged behind that 
of the Dutch and English.
62
  The French commerce that did occur in Venezuela came 
mostly from Martinique.  As Kenneth Banks has noted, because illicit trade took place 
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firmly outside of the French imperial sphere of influence, this commerce allowed French 
colonists to glean information, contacts, and opinions that were unadulterated by the 
Ministry of the Marine.
63
  In turn, because smugglers to the Spanish American coasts felt 
essentially disregarded by French imperial administrators, they possessed little allegiance 
to the French Empire. 
Given the ambiguous legal and political relationships between these smugglers 
and their empires of origin, the national designations used by Spanish prize courts to 
identify foreign contrabandists seem fraught with imprecise classifications.  In addition, 
the realities of manning ships for illicit commerce underscored the difficulty in 
categorizing individual traders as representatives of a given empire.  Because 
contrabandists, by the very nature of their work, willingly disregarded restrictions on 
inter-imperial contact, they found nothing objectionable about international crews.  A 
single vessel might have been made in one empire, owned in another, sailed by mariners 
of three or four nationalities, and contained letters of passage from multiple ports.  The 
question arising from such multinational ventures is, were their crews representatives of 
any one nation-state? 
The case of the Pitre, a Danish sloop, highlights the inadequacies of nationality as 
a descriptive category for illuminating the social history of smugglers.  Caracas Company 
patrols ranging far afield captured the Pitre off the southern coast of Puerto Rico and 
brought it back to Venezuela.  The sloop had left from the Danish island of St. Thomas 
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(present-day U.S. Virgin Islands) in 1779 with an assortment of goods.  Crew members 
claimed they put ashore in Puerto Rico only to secure water and firewood for their 
journey.  The vessel itself was Danish.  Among her crew were a pilot from Philadelphia, 
a Dutch, Jewish scribe from Amsterdam, a ship’s officer from Laguedoc in the south of 
France, and a Venezuelan common sailor.   
Adding another transnational wrinkle to the voyage, the sloop’s ultimate 
destination was New England, where in 1779 war raged between the British and their 
former subjects.  Though none of their testimonies mentioned it explicitly, the crew likely 
carried supplies from this part of the Caribbean to aid the American revolutionaries.
64
  
After all, the Dutch island of St. Eustatius, a close neighbor of St. Thomas, served as a 
key provider of smuggled war materials for the American cause in the war’s early 
years.
65
  That these sailors of many separate polities abetted an anti-colonial war suggests 
that their identities were not bound up with the countries listed on their passports.  
A letter written by the pilot and scribe of the Piter to the Intendant of Caracas 
demonstrated the multi-imperial crew’s frustration at being detained for little more than 
their colonies of origin.  The pilot and scribe quoted by chapter and verse sections of the 
navigational laws of the Recopilación de Castilla that allowed foreign vessels to land on 
Spanish shores in order to replenish provisions.  Nonetheless, they believed that Spanish 
laws should not matter for their situation as “there is no precept in natural law nor by the 
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laws of man that impedes the free navigation of the seas or the common use of their wide 
open spaces.”  They added that, “human society requires this liberty to communicate.”
66
   
That two officers of a relatively unimportant vessel in the Caribbean would make such 
bold pronouncements indicates what little regard they had for imperial boundaries.   
If smugglers frequently did not identify with or conform to the imperial projects 
of their birthplaces, what commonalities characterized them?   For many contrabandists, 
religion proved a powerful organizing principle.  This is not to say that smugglers were a 
terribly religious group.  Rather, many coalesced around the cultural bond of not being 
Catholics.  Spanish interrogations of foreign prisoners nearly always asked defendants 
and witnesses to declare their religion.  Smugglers of northern European descent 
frequently identified as Lutherans, Protestants, and Jews.  Spanish Catholics swore in 
Protestants, who could not make the sign of the cross, by asking them to swear on a bible 
or swear by “the evangelical saints.”
67
  Judges commanded Jews to pledge to tell the truth 
“by the laws of Moses.”
68
   
Judaism formed an important bond for many smugglers.  Many Jewish traders in 
the eighteenth-century Caribbean were the descendants of the great Jewish transatlantic 
trading houses centered in Portugal in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Like these 
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earlier commercial entities profiled by Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, Jews in the Caribbean 
often represented “a nation without a state, a collectivity dispersed across the seas.”
69
   
Dutch Curaҫao, Venezuela’s dominant illicit trading partner, contained an 
especially high number of Jews in its merchant ranks as the Dutch Republic tolerated 
Jews in its colonies.  What is more, the Dutch perceived them as a strategic commercial 
resource given the Sephardim’s ties to Iberian empires dating back to Medieval Spain, 
and continuing with the Jewish expulsion from Spain in 1492.  The Jews had populated 
Dutch ventures in Brazil and later migrated to the Dutch West Indies after the Portuguese 
had reconquered the colony.  By some estimates, as much as one third of trade in Curaҫao 
passed through Jewish hands and the percentage was probably higher if the count only 
included commerce with Spanish America.
70
  Even the tiny and undeclared Dutch 
smuggler’s settlement at Tucacas had a synagogue.
71
   
Many Jewish traders personally undertook voyages from Curaҫao to the 
Venezuelan coast.  For example, in 1764 Spanish coastguard officials captured two 
Jewish smugglers Manuel Taboada and Issac Barugh near the mouth of the Unare River 
with substantial quantities of cacao, hides, and beef tallow purchased from local 
merchants at this key contraband crossroads in eastern central Venezuela.
72
  In other 
instances, Jewish merchants hired middlemen to trade their wares for them.  One wealthy 
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Jewish trader from Curaҫao employed a Spanish práctico to run circuits between Aruba, 
Curaҫao, and Coro to rake salt from barrier islands between these points, to trade 
merchandise with the Spanish and to bring Venezuelan produce and the salt for further 




Though their numbers never approached the concentration in the Dutch West 
Indies, Jewish smugglers were also active in the British Caribbean.  Jamaica, in 
particular, nurtured a thriving Jewish commercial community.  By 1720 eighteen percent 
of Kingston’s population was Jewish.  Additionally, Jewish financiers contributed to the 
development of colonies in the British Antilles in that they lent money to both merchants 
involved in clandestine trade and plantation owners.
74
  The inter-imperial contacts of 
Jewish traders and bankers in Jamaica and Barbados allowed them to undercut 
competitors and bred resentment within the larger British Caribbean merchant 
community.
75
  Allegiances fostered by religion thus provided important business 
advantages as well as networking capabilities.   
More than religion, demographics and socioeconomic circumstances were more 
likely to lead men into smuggling and define their identities as illicit traders.  In general, 
participants in clandestine commerce on the Venezuelan coast were young and single.  
While men in their forties and fifties occasionally appeared in the crew registries of 
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Spanish prize courts, sailing was a young man’s trade. Therefore, ordinary seamen on 
smuggling ships were most commonly in the second decade of their lives, while ships’ 
officers, captains, and principle merchants might be in their thirties.  A sampling of 
foreign contrabandists who disclosed their ages from surveys of the two largest 
collections of documents in the Archivo General de la Nación of Venezuela (the 
Compañía Guipuzcoana and Comisos sections) confirms this breakdown.  Of thirty-one 
contrabandists who gave their ages, fifty-eight percent were in their twenties or younger, 
twenty-three percent were in their thirties, and only nineteen percent were forty years old 
or older.
76
  Life expectancies in the Caribbean were low because of tropical diseases and 
natural disasters.  Furthermore, sailing was a dangerous profession.  With these caveats in 
mind, the evidence suggests that smugglers as an occupational group shared a common 
bond of youth. 
Humble origins, as much as age, motivated many contrabandists to enter the 
business.  Most illegal traders captured along the Venezuelan coast were peddlers, not 
wholesalers.  Notwithstanding some outliers, they chose small and maneuverable ships 
with shallow bottoms to hug the shore and reach areas where larger craft would run 
aground.
77
  Smuggling crews typically numbered less than ten men.  They carried a 
mixed cargo of clothes, foodstuffs, and a few slaves meant to attract a range of buyers.  
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These voyages hardly resembled the massive endeavors of asiento slave purveyors or the 
legal commerce of the Spanish trade fleets.  Coastguard patrols sporadically ensnared 
large-scale foreign trade operations on the coast and more frequently captured small 
vessels financed and provisioned by affluent merchants.  Yet, ventures chartered by 
itinerant hawkers and peopled by small crews overwhelmingly comprised the norm.            
 Although contraband trade offered a subsistence occupation for foreign and 
domestic smugglers alike, it rarely provided profound riches for the rank-and-file sailor.  
He did, however, receive a wage for his voyage and an allotment of space on most boats 
for Spanish goods he hoped to trade privately.  The English merchant John Campbell 
described a shares system of this kind that made “every private Man on board…a 
Proprietor,” who “fights for his own Property.”
78
  
Defendants often explained that they had entered into clandestine commerce 
simply to make a living (ganar or buscar la vida).
79
  Juan Piñero, the captain of a 
Curaҫaoan schooner, provided this rationale for his activities on the Venezuelan coast in 
1778.  Piñero claimed that while he had traded in the employment of a Dutch merchant, 
he did not realize the severity of his actions.  Furthermore, “it had not been my intent to 
violate the laws of the Spanish monarch, but rather to care for my needs, and those of my 
family, wife, and children.  These concerns impelled me, for the first time, to visit these 
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shores.”  After this testimony, Piñero pleaded for clemency.
80
  The extent to which he 
understood the criminality of his actions is debatable.  However, it is unlikely that he 
would have lied about using his trip to support his family.
81
  Piñero and others like him 
smuggled in Venezuela not to strike a blow to Spanish commercial interests, but rather to 
put food on the table. 
Venezuela was not alone in attracting those who practiced commercial crimes as a 
means of subsistence.  Smuggling provided a livelihood to maritime workers throughout 
the Caribbean and particularly in ports considered peripheral to imperial interests.  
Caribbean-based, petty merchants in the French Lesser Antilles known as 
commisionnaires trafficked goods to foreign colonies without royal sanction.
82
  In the 
British case, Michael Jarvis, in his excellent work on the maritime community of 
Bermuda, highlights the existence of hybrid “merchant mariners” very much like the 
small-time, foreign traders who visited Venezuela.  They built a living around under-the-
table trade.  Furthermore the dynamics of small ships, where everyone had a stake in a 
voyage’s success, democratized labor relations on the water.
83
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 Smugglers were not only towards the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder, their 
experiences with structural shifts in Caribbean economies made them a relatively 
rootless, flexible, and mobile maritime labor force.  Starting in the mid-seventeenth 
century, the sugar revolution in the Antilles meant that planters holding large tracts of 
land and significant numbers of slaves came to dominate the politics, economics, and 
territory of the region.  By the early eighteenth century, small landholders, 
transfrontiersmen, buccaneers, and other unincorporated people of humble means had lost 
a meaningful place in the newly-formed plantation complex as they were neither slaves 
nor sugar planters.  The monocrop dominance of sugar also concentrated legal trade in 
fewer hands.
84
  At the same time, war and displacement in the Caribbean and population 
pressures in Europe increased the ranks of shiftless men.
85
  As non-Spanish colonies in 
the Caribbean morphed from bases for buccaneering to centers of agricultural production, 
Antilles officials came to see sea raiders as a nuisance to stability.  In the late-seventeenth 
and early-eighteenth centuries, they branded these men, who had helped to establish non-
Spanish footholds in the Caribbean, as pirates and hunted them down.
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Despite its questionable legality, inter-imperial trade provided employment 
opportunities and favorable terms of labor for seafarers displaced by Caribbean 
upheavals.  Illicit commerce comprised part of a life course that might include 
privateering, legal shipping, naval service, and piracy.
87
  This is not to say that the 
flotsam and jetsam of the Antilles represented the cohesive and self-aware proto-
proletariat conceptualized by Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh.
88
  Maritime workers’ 
interests and identities sometimes aligned with those of their empires and social betters.  
However, they sought out occupations that existed on the margins of the plantation 
complex and that usually defied mercantilist trade objectives.  The conflicting imperial 
legal systems that Caribbean mariners passed through in their seaborne travels blurred the 
line between licit and illicit professions.      
 
Smugglers before the Spanish Courts 
 
 
 Although the expansive international connections developed by smugglers made 
contraband trade seem like the normative mode of commercial exchange in the 
Caribbean, it is worth noting that it was still a highly criminalized economic practice in 
Spanish America.  If the testimonies of illicit traders remind the historian of how 
arbitrary national designations could be when applied to people and their material 
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transactions, these documents also confirm that imperial commercial boundaries 
concretely shaped the destinies of many early modern subjects.  Put differently, illicit 
trade was still illicit by someone’s laws.   The only reason smugglers’ narratives survive 
today is because Spanish coastal forces ensnared some of them in dragnets of commercial 
policing.  In Venezuela, the Caracas Company’s monopoly on the cacao trade along with 
its private navy and army produced especially active enforcement structures.  
Coastguards stripped smugglers of their mobility and their wares.  Investigators prodded 
them about their itineraries, trading patterns, connections, and intentions in Spanish 
waters.  Prize court judges sentenced guilty contrabandists to exile, jail, and forced labor.  
To carry out these sentences, the Spanish military complex shipped them all over the 
Spanish-speaking world.  The criminal prosecution of smugglers contradicts narratives of 
seamless inter-colonial exchange and underscores the lasting human consequences visited 
upon economic actors who trespassed imperial borders.  
 Foreign smugglers’ first contact with the Spanish justice system came when 
coastguard patrols captured, impounded, and processed their ships.  Spanish marine 
forces, whether under the auspices of the Crown or the Caracas Company, followed the 
shoreline of Venezuela looking for suspicious vessels.  Any ship captain that acquiesced 
to the boarding his craft could expect maritime enforcers to review the crew’s travel 
documents and search the ship’s hold.  By Spanish law, coastguard men had the right to 
stop ships of any nationality and frequently searched Spanish vessels as well as those of 
foreign empires.  However, non-Spanish shipping usually presented a more tempting 




foreign ships in Spanish territorial waters, higher authorities were more likely to declare 
them contrabandists.  In general, foreign vessels also contained a richer cargo of 
commercial goods.     
 When coastguard vessels appeared on the horizon, a contrabandist captain had 
several options.  He could loose his sails and attempt to outrun the pursuers.  If close to 
shore, he and his crew could abandon ship and try to hide on land.  If he had a good claim 
to legitimate business or thought he could pay off a coastal patrol, he could allow his 
vessel to be boarded.  Finally, he could stay and fight.  This last option was usually a 
losing prospect as the arms aboard Spanish privateering boats overwhelmingly dwarfed 
those of most smuggling ships. 
 The suddenness of a coastguard attack could precipitate fight or flight instincts 
and the breakdown of discipline among a ship’s company.  On October 10, 1784, the 
royal privateer San Nicolás overtook a Dutch smuggling schooner called the San Josef.  
The two ships entered into a brief artillery duel until the superior firepower of the San 
Nicolás forced the Dutch into submission.  Some Dutch sailors hid in the ship’s hold, 
while others jumped overboard.  These panicked actions incriminated the San Josef’s 
crew as smugglers and its cargo as illicit.
89
   
Seizures like that of the San Josef served the interests of coastguard crews far 
better than instances in which illicit traders immediately surrendered.  Spanish courts 
would bestow a portion of the spoils from convicted smugglers’ cargo upon the members 
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of a patrol ship, making it beneficial for coastguard men quickly to establish the guilt of 
those they pursued.
90
  Self-defense and flight were sure signs of a trader’s culpability.  
Dead or absent foreign sailors could not defend their right to property in prize courts.  
Within this context, record after record of fleeing smugglers and unattended ships and 
goods appear suspicious, if not sinister.  Might these unpopulated contraband caches 
signal greater levels of violence against smugglers than coastguard officials freely 
admitted?   Certainly, foreigners had every reason to fear capture as it risked harsh 
punishments.  Yet, the number of documents cataloging abandoned vessels and 
merchandise imply that the fear of castigation alone could not have produced these 
results.  It is little wonder that one royal accountant (contador general) admonished “the 
carelessness and malice of militias and coastguards in failing to apprehend any suspects” 
when they seized ships.
91
   
 If captive smugglers survived the ordeals of arrest, Venezuelan anti-contraband 
patrols brought them to land for arraignment.  Depending on their site of capture, accused 
contrabandists came before prize courts in La Guaira and Caracas, Puerto Cabello, and 
Maracaibo.  Authorities in port drew up appraisal forms (avaluos) that identified all 
pertinent goods and supplies aboard a seized vessel.  Officials then estimated the value of 
these items as well as the ships in which they arrived.  In noting the minutia of a boat’s 
cargo, investigators meant to record evidence of illegal commerce, but also to prepare 
products for auction if the court determined the voyage to be illicit.  In the same 
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formulaic manner, Spanish scribes also prepared crew lists, which enumerated the name, 
nationality, and occupation of each man aboard.   
After these procedures, a sort of trial could begin.  The word “trial” gives the 
judgment of contrabandists a certain formality and presumption of impartiality that it did 
not possess.  Though a procedural order of events existed in trying smugglers, individual 
cases could diverge from these informal norms, adding or omitting steps as they went 
along.   
While a trial is the most appropriate term to conceptualize the flexible series of 
arrest summaries, interrogations, prisoner and witness testimonies, and magisterial 
consultations that occurred in most contraband cases, these legal proceedings lacked 
elements the modern observer would associate with criminal prosecution and defense.  
Smugglers usually received no legal counsel and rarely could call witnesses or present 
evidence on their own behalf.  No jury was present to judge them.  Instead, prize court 
judges, with the council of governors and occasional outside officials, deliberated on the 
fates of the defendants.  In some tricky cases with extenuating circumstances, magistrates 
made appeals to the viceregal court or peninsular judges for help with decisions.   
However, nothing like present-day due process applied to contraband courts.  
Prisoners’ status as uninvited foreigners made for the presumption of guilt unless they 
could prove their innocence.  This is not to say that prize courts presided over show trials.  
As this chapter will discuss later, anti-contraband magistrates exonerated many accused 
smugglers.  On the whole though, captured contrabandists found the deck stacked against 




The process of trying the accused began with the testimonies of several 
coastguard officials to provide eyewitness accounts of wrongdoing and of the arrest.  
After taking these statements, judges questioned prisoners one-by-one.  Interrogators 
examined as many sailors from a ship’s compliment as they deemed necessary to 
establish guilt or innocence.  Once they had sworn in a defendant, officials asked for his 
name, nationality, religion, and sometimes age and marital status.  With these formulaic 
details out of the way, the interrogation became more particular to a given case. Mostly, 
suspects responded to a group of questions meant to establish where they had been, why 
they were on the Venezuelan coast, what they carried, and if they knew that unlicensed 
trade in the Spanish Empire was a crime. In situations where coastal patrols had detected 
accomplices, judges often asked about their associations with Spanish or other foreign 
contrabandists.   
Authorities occasionally probed for deeper motivations for visiting Spanish 
dominions.  Inquiries about raiding, potential settlement plans, or war movements were 
not out of the question.  Particularly in wartime, officials grilled potential interlopers 
about strategic military developments in the Caribbean.  During the War of Jenkins’ Ear 
in 1741, magistrates pumped one predominantly English crew for news because these 
men had heard rumors during a stopover in French Guadeloupe of a potential English 
fleet heading for Cartagena.
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Although prize court records outline basic procedural patterns of smuggling trials, 
they remain silent about key elements of these legal undertakings.  Documents usually 
include the signatures of a scribe and at least one official, but it is impossible to 
determine how many people were in the room or who was asking questions during an 
interrogation.  In addition, prize court records almost never speak to how authorities 
conducted the sessions.  Unlike inquisition documents, smuggling cases provide no 
mention of coercion or torture in order to produce testimony.  Nevertheless, conventions 
of early modern justice make it difficult for the historian to completely rule out physical 
torment.   
The conditions of captivity are a mystery as well.  Were the accused well-fed, 
sheltered, and clothed?  If not, did their corporal want influence their testimonies?  
Numerous cases mention prisoners developing illnesses after their arrests due to jail 
conditions.  Sickness may have allowed for a transfer to better quarters and a means to 
escape.  One sick Venezuelan smuggler named Pedro José de Echeverría requested and 
received a transfer from his jail cell to the Hospital of San Pedro.  When he was found 
guilty, Echeverría fled from the hospital and successfully avoided recapture for several 
years.
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Another major analytical concern of prize court records is how to interpret the 
voices of suspects in captivity.  Smuggling trial documents present virtually the only 
means to reconstruct the experiences of a group of people who purposefully destroyed 
any paper trail vouching for their existences.  Furthermore, the ad-hoc quality of 
interrogations meant that nothing was out of bounds in their testimonies.  Though 
smugglers often proved reticent, magistrates allowed them to discuss virtually anything 
that came to mind in response to inquiries.  These points aside, contrabandists’ 
testimonies evince the interlocution of the investigator and the scribe.  An interrogator’s 
queries led the illicit trader’s narrative in certain directions and toward what a prize court 
hoped to learn.  Most trial documents recorded the accused’s utterances in the third 
person, potentially obscuring what they actually said.  First person letters and appeals to 
higher officials show up only in some cases.
94
       
With these limitations in mind, smuggler interrogations permit a glimpse of the 
general strategies and counterstrategies employed by foreign contrabandists and Spanish 
legal officials in establishing maritime criminal behavior.  From this cat-and-mouse 
game, both sides expressed their understanding of what was illicit trade.  Defendants’ 
first line of defense involved trotting out any explanation that might provide a legitimate 
air to their voyages.  As mentioned previously, bad weather, ship repairs, the need for 
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freshwater and provisions, and other emergencies came up early and often in foreign 
sailors’ testimonies.    
Captured traders also claimed to be just passing through commonly-used sea lanes 
en route to legitimate business elsewhere.  The crew of the Prins Willem, a Dutch ship, 
said they had left from St. Eustatius with the intention of buying mules and horses in 
Curaҫao and Bonaire.  Though a coastguard vessel captured the sloop near Los Roques, a 
tiny group of Spanish islands off the coast of Venezuela, the Dutch vessel was nearly 
thirty leagues from the South American mainland.  Despite the believable rationale of the 
Prins Willem’s captain that the vessel engaged only in intra-Dutch commerce and had no 
intention of sailing for the Spanish coast, the La Guaira prize court pronounced them 
guilty of clandestine trade.
95
  
Other smugglers feigned ignorance that the items they had loaded or unloaded 
were illegal.  Considering the numerous and conflicting trade laws of the various empires 
transnational smugglers encountered, their claims of obliviousness were sometimes 
honest.  Nonetheless, other contrabandists strained their credibility with outlandish 
rationales.  One foreign merchant disavowed knowledge of the entire Spanish 
commercial code, remarking that he “was not aware, nor had he heard it said, that a 
prohibition existed against trading on the coasts of this province.”
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To defend themselves successfully in court, foreign smugglers had to employ 
these strategies while placing their voyages within the bounds of internationally agreed-
upon sailing routes and commercial practices.  Context mattered in a defendant’s 
remarks.  The trajectory of a ship’s itinerary needed to be believable.  In 1760, coastal 
patrols seized one Dutch craft that supposedly sought to replenish their water near 
Cumaná in eastern Venezuela.  The Dutchmen stated that they had intended to fill their 
barrels after a voyage from St. Eustatius to Grenada and before catching the circular 
Caribbean currents that would take them back to Eustatius.  However, Spanish authorities 
were incredulous of their need to go to the mainland because, as one investigator pointed 
out, they could have filled their water supplies on the uninhabited and offshore islands of 
Isla Blanca or Isla de los Testigos.
97
   
The contents of a foreign ship’s hold also factored into a story’s believability.  
When coastguard men found vessels nearly empty or containing only non-commercial 
items, they usually allowed them to go free.  Conversely, when Spanish authorities found 
“goods only produced in the Spanish dominions,” they became incredulous of smugglers’ 
stories.
98
   
 A defendant’s actions during and immediately after his capture proved as 
important as the context surrounding his voyage.  It was essential that a crew stick to 
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their initial story as changing or multiple narratives rarely convinced prize court judges.  
Furthermore, Spanish magistrates almost never exonerated foreign sailors who resisted or 
sought to flee from coastguard patrols.  They believed that innocent men would face 
scrutiny willingly.
99
    
 When testimonies and deliberations concluded, prize court judges issued a verdict 
that set in motion the final phase of the legal process.  If found guilty, smugglers quickly 
received a criminal sentence and saw their cargo auctioned off publicly.  The Spanish 
treasury, officials, and others affiliated with the ship’s capture divided the proceeds from 
these sales.
100
  If vindicated, defendants retook control of their ship and cargo and 
sometimes even received restitution for their inconvenience.  Such occurred when a 
Dutch crew carrying meat and cheese from St. Eustatius to French Grenada in 1762 fell 
into the hands of Caracas Company patrols, the sailors protested the seizure and argued 
that they had papers for this voyage and carried no contraband.  They had followed a 
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conventional route between the two islands, and were captured near Grenada.  During the 
time of the crew’s imprisonment, Spanish officials auctioned off some of their goods and 
supplies.  In the end, the chagrined governor of Venezuela had to concede the sailors’ 
innocence and to offer them 19,583 reales as indemnity for these lost products.
101
   
When trials neared their conclusions, a significant number of contrabandists 
ducked the verdicts of prize courts by escaping from custody.  The case of one 1767 
jailbreak illustrates this trend.  Three penniless and nearly naked prisoners used a lock 
pick to flee the royal jail in La Guaira while their guard took a smoke break.  The 
cellmates consisted of two smugglers (one French and one English) taken from two 
separate voyages in March and April of that year and a Spanish prisoner jailed by the 
ecclesiastical tribunal for an unspecified offense.   
That men of three separate nationalities hatched this escape plot from within one 
of the enforcement mechanisms of Spanish mercantile law (a prize court holding cell), 
testifies to the power of inter-imperial cooperation in the region.  Pervasive mentions of 
suspects breaking out of jail suggest that they may also have had help from their 
captors.
102
  A 1787 contraband trade investigation on the island of Trinidad actually 
discovered and prosecuted one jailer who had received a bribe to help his prisoner 
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  Official corruption thus played a key role in the criminal justice process and in 
facilitating transnational trade. 
For foreign sailors not fortunate enough to escape jail or to beat the charges 
against them, smuggling convictions carried stiff punishments.  These penalties seem 
draconian given that unlicensed trade was typically a victimless crime and an essential 
pillar of the coastal Spanish American economy.  Nevertheless, the sentences emphasize 
that while smuggling represented an ordinary and negligible transgression in the minds of 
most merchants, Spanish imperial law remained convinced of the offense’s severity and 
eager to prosecute it.  Among the lesser punishments meted out to convicted 
contrabandists were fines, short stints in jail, and deportation from the Spanish colonies.  
More serious offenders incurred long sentences of convict labor building the great 
eighteenth-century fortifications of Bourbon Spanish America.   
The imperial justice system also deposited the convicted in military posts that 
Spanish subjects would not willingly man.  It shipped them as free labor to presidios and 
forts, entered them as sailors into the rolls of transportation galleys and coastguard 
vessels, and converted them to factory laborers in peninsular arsenals.  Spanish officials 
theoretically could order the death penalty for smuggling.  However, Spanish judges 
rarely mandated the execution of smugglers as this grave punishment tended to provoke 
reprisals among rival governments holding Spanish subjects, and to deplete able-bodied 
labor for the military arm of the empire.    
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Changes in sentencing of smugglers over time exemplified subtle shifts in the 
Spanish legal attitude toward contraband trade and foreigners.  In Venezuela, the 
formation of the Caracas Company in 1728 began a period of frequent and strict 
prosecution of illicit traders.  Of course, corruption and bribery still flourished within 
anti-contraband enforcement structures.  Nevertheless, criminal sentences for foreign 
merchants from the 1730s until roughly the late 1770s tended to be harsh and long in 
duration.  Normal penalties for smuggling between the 1730s and 1760s included four to 
six years of forced labor in the arsenals of Cádiz, the Spanish presidios of North Africa, 
or other peninsular fortifications.
104
   
During the second half of the eighteenth century, Spanish governors increasingly 
diverted foreign criminals from Spanish peninsular work details to the expansive 
Bourbon military projects in the Americas.  A royal order in 1754 discouraged shipments 
of prisoners to Spain.
105
  Convicted contrabandists endured four to ten-year work 
sentences building and manning fortifications in port towns like San Juan, Puerto Rico, 
Havana, Cuba, San Juan de Ulúa, Mexico, and Cartagena, Colombia.
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By the end of the Caracas Company’s tenure in the 1780s and 1790s, the Spanish 
criminal justice system demonstrated increasing leniency for contrabandists.  Long labor 
sentences gave way to fines.  Though royal magistrates still threw the book at captains 
and head merchants of smuggling voyages, they tended simply to deport rank-and-file 
crewmembers back to their colonies of origin.
107
  These shifts demonstrate the 
seriousness of purpose and manpower that the Caracas Company brought to prosecuting 
smuggling as well as its desire to cut out competition in the cacao trade.  They also reveal 
how much Caribbean commerce opened up in the second half of the eighteenth century.  
With the development of free ports and limited free trade between Spanish harbors, inter-
imperial commerce probably seemed more innocuous in the minds of Spanish jurists. 
  Despite liberalizing attitudes toward the punishment of unlicensed trade at the 
end of the eighteenth century, smugglers still experienced dislocation and misery as 
captives laboring in far-flung corners of the Spanish realm.  Their position as foreign 
observers and coerced labor in a mostly xenophobic empire also offers a fascinating 
perspective on both criminal justice and transnational contact in the early modern Spanish 
Atlantic.  The prisoner narratives that do survive mention poor food, heavy labor, and 
extreme discomfort.  The testimonies of a group of Dutch mariners in 1792 during their 
trial admit to being “treated in a way that we would not treat a dog.”  They complained 
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that the coastguard captured their vessel only to rob it, threw the Dutchmen in jail for 
three months without due process, and then coerced them into signing false confessions 
by threatening to “tie us to the church bell and have the executioner beat us with sticks.”  
The crew even claimed that interrogators tried to force them to renounce their Jewish 
faith.
108
   
Although Spanish authorities shipped convicted smugglers all over the empire, 
the Spanish military often lacked the money to pay for these logistics.  In 1742, one 
officer bemoaned not having enough food to send along with prisoners embarking for the 
House of Trade (Casa de Contratación) in Cádiz.
109
  A British sailor in 1737 wrote that 
while awaiting transport from Havana to Cádiz, his only food consisted of  “turked Beef 
& maggoty bread.”
110
   
Reaching their destinations did not end the men’s hardships.  The same 
anonymous British convict described his time in the infamous Cádiz arsenal and shipyard 
known as La Carraca.  It was a place “where we are put in Gaol every night among all 
manner of Villains, such as Thieves, Murderers, Turks, Fellows that has committed all 
manner of Villany.”
111
  One of his former shipmates wrote to his wife, informing her that 
their living quarters were “130 foot long and about 30 broad” and held “300 odd slaves 
with irons on and Chains” who were, “as full of Vermin as you can think anybody 
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  Spanish trial records routinely mentioned attaching shackles to a convicted 
criminal’s leg (grillete a pie) as a part of their punishment.
113
   
Construction details were harsh as one Englishman learned.  In making gun 
batteries in Cuba, he and his fellow prisoners awoke “every Morning to carry Stones, and 
cut Wood, which we were compell’d to do, with a Driver at our backs, for six Weeks… 
In a Word, we were much worse used than their Negroes.”
114
  Though these English 
accounts no doubt exaggerated the suffering of sailors as a propaganda tool around the 
time of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, their descriptions gave a sense of the captive’s 
experience.   
These forced labor terms proved incredibly hazardous to the health of captured 
smugglers.  Few records survive from which to estimate mortality rates in the Spanish 
convict labor system.
115
  However, bad and insufficient food, harsh toil, overcrowding, 
and disease (especially in the Caribbean) almost certainly took their toll.  Such was the 
case for Lucas Hanos, a Dutch ship captain sent to Cádiz.  An official in the House of 
Trade interceded in 1754 on behalf of the Dutchman after he had worked and served less 
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than a year in the royal jail.  The toil had made him so infirm that he had developed a 
respiratory ailment that caused him to cough up blood uncontrollably.  Spanish 
authorities eventually gave Hanos passage back to the Netherlands on the condition that 
he would never smuggle again.
116
  The forts and presidios that received these criminals 
had continual shortages of Spanish manpower for the same grim reasons.
117
  Thus convict 
labor was a necessary method for replenishing ranks ravaged by disease and desertion.   
In an irony not lost upon Spanish magistrates, they converted enemies of the state 
into its soldiers and defenders.  Foreign convict labor built and patrolled the walls of all 
the key strongholds of Spanish military power in the Caribbean basin and some in Spain.  
Spanish bureaucrats saw exiling clandestine traders to far away defensive positions as a 
way to increase troop numbers and remove contrabandists from the original site of their 
crimes.   
More surprisingly, imperial authorities recruited captured contrabandists to serve 
on Spanish ships in the fight against smuggling.  Coastguard duty represented a poorly 
paying and thankless task that, like presidio garrisons, drew from the dregs of society.
118
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In many ways, smugglers, as warm bodies with maritime training and insider knowledge 
of contraband trade, made strong candidates for coastguard service.   
Thomas Gallant points out the early modern “dilemma of setting a thief to catch a 
thief.”  He observed that, “brigandage flourished in the frontier zones and the security 
forces sent to control their depredations and guard the border were often indistinguishable 
from the outlaws.”
119
  The writings of high-placed Spanish administrators echo these 
sentiments.  A letter from 1735 conscripted foreign prisoners into the king’s ships, but 
only for use in Old World ports so they could not return to Caribbean smuggling.
120
   
By 1738, the Council of the Indies opined that the risk of convicts’ flight and 
recidivism proved too great to allow forced maritime labor to continue.
121
  Despite the 
Council’s warning, the practice of drafting smugglers into anti-smuggling operations 
continued throughout the eighteenth century.  A royal cédula of King Charles IV in 1793 
directed his governors to send contrabandists to serve in the regular Spanish army or in 
the presidios of Africa and the Americas, but forbid their conscription into naval or 
maritime forces as their crimes made them “not apt” for these duties.
122
 
The prosecution, conviction, and punishment of foreign smugglers in Spanish 
courts and penal systems illustrate that imperial boundaries still constrained transnational 
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commerce in the eighteenth century.  Despite endemic corruption in most facets of the 
legal process, Spanish law itself still approached contraband commerce as a serious and 
pernicious offense.   Its proprietors deserved to suffer.  The very real human costs of 
deportation and coerced labor contradict the perception that smugglers and their 
accomplices could always disarm enforcement structures with a wink and a nod.  
 
Business in a Warzone 
 
 
 Between the extremes of unfettered commercial networks and imperial regulation 
of trade and borders existed a range of economic interactions that were both open and 
bellicose.  The Spanish imperial presence on the Venezuelan coast was simply too weak 
to monitor all commercial exchange taking place in the region.  Autonomous violence 
between foreigners, Spanish subjects, and coastguard men filled this power vacuum.  As 
a result, intermittent, undeclared, and unpredictable warfare represented a familiar hazard 
for foreigners practicing unlicensed trade.   
Foreign merchants’ very presence on Spanish shores put them in violation of 
Spanish commercial codes and legitimized violence inflicted upon them.  As the many 
examples of run-ins with the coastguard have highlighted, outsiders that trafficked wares 
on the Venezuelan littoral might find themselves subdued by force.  Furthermore, the 
right to seize vessels often imbued Spanish coastal patrols with an appetite to rob or to 
harm non-nationals whose guilt was more questionable.   
No doubt, some Spanish maritime forces violently overstepped their missions 




Dutch ships off the coast of Hispaniola in 1733 underscores this point.  Although, the 
vessels sailed peacefully toward Curaҫao and had no discernible connection to 
contraband trade, the Spanish impounded them anyway.  After his men roughed up the 
Dutch crews, a Spanish coastguard captain told one of his Dutch counterparts that, “if he 
could seize twenty ships like yours he would.”
123
   
In other cases, pure greed overwhelmed the call of duty.  The coastguard system, 
based as it was on organized privateering, encouraged fraud and rapaciousness by its 
nature.
124
  As a group of British West Indian merchants explained, it was “the general 
custom and usage in the Spanish West Indies for all who engage in these cruising 
voyages to do it without any certain pay, each man being by agreement to depend entirely 
for his reward out of the captures they shall make.”  In their view, this incentive structure 
put Spanish coastguard men “on the same footing with freebooters and pirates.”   The 
merchants concluded from their brethren’s complaints that this maritime looting went 
hand-in-hand with wanton violence.
125
  
 The Spanish use of force against smugglers dovetailed with the contrabandists’ 
own militancy.  In his work on global smuggling, Alan Karras argues that smugglers 
rarely resorted to violence in practicing their trade.
126
  Yet, numerous incidents on the 
Venezuelan coast contradict this assessment.  Those aboard smuggling voyages often 
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bore arms and retaliated for Spanish cruelties visited upon their colleagues.  Around 
Venezuela, the British and French did not have the resources or interests in the region to 
pursue regular reprisals.  Of course, Spanish meddling with British shipping did 
precipitate a large British response in the 1730s culminating with the War of Jenkins’ Ear 
(1739-1748).
127
  Nonetheless, it appears that Dutch smugglers committed most freelance 
acts of revenge in Venezuela.         
Dutch violence frequently took the form of forced trade.  By this practice, Dutch 
smugglers used their naval muscle to coerce Spanish subjects into exchange.  In 1737, 
Venezuelan Governor Gabriel de Zuloaga described an incident of forced trade like this:  
“They [the Dutch] took the cacao violently after they made the cacao producers from 
whom they stole sign a bill of sale under duress.  They also left European products on the 
beach corresponding to the value of the cacao taken.”
128
   
Divining the intentions of both foreign and Spanish subjects in such transactions 
is difficult.  A smuggling party that could take cacao producers captive could steal their 
cacao as easily as it could pay for it.  Why go through the hassle of making the 
transaction and writing out a receipt?
129
  One Spanish royal attorney (fiscal) looked 
                                                 
     
127
 Sicilian Abbots to Waldegrave.  May 26, 1738.  BNA, State Papers, 78/218, f. 148-149; Eliga H. 
Gould, “Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery” 
American Historical Review 112:3, (June, 2007): 777; Earl J. Sanders, “Counter-contraband in Spanish 
America: Handicaps of the Governors in the Indies” The Americas 34 (1977): 79. 
     
128
 Gobernador Don Gabriel de Zuloaga to the King.  Caracas.  November 14, 1737.  AGI, Santo 
Domingo, 785. 
     
129
 I am grateful to Michael Kwass for sharing with me with an advanced draft of a chapter he has 
written on the continental French smuggler Louis Mandrin.  Mandrin used similarly aggressive tactics of 
forced trade in mid-eighteenth century France to force the French royal tobacco monopoly to buy his 
contraband leaf.  The presence of this practice across the ocean and in a different imperial group suggests 
that it was a ritualized practice common to eighteenth-century European extralegal commerce.  Michael 




suspiciously upon a similar description, explaining that, “the owners of the cacao attempt 
to buy the illicitly-introduced effects under the pretext that they cannot be held 
responsible because of Dutch coercion.”
130
  Dutch officials also recognized the 
subterfuge and wrote to their Spanish counterparts that “to avoid the established penalties 
against prohibited commerce,” Spanish subjects “pretend that they have been compelled 
[into trade] with violence, when at the same time it is they who have invited and 
persuaded other nations to do it.”
131
   
Spanish American traders certainly used the specter of forced commerce to justify 
their transactions at times and probably had Dutch participation in this ruse.  A record of 
nine separate cases of coerced trade from 1763 lists the value of products left by the 
Dutch for each occasion.  Amounts ranged from 300 to 5008 pesos; sums far too large for 
“captives” to have received in coercive situations.  That this awkward arrangement of 
trade occurred nine times in one year on the Venezuelan central coast also casts doubt on 
the credibility of victims’ accounts.
132
  
Notwithstanding this skepticism, Venezuelans sometimes told the truth when they 
asserted that coerced commerce masked the theft of their possessions.  Foreigners had 
good reason to give off the appearance of trade rather than to steal unabashedly.  Leaving 
goods and receipts, even in instances where their actions approached outright robbery, 
kept the Dutch from receiving the death penalty for piracy.  In 1753, one Dutch 
smuggling expedition of three ships sent twenty-five armed men of color inland to find a 
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cacao hacienda.  Once there, they tied up the overseer of the farm, took thirty-five 
fanegas of cacao (roughly 3,850 pounds), and left a token sum of goods.
133
  The size of 
this force, their aggressive binding of the overseer, and the small amount of wares they 
discarded signal the unlikelihood of collusion between the trading parties. 
In addition to forced trade, Dutch aggression took the form of raids against royal 
and Caracas Company patrols.  Spanish enforcement of anti-contraband regulations had 
created friction since the Dutch took possession of Curaҫao in the mid-seventeenth 
century.  In 1689, a Dutch merchant ship opened fire on coastguard troops near Coro in 
western Venezuela.  The men ferried José Anieto, a former governor accused of illicit 
commerce with foreigners, to Caracas to stand trial.  Raiders from the Dutch vessel 
quickly overwhelmed the Spanish patrol and took Anieto aboard their ship bound for 
Curaҫao.  Perhaps they sprung the fallen official from custody because he planned to 
identify their networks.  Possibly they attacked in defense of a commercial ally.  Despite 
this foreign assistance, Spanish officials eventually recaptured Anieto and forced him to 
pay a 20,000 peso fine.
134
    
The early years of the Caracas Company witnessed a surge in contraband arrests 
and an accompanying uptick in Dutch violence on the Venezuelan coast.  Dutch 
merchants armed themselves as never before and sometimes outgunned their Company 
foes.
135
  In the 1730s, a series of dispatches spoke of bloody raids on Company ships and 
storehouses in retaliation for Company interference with Dutch trade.  Both Spanish and 
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British accounts discussed a 1737 fleet of Dutch privateers manned by over one hundred 
sailors that picked fights with Caracas Company ships and looted cacao from Company 
warehouses.  According to the British governor of St. Christopher, the privateers 
succeeded in killing an infamous Spanish coastguard official known for his viciousness to 
foreigners.
136
   
A year later, another raiding party seized a Company ship transporting 
Brazilwood (a common dyestuff) to Santo Domingo.  The aggressors settled scores with 
the Company by freeing two imprisoned contrabandists, burning the ship’s registers, 
torturing the ship’s captain until he disclosed the whereabouts of treasure aboard the 
vessel, and executing two Spanish crewmembers with pistols.  The Dutch captain’s 
motivation probably came from family relations to the Curaҫaoan merchant community, 
of which his brother was a well-known member.
137
   
Such wanton bloodshed soured relations between Caribbean representatives of the 
two empires and ensured that contraband trade would continue to exist in a quasi-
warzone.  Dutch calls for reparations in return for improperly-seized ships went 
unheeded.  One Spanish bureaucrat wrote that “so many deaths, drownings, and home 
invasions on the coasts of Caracas, Cumaná and his majesty’s other possessions” in the 
1730s made restitution unlikely.
138
  The Dutch ambassador to the Spanish court, in turn, 
denied these accusations.  He complained that the Spanish had captured at least five 
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Dutch vessels illegally in the past year, and noted that the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) forbid 
harassment of Dutch shipping “on the open sea.”
139
   
Provoked and emboldened by increasingly strict Spanish coastal policing, Dutch 
smugglers, and to a lesser extent their foreign contemporaries, accepted violence as part 
of their trade.  If the Caracas Company’s early patrols represented a shock to the status 
quo of lax enforcement, the raiding of the 1730s was the contrabandists’ response.  An 
unregulated, intermittent, and seemingly unending series of violent engagements 
punctuated accounts of smuggling in Venezuela throughout the eighteenth century.  Of 
course, many illicit merchants used stealth or a well-placed bribe to pass through Spanish 
territories unmolested.  Yet, contrabandists understood that in the event of confrontation, 





 Contrabandists ran afoul with Spanish commercial law and its enforcers as much 
because of what these smugglers represented as their toll on the imperial treasury.  The 
Spanish state feared that smugglers’ mobility and economic autonomy inspired 
insubordination in its subjects.  Illicit merchants signified the spread of goods, 
information, and relationships that the state could not control.
140
  Furthermore, their 
lifestyles evinced a weak allegiance to their home nations and a greater preference for 
maritime transnationalism.  This ethos evoked a long and painful history of piracy and 
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raiding in Spanish dominions.
141
  Metropolitan imperial governors perceived smugglers 
not just as thieves of revenue, but as a moral contagion.
142
  Therefore they targeted 
contrabandists for arrest and severe punishment.    
 Although these quasi-stateless actors sometimes collided with the state’s 
enforcement mechanisms, on the whole they were essential agents of global trade, 
especially in neglected colonies.  Allison Games contends that European empires in the 
Age of Sail, were “not driven and shaped solely by events and actions from a single 
center” but rather were “built on the ground, in the peripheries, in colonies and trading 
posts, on islands and in port towns, on board ship and within fortifications.”
143
  In 
Venezuela, smugglers aided the commercial development of the province, albeit in a 
manner that went against the wishes of peninsular Spanish authorities.  Foreign 
smugglers became vital for the importation of European products and the exportation of 
Venezuelan produce.  Their role as willing traders in a passed-over region, along with the 
early eighteenth-century boom in cacao, revived the Venezuelan economy.
144
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 More than simply improving the prospects of commerce in Venezuela, smugglers 
catalyzed free trade and merchant experimentation throughout the Americas.  Particularly 
in peripheral locales, lax imperial control and directives, local autonomy, and material 
scarcity combined to produce remarkably unfettered trading patterns.
145
  As independent 
participants in the New World marketplace, smugglers cared little for imperially-bound 
modes of trade and employed a range of commercial strategies in the struggle to provide 
for themselves.
146
  With the aid of willing Spanish American trading partners, foreign 
contrabandists’ business developed from a niche market to the predominant means by 
which many coastal subjects procuring their daily wares.  This exchange rendered closed, 
mercantile systems of exchange obsolete.   
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III.  Accomplices on the Shore: Venezuelan Merchants and the 
Proliferation of Illicit Trade 
 
 
 Although Dutch, British, and French smugglers were ingenious and resourceful, 
their livelihoods depended on the patronage of Spanish colonists.  Traders from Spanish 
America responded to market inefficiencies or outright breakdowns in the imperial 
commercial system with independent commercial solutions.  By trafficking with 
foreigners on their own shores and in non-Spanish colonies, they cut out layers of 
middlemen.  Discussing the Mexican and Peruvian perspective on imperial commerce in 
the early eighteenth century, historian of Spain Geoffrey Walker observes that,  
obviously the colonial merchant came to resent the Peninsular merchant.  Of 
course he welcomed the smuggler.  Naturally he sought as much freedom as 
possible from commercial domination by compatriots who lived in the mother 
country, and who, despite their economic impotence, thought they had the right to 




Walker’s statement aptly expresses the frustrations and worldview of Spanish American 
subjects who turned to extralegal foreign trade in the Americas.  Nevertheless, the lives 
of domestic merchants who depended on smuggling were more complicated than this 
peninsular-creole divide reveals. 
Spanish commercial law placed those who “welcomed the smuggler” in a truly 
difficult position.  Aside from the nationality of their trading partners, the commercial 
practices of Spanish American smugglers were similar to those of their counterparts who 
trafficked in legal wares.  They studied market conditions and bought and sold the goods 
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they needed at the best prices they could negotiate.  Though they concealed their 
transactions, historians would nonetheless call them merchants.  Yet in their 
correspondence, Spanish royal officials described their subjects who practiced unlicensed 
trading with outsiders as traitors and even rebels.  One prize court justice in 1718 wrote 
to his superiors that Venezuela was “a land of uprisings…because every subject is friends 
with the Dutch and between the two groups there are a thousand entanglements 
(enredos).”
2
  Unlike their foreign contacts, who could sail from anchorage to anchorage 
conducting what Spanish authorities deemed illicit business and then return home, 
Spanish American contrabandists had to complete most of their transactions in the same 
legal jurisdictions where they lived. 
Internal contradictions attached to illegal exchange only added to the domestic 
smuggler’s legal stigma.  Particularly in Venezuela, the decrepit and monopolistic state of 
commerce compelled merchants to trade illegally.  These individuals either lacked legal 
trading partners or ended up at a heavy disadvantage because of the terms of licit 
exchange.  By contrast, the ubiquity and utility of smuggling in the neglected colony did 
nothing to decriminalize the practice in the minds of imperial bureaucrats.  Non-Spanish 
traders stood at the ready to sell their merchandise.  Almost anyone, from habitual 
wholesalers to petty peddlers, could do business with the foreigners off the coast.  Yet, 
royal authorities branded all those who engaged in commerce with non-nationals as 
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“contrabandists” (contrabandistas).  The term thus lost its ability to denote any specific 
sort of illegal trader.   
With these incongruities of legality and identity in mind, several questions help to 
elucidate the experiences of Venezuelan black-market merchants.  What drove people to 
smuggle professionally?  Who were these accomplices in prohibited foreign trade?  And 
finally, what people and methods facilitated their work?   
To address these historical problems, this chapter first examines the complexities 
of the Venezuelan external commerce that made Spanish official trade unreliable, 
cumbersome, and unprofitable for most of the province’s merchants.  After establishing 
the primacy of illicit exchange in the Venezuelan economy, it then differentiates the 
various groups involved in unlicensed business with foreigners.  Parsing the 
socioeconomic diversity of covert traders helps to explain their relationships with 
authorities and their degree of success in criminal activities.  In its final section, this 
chapter uncovers the methods and personal affiliations of Venezuelan contrabandists in 
order to explicate how smuggling transcended the narrow commercial sphere and came to 
infiltrate numerous sectors of civil society in the province. 
The historiography of Venezuelan merchants has not sufficiently addressed their 
participation in illegal trade.  Scholarly works on the colony tend to focus on commercial 
actors only as they factored into resistance and loyalty to Spanish rule in the years 
immediately preceding the nineteenth century independence wars.
3
  Coverage for the 
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earlier eighteenth century emphasizes merchant political activity, portraying them as a 
unified bloc opposed to the Caracas Company.  While these histories admit that 
unlicensed trade played a big part in the Venezuelan economy, they gloss over the details 
of domestic merchant participation in these exchanges, only offering an occasional 
anecdote.
4
   Such omissions are particularly surprising given that, according to one study, 
Spanish American subjects made up the largest percentage by nationality (forty-six 
percent) of personnel aboard contraband ships seized by the Caracas Company.
5
   
The study of illicit merchants also has suffered from the lack of an appropriate 
methodology.  With a few notable exceptions, historians have been content to analyze 
licit commercial agents either through singular biographies or quantitative examinations 
of their goods.
6
  These strategies cannot properly analyze contrabandists because 
smuggling rarely generated sufficient data to profile individual operatives.  Furthermore, 
historians will never know the full extent of their cargos as so many illicit merchants 
escaped detection.  A prosopography, built from many separate cases of fleeting 
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commercial actors, is again necessary.  This methodology, combined with inquiry into 
the major shifts in Venezuelan commercial policy, proves the best way to get at the day-
to-day lives of domestic illicit traders.     
A collective survey of criminal proceedings against domestic contrabandists in 
Venezuela demonstrates that they entered into commerce with foreigners for a variety of 
reasons in addition to simple profit motive.  The backgrounds of smugglers were as 
diverse as the incentives that propelled them into the trade.  This chapter mainly focuses 
on small-time Venezuelan traders.  Their lack of money and clout not only prevented 
them from evading arrest and prosecution, but also inserted them more frequently into 
prize court documents.   
Most smugglers existed not as full-time criminals marginalized from society, but 
rather as members of coastal communities.  Their influence spread over many sectors of 
society including the bureaucracy, the Church, kinship groups, and, of course, criminal 
cliques.  Strengthened by these networks, domestic smugglers often engaged in both legal 
and illegal commercial activities.  Illicit business provided monetary gain and material 
sustenance.  Covert commerce also drove Venezuelan merchants, albeit to a lesser extent 
than their foreign counterparts, into a world of violence and punitive legal action.   
Venezuelan smugglers, along with foreign contrabandists and corrupt officials, 
formed the indispensable parts of a trade that held together the local economy, kept 
merchants in business, and drove the province toward commercial autonomy.  
Contraband commerce stocked Venezuelan cupboards.  More importantly, contraband 




Christian Koot has demonstrated for the British Atlantic colonies, clandestine foreign 
trade gave domestic smugglers a “growing belief that local interests diverged from 
imperial concerns and that they, as locals, best understood the commercial needs and 
opportunities of their colonies.”
7
   
Spanish officials could temper this sentiment through enforcement of the law.  
Indeed, they made life challenging and criminally-tinged for those ranks of professional 
merchants, peddlers, and private citizens involved in covert foreign trade.  However, 
imperial bureaucrats realized that by killing illegal trade, they would be crippling the 
economic activity of the society that had hosted it for generations.  All but the most naïve 
officials realized that it was necessary for colonial provisioning and revenue.  Therefore, 
royal authorities negotiated smuggling’s place within imperial rule and settled for 
prosecuting its most flagrant or most humble domestic practitioners.  The stories and 
circumstances of these unlucky individuals illuminate complex conflicts over everyday 
patterns of trade in eighteenth-century Spanish America. 
 
The Economic and Political Rationale for Smuggling 
 
 
 Venezuelan merchants chose to join the potentially dangerous business of 
smuggling for reasons that were sometimes self-evident and sometimes complicated.  
Basic necessity and convenience mingled with intricate structural shifts in economic 
practice and geopolitics to compel traders into below-boards exchange.  Contact with the 
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Dutch, English, and French represented more a practical solution to commercial 
deprivation and inefficiency than inherent criminality or rebelliousness.   
At their core, Venezuelans’ forays into illicit trade reflected their aspirations for 
greater profits and more equitable terms of exchange.  Local merchants willing to risk 
criminal prosecution reaped economic rewards from the competitive prices of unlicensed 
foreign trade.  The taxes involved with trading legally could be onerous.  Fees were 
contingent on the goods traded, where a merchant entered port, and varied over time.  
Merchants from Spain customarily passed these costs onto Venezuelan merchant and 
consumer.   
The result was that a long list of potential duties awaited traders entering Spanish 
American ports.  They all paid the almojarifazgo, a large tax required for the privilege of 
conducting business between multiple Spanish kingdoms.  A three-percent tax on 
merchandise called the corso (previously the armada y armadillo) financed the 
coastguard forces, while a one-percent fee (the avería) funded the merchant guild 
(consulado).  Additional levies included an entry and exit port tax (the alcabala del mar), 
a state tax paid on land (the alcabala del mar) and a tax to fund the fleet (almirantazgo).  
Late in the eighteenth century, the Crown also charged merchants a fee to pay for the 
extraordinarily long period of war with the British (the subvención de guerra).
8
   
The Venezuelan merchant who paid his transatlantic counterpart such additional 
costs could not hope to sell his goods at a competitive price.  One intendant noted in 1791 
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that despite passing “by way of overgrown roads and mountain passes inaccessible on 
horseback,” smugglers avoided “royal duties that are paid…for the exporting to America 
and importing into this province.”  This commercial detour, “leaves the contrabandist a 
profit that allows him to sell his goods cheaper than those [legally] brought here 
[Caracas] and to La Guaira.”
9
  Though it is difficult to ascertain the exact prices of 
smuggled goods, the Dutch probably sold clothes an average of twenty percent cheaper 
than the Caracas Company.
10
  Given that the Company had a legal monopoly on cacao 
going to Spain, and therefore could afford to offer the best prices on legitimately-traded 
items, Venezuelan merchants without such advantages probably had to charge even 
higher costs than these inflated sums for their wares.  Illicit commerce eliminated such 
overhead benefitting beleaguered traders.   
Covert exchange also helped merchants sell Venezuelan exports effectively.  
Dutch traders offered better prices for cacao than Caracas Company officials.  Given the 
Company’s unchallenged position in the legal cacao market, its agents depressed prices 
of the commodity to truly abysmal sums.  In the period before the Company’s inception, 
producers and merchants received around twenty-two pesos per fanega of cacao (a fanega 
totaling about 110 pounds).  During the first twenty years after the Company’s 
establishment, cacao plummeted to an average of eight pesos per fanega with extreme 
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lows of four to five pesos per fanega.
11
  Unless a Venezuelan merchant enjoyed a 
privileged position in the Company’s good graces, he depended on foreign intervention to 
help him profitably liquidate cacao. 
Another obvious but powerful motivation for reaching out to willing foreign 
purveyors was the colony’s scarcity of basic goods and as well as luxuries.  Such dearth 
was especially acute in locations separated by long distances from the trading cores of 
Mexico and Peru.  By the early eighteenth century, Spain’s stagnant system of commerce 
routinely failed to provide either staples or European finery. Although the material 
conditions and culture of Venezuelan coastal communities will be investigated more fully 
in chapter five, for now some basic traits of the Venezuelan market deserve mention.   
Despite its sixteenth-century origins as a secure bulwark against foreign 
predations, the Spanish transatlantic trade system had become entirely inadequate for 
meeting the needs of maturing New World colonies and their merchants.  Before the 
eighteenth century, the annual fleet system (broken up into the flota to serve New Spain 
and the galeones for South America) had represented virtually the only legal means of 
entry for Old World goods into the Spanish Indies.  Spanish imperial authorities regarded 
the provisioning of the New World as a secondary concern to the flota’s primary mission 
of ensuring the safe transfer of Mexican and Peruvian silver to Europe.  In addition to 
neglecting the fleet’s role in exporting European merchandise, Seville and Cádiz 
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merchants sought to fleece Spanish American buyers by intentionally under-stocking 
vessels bound for the Indies and delaying their departure.  This tactic drove up prices for 
goods and helped to extract more bullion from the colonies.
12
   
While Spanish reformers in the early eighteenth century realized that foreign 
interlopers had come to exploit the commercial voids left by this inflexible system, 
entrenched merchant guild (consulado) interests prevented substantial changes.  The 
tremendous costs of operating the fleets eventually led in 1739 to the creation of licenses 
for individual, unaccompanied register ships from Spain.  These vessels replaced the 
galeones trade to South America in 1740 and intermixed with the Mexican flota until 
1789 when the latter was finally abolished.  During the first half of the eighteenth 
century, frequent suspensions of the fleet due to warfare and the oversaturation of New 
World ports with contraband goods meant that the convoys produced more uncertainty 
than stability in colonial marketplaces.
13
   
The distribution of wares that did occur benefitted New Spain and Peru far more 
than colonies removed from these imperial centers.  Products from the fleets reached such 
peripheries infrequently and at great cost.  The complete breakdown of the Portobello 
Fairs serves as an important signifier of the scarcity of legal trade in places like 
Venezuela.  Ideally, this annual trade fair was supposed to stock Peru and all of northern 
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South America with its cargo of goods from Europe.  Between 1696 and 1720 only one 
Portobello fair took place.
14
     
In Venezuela, the paucity of legitimate maritime exchange, aside from that of the 
exploitative Caracas Company (1728-1784), encouraged subjects’ descent into 
smuggling.  In a 1779 petition to the king, the Caracas city council argued that the first 
half of the eighteenth century had witnessed an explosion in contraband trade “born out 
of shortages and the poor arrangement of licit commerce.”  The council tied “the origin 
and crooked course of how cacao and other exports became illicit” to the Caracas 
Company’s monopoly.  The majority of the province’s trade with the outside world 
“continues to be maintained by one hand alone” resulting in “rising prices for their 
merchandise and falling ones for our exports.”
15
  Lacking other legitimate options, a 
Venezuelan merchant, in the council’s opinion, had to choose between poverty and 
criminality.   
Throughout the eighteenth century, wartime privations further exacerbated 
problems in legitimate modes of trade and heightened contraband’s appeal for 
Venezuelan merchants.  As the colony lacked ready naval forces or strong fortifications 
to protect against foreign warships, its inhabitants endured blockades and ship seizures 
during a slew of conflicts.  Bellicose geopolitics stalled already listless Spanish trade to 
Venezuela during the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the War of Jenkins’ Ear 
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(1739-1748), the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), the American Revolutionary War 
(1776-1783) and the conflicts of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars (1789-
1815).   
Such wars crippled licit merchant activity and import consumption in the 
province, but also opened the door to contraband.  At the start of the War of Spanish 
Succession in 1701, Francisco Gil Arratia, the solicitor general (procurador general) of 
Caracas, presented the governor with a dispatch detailing the complete lack of simple 
goods in Venezuela such as wine and cooking oil.  The severing of Spanish commerce, 
combined with poor agricultural yields in the province that year pushed Venezuela into 
famine.
16
  Though Caracas Company forces and coastal militias helped to ward off a 
1743 English invasion during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, they could not break the blockades 
and end the misery of Venezuelan consumers.  One Spanish official approved Caracas 
Company plans to land goods in Santa Marta and Cartagena, Colombia in 1743 because 
entering Venezuelan ports remained too dangerous.
17
   
Wartime legal commerce further deteriorated in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, leading merchants to question Spanish imperial sovereignty in the Atlantic.  By 
1779, superior British sea power began to harass Spanish merchant shipping almost 
continuously as a series of conflicts blended into one another.
18
  The Napoleonic Wars 
showcased a commercial system in utter disarray.  The Intendant of Caracas in 1791 
described Caraqueños driven to smuggling with the inhabitants of Cumaná due to a 
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complete lack of underwear (lencería) in the capital.
19
  Contraband trade spiked in the 
1790s because Spanish American merchants lost confidence in the Crown’s ability to 
protect their interests from foreign navies and to govern commerce in a consistent 
manner.
20
  Merchant behavior during the Napoleonic Wars reveals an historical constant 
of the war-torn eighteenth century: smuggling increased during times of conflict-induced 
scarcity. 
Whether at war or at peace, a host of political factors also prompted merchants to 
engage in illicit commerce.  Bureaucratic missteps in regulating the Mexico trade 
encapsulated how imperial politics quashed legitimate trade opportunities in the province.  
Almost from the beginning of cacao production in Venezuela, the colony had relied upon 
licensed trade with New Spain.  It was perhaps the most important means of legal 
commerce for the Venezuelan cacao merchant.  Mexico provided a crucial market for 
Venezuelan cacao and an important source of currency (Mexican silver) in return.  
Moreover, unlike the transatlantic voyage to Spain, the Mexican route required fewer 
transportation costs meaning that a larger and more diverse group of merchants could 
participate.  From 1674 until the second half of the eighteenth century, Venezuelan 
merchants and producers enjoyed a monopoly on cacao imports into New Spain.
21
  
Shipments to Mexico comprised a large amount of the early eighteenth-century cacao 
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trade.  In 1728, for example, out of fifty thousand fanegas of legally-traded cacao, twenty 
thousand remained in the New World for Mexican or internal consumption.
22
 
Overregulation, oligarchic meddling, and economic competition from inside the 
empire chipped away at this pillar of Venezuelan commerce.  In 1722, the Marques de 
Torrecasa, a wealthy nobleman in Caracas, attempted to monopolize the cacao trade with 
New Spain by limiting the use of his ships for transport to favored individuals.  Though 
the Council of the Indies quickly intervened to break Torrecasa’s stranglehold on the 
Mexico trade, they did little when the Caracas Company sought to expand beyond its 
initial charter and into the Mexican market in the late 1730s.
23
  In 1741, the Company 
used the rationales of low cacao prices combined with the relative security of its ships 
during war time to obtain permission to trade in New Spain.
24
   
Venezuelan merchants not closely linked to the Company viewed this 
development with consternation.  They believed the Company would come to dominate 
the market and depress the prices of cacao exported to Mexico just as they had done for 
supplies of the commodity headed to Spain.  Following the Juan Francisco de León 
rebellion (1749-1751), which demonstrated the Company’s overreach in the colony, 
imperial authorities in 1753 forbade their presence in the Mexican market.  However, the 
Crown also placed strict regulations on the trade including the formation of price lists for 
enumerated goods that could be bought with cacao.
25
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Venezuelan cacao merchants and producers not only coped with bureaucratic 
indifference regarding monopolization of the Mexican chocolate trade, but also endured 
the Crown’s listless response to forbidden competition from Ecuador.  Guayaquil was a 
fertile site for cacao production and a convenient Pacific shipping port to Acapulco, 
Mexico.  Venezuelans resented Ecuadorean intrusion into their supposedly exclusive 
market.  While the king issued a royal order (real cédula) in 1724 outlawing the presence 
of Guayaquil cacao in New Spain, the empire invested few actual resources toward 
staunching the illicit flow of chocolate from Ecuador.  Frequent dispatches from 
merchants and governors complained that Guayaquil cacao had glutted the Mexican 
market and dramatically reduced legal cacao prices.
 26
  Ironically, Venezuelan traders 
became the victims, rather than the beneficiaries, of smuggling.  The gradual decline of 
the Mexican cacao trade as a viable means of above-board commerce provided yet 
another impetus to sell Venezuelan produce to foreign markets.    
When imperial bureaucrats did institute major, top-down measures to discourage 
contraband trade and provide legal commercial alternatives, such initiatives had a 
negligible impact on Venezuelan merchant behavior.  Bourbon imperial reforms to the 
decrepit Spanish transatlantic commercial system were often counterproductive or a step 
too late for Venezuela’s economic development.  The early eighteenth century saw much 
                                                 
     
26
 Real Cedula que prohibe comercio de cacao de Guayaquil con Nueva España.  Madrid.  June 27, 1724 
in Nuñez, Cacao, 132; Sobre el bajo precio que tiene el cacao de esta provincial en Nueva España por la 
competencia que le hace el de Martinica y Guayaquil.  Cabildo del 18 de junio de 1708.  Caracas.  June 18, 
1708 in Ibid., 124; Representación en que se pide al rey la prohbición de introducer cacao de Guayaquil en 
Veracruz.  Cabildo del 23 de febrero de 1767.  Caracas.  February 23, 1767.  in Ibid., 211; Ynforme del 




debate on the need for changes in the Spanish commercial system and numerous schemes 
for reanimating colonial trade, but little action.
27
     
This contentious atmosphere permeated a group of proposals and rebuttals 
between 1705 and 1706 from the Council of Commerce (Real y General Junta de 
Comercio) in Madrid.  This key economic institution came into existence near the end of 
Habsburg rule, and later proved responsible for many of the Bourbon plans to foment 
new industry and trade.
28
  To energize licit trade and smother smuggling, several 
members of the junta proposed the creation of a general Spanish company of the Indies in 
the model of the French Compagnie des Indes occidentales.  Others encouraged the 
replenishing of the naval infrastructure and combining sailings of traditional trade fleets 
with individual register ships.  The most forward-thinking proposals suggested there be 
limited free trade between Spanish American ports and a modicum of highly-regulated 
commerce with foreigners.   
Ultimately, the Council of the Indies and the voting body of the Junta de 
Comercio rejected or delayed nearly all of these suggestions.  Spain was in the midst of 
war and opted instead to maintain the creaky status quo.  Although the Junta discussed 
measures meant to affect all of Spanish America, they only mentioned Venezuela once in 
passing.  The province, in their opinion, was a territory so devoid of resources except for 
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cacao and so infiltrated by Dutch and English commerce that it required serious 
reorganization or inevitable abandonment.
 29
   
Peninsular bureaucrats chose dramatic intervention over desertion.  They began 
an abrupt transformation of the Venezuelan economy in 1728 by establishing the Caracas 
Company.  Nevertheless, the Company was an outside institution that made its money by 
exploiting and marginalizing most Venezuelan merchants and producers.
30
  The 
Company’s first incarnation (between 1728 and 1749) came undone because its directors 
refused to acknowledge the constraints of the existing commercial situation and instead 
sought simultaneously to squeeze merchants and rip up smuggling by the roots.
31
  The 
Rebellion of Juan Francisco de León (1749-1751) ended this first period and led the 
Crown to reinstitute the Company in a much chastened form.  The uprising signaled 
Venezuelan merchants’ frustration with productive, but abusive, legal commerce and 
their defense of smuggling.           
Beyond the contentious imposition of the Caracas Company, later Bourbon 
commercial reforms offered mixed consequences for Venezuelan traders.  After 1765, a 
cascade of free trade (comercio libre) decrees attempted to liberalize overseas commerce.  
Some of these provisions directly affected Venezuela.  Metropolitan authorities abolished 
old duties on certain commercial items, legalized the direct sale of Venezuelan mules to 
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Spanish Caribbean islands, and permitted locals to purchase a pardon (composición) for 
illicit goods they had bought unknowingly.  The comercio libre decrees also opened 
various trade routes by allowing Spanish vessels from a number of peninsular ports, 
rather than just Cádiz, to visit the province and by sanctioning completely open intra-
Venezuelan trade.
32
  A subsequent round of 1777 reforms opened up trading with the 
French Antilles for food in wartime as well as slaves and hard currency during peacetime.  
The only restriction was that Venezuelans merchants were not to sell cacao for these 
items.
33
     
The substantive parts of the comercio libre decrees came to Venezuelan 
merchants later than any other colony in the Spanish dominions with the exception of 
New Spain.  The free trade decrees guaranteed many Spanish American ports unfettered 
trade with each other and a host of peninsular ports in 1765.  Many more harbors 
received these rights in 1774, 1776, 1777, and 1778.  New Spain and Venezuela did not 
gain similar status until 1789.
34
  Moreover, aside from very limited trading for slaves and 
supplies in wartime, Spanish-style free trade did nothing to legalize commerce with 
foreigners, the most willing trading partners of Venezuelan subjects.  As Jeremy 
Adelman points out, the commercial liberalization of the 1760s and 1770s was “designed 
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to reconstitute mercantilist empires on more effective patterns, not to abandon the 
model.”
35
   
Other provisions of the eighteenth-century reforms pleased some merchant groups 
while upsetting others.  The formation of the Caracas Consulado (merchants’ guild) in 
1793 satisfied elite merchants as it rationalized trade and production.  However, this 
organization excluded traders of more humble means, driving them away from legitimate 
business.
36
  More locally, several governors and intendants sought to clean up the 
physical space of Caracas’s central market (on the plaza central).  This initiative 
contented merchants who desired a more orderly space to sell their wares, but irked 
purveyors who saw their stalls shut down because they sold contraband.
37
     
Competitive advantages, simple circumstances, and complex political 
transformations all attracted Venezuelan merchants to smuggling.  In the neglected and 
embattled colony, legitimate trade consistently proved prohibitively expensive, 
inconvenient, unavailable, or dangerous.  While it could be a risky proposition to enter 
the criminal world of illicit exchange, the lackluster conditions of legal commerce 
presented just as much uncertainty, but comparatively smaller opportunities for profit.  
The operative question when analyzing Venezuelan merchant motivations is not “why 
did they smuggle?” but rather, “why trade legally at all?”   
 
A Plurality of Merchants   
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 Given the prevailing commercial circumstances, it is not surprising that 
Venezuelan commercial agents became smugglers.  While for the purposes of outlining 
the dire conditions of legal trade in Venezuela it has made sense to speak of domestic 
merchants as a unified bloc, they did not act as such.  Local traders separated into many 
different strata.  Their business interests, advantages, and liabilities varied greatly.  The 
factors animating one merchant to exchange goods with a foreign smuggler kept another 
within the fold of legitimate commerce.   
Overwhelmingly, participants in smuggling at the lower end of the class spectrum 
found themselves more frequently targeted for arrest and prosecution.  Of course, this 
reality reflected their comparatively smaller ability to bribe or buy their way out of 
trouble.  It also illustrated colonial administrators’ decision to pursue easy convictions 
given their limited resources.  As authorities needed to punish someone to show 
compliance with their duties, they chose to prosecute those who contributed the least to 
bureaucratic pocketbooks and imperial coffers. 
 The term “merchant” provides a convenient designation for all those who bought 
and sold goods in coastal Venezuela, but fails to express the gradations of commercial 
participants.  This diversity was particularly evident for domestic businessmen involved 
with clandestine commerce.  In his survey of two-hundred years of inter-imperial 
smuggling, Wim Klooster writes that “the term ‘merchant’ may be misleading: on the 




participated in illicit trade with foreigners.”
38
  Career Spanish American smugglers 
existed in Venezuela, but they surely comprised a small portion of the total body of 
accomplices within the province.  In the less developed colonial society of Venezuela, 
defining an individual exclusively as a merchant or contrabandist proved difficult.  The 
lack of imperial attention made for greater material need among all classes, but smaller 
degrees of wealth separating them.  Therefore, trading partners of non-Spanish smugglers 
could be career merchants, versatile opportunists, agricultural producers, clergy 
members, or just private citizens formally employed in other occupations.   
 The echelons of those subjects technically-known as merchants, though not 
representative of all who engaged in smuggling, included a number of class designations.  
At the top of the heap were the comerciantes.  To be a member of this group, a merchant 
needed 30,000 pesos in wealth.  Comerciantes oversaw their firms, which dealt in 
European imports, but did not directly buy or sell anything as they considered this 
activity beneath their station.  They bought and sold in quantities befitting wholesalers 
and were most active in the transatlantic trade.  In Venezuela, the comerciantes usually 
numbered only about 100 to 120.  Most were noblemen and Basque given the Caracas 
Company’s dominance over the colony.   
Beneath the comerciantes, a group of primarily Spanish-born merchants called 
mercaderes bought and sold European imports.  They were more active in trades 
individually, selling mostly dry goods and cloth in smaller quantities and often 
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participating in Spanish inter-colonial markets.  Further down the socioeconomic ladder 
were the bodegueros who mainly sold imported food.  Unlike comerciantes and 
mercaderes, they maintained retail stores in towns.  They developed close business 
relationships with the mercaderes.  The pulperos were the lowest merchants to own their 
own shops.  In contrast to the bodegueros, they sold mostly native (criollo) foodstuffs.  
Finally, at the bottom of the merchant ranks existed the buhoneros, who made a living as 
street vendors without fixed retail space.
39
 
Not only varieties of merchants, but planters and agriculture producers also 
participated in trade and smuggling.  Many large-scale planters (known as the grandes 
cacaos or mantuanos) could afford the overhead costs that came with trading legally with 
Spain or New Spain or smuggling through an intermediary.  Smaller producers (the 
cosecheros) lacked the financial means to interact with overseas markets or with 
smugglers by proxy and often carried on trade directly with foreigners.  They, along with 
overseers for large plantation owners (mayordomos), sometimes stole cacao from the 
mantuanos to trade with foreigners.
40
         
It was not uncommon for subsistence farmers and coastal residents employed in 
other occupations to trade with foreigners to meet the daily needs of their communities, 
making them “merchants” of a sort.  Immigrants from the Canary Islands (Isleños), in 
particular, conducted brisk business with non-Spanish smugglers.  The Isleños’ special 
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affinity for smuggling stemmed from their fiercely independent and self-made character 
in Venezuela as well as the marginal lands they had received upon arriving to the colony 
at the end of the seventeenth century.
41
  As a disadvantaged group living far from the 
main routes of legal trade, the Canary Islanders used contraband commerce as an 
important bridge to access transatlantic markets.   
Considering the hierarchy of domestic smugglers, it was elite merchants who 
maintained the most ambivalent relationship with the business.  Many comerciantes and 
mercaderes had one foot in legitimate commerce and the other in clandestine trade.  
These men possessed no ideological affiliation to the Spanish transatlantic system, 
foreign contrabandists, or the Caracas Company.  Instead, they made calculated business 
decisions regarding which means of trade would maximize their profits in volatile times.  
For example, the Venezuela merchants and producers who made up “the illustrious 
families known in Europe” supported León’s rebellion against the Caracas Company’s 
abuses in 1749.  These same patricians became partners in the Company when the Crown 
granted Venezuelans partial ownership of the venture in 1751.
42
  Whereas one of the 
Bolívar family’s personal slaves had read the news of the Company’s temporary 
                                                 
     
41
 John Lynch, “Spanish America’s Poor Whites: Canarian Immigrants in Venezuela, 1700-1830” in 
Latin America between Colony and Nation: Selected Essays, John Lynch (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 60-
64; Lucas Guillermo Castillo Lara, La aventura fundacional de los Isleños: Panaquire y Juan Francisco de 
León (Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1983), 10-12, 164-166. 
     
42
 Joseph Luis de Cisneros, Descripción exacta de la provincia de Venezuela (Caracas: Academia 




expulsion to a cheering crowd in 1749, the Bolívars numbered among the many 
prominent Caracas names inscribed in Company shareholder legers several years later.
43
 
Throughout the Americas, elite merchants who benefitted from the rigid fleet and 
register ship systems often bristled at commercial reforms.  Many Mexican merchants, 
for instance, continued to advocate for the flota and annual trade fairs even though they 
had no personal stake in the success of these institutions.  These traders had become 
master manipulators of the status quo, purchasing and spreading contraband items 
throughout New Spain and Central America in advance of the fairs to ensure deeply 
discounted prices on officially-licensed goods.
44
  Likewise, many of the top merchants in 
Venezuela loathed comercio libre because it lessened their control over small producers, 
who gained more options for shipping their cacao.
45
   
Wealthy purveyors rejected attempts to open up legal trade with foreigners 
because non-Spanish merchants would break their dominant influence over the cacao 
market.  The elite-controlled Consulado of Caracas of the late eighteenth century took a 
strict stance against foreign trade in its pronouncements and actions.
46
  Thomas Kinder, a 
British trader in Argentina at the end of the eighteenth century, confirmed a similar 
sentiment in Buenos Aires, where “every Merchant here is a decided enemy to the 
establishment of free trade, & to Englishmen being permitted to settle as Merchants.  
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In contrast to wealthy wholesalers, peddlers depended on covert commerce 
because they did not have the fiscal resources to conduct business on both sides of the 
legal divide.  One occasional smuggler named Dionysus Black (Dionisio Negra) made 
ends meet by trading with foreigners near the city of Coro.  Black was an Irish immigrant 
and a self-described “laborer” who had lived in the isolated Venezuelan hamlet of 
Capadare for many years.
48
  After coastal authorities caught him exchanging tobacco for 
flour and a little imported cloth in 1736, they insinuated that he regularly bought and sold 
with the Dutch.
49
  Black denied the charge, claiming that his business with the Dutch was 
a singular event.
50
  Regardless of whether or not his illicit trading was habitual, the 
negligible amount of goods he received suggests he probably employed smuggling as a 
means to supply himself in a region passed over by licit merchants.   
Others relied on smuggling to keep their jobs.  A mixed-race servant (parda) 
named Beatriz traded with foreigners not to clothe herself, but rather to dress the family 
of her employer.  According to an informant, Beatriz went aboard a Dutch ship in 1693 to 
buy finished clothes like shirts and dresses for girls, fabric such as taffeta silk, and even a 
pearl choker on behalf of Juana Agras, her boss.  Spanish officials called her a 
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“contrabandista” charging that she had a history of covert trading with foreigners.
 51
  
Unlike Dionysus Black, she smuggled because her employment with Agras depended on 
it.  Still, for both of these small-time “traders” (if such a word is applicable), black-
market commerce represented the most efficient, and perhaps only, means of entering the 
European textile market. 
Though both rich and poor traders engaged in smuggling, individuals of humble 
means became convenient and disproportional targets for law enforcement officials.
52
  
People like Dionysus Black and Beatriz appear more frequently in documents cataloging 
contraband arrests.  Black, for example, received a three-year term of exile from his 
hometown and the threat that any noncompliance would trigger further removal to one of 
the Spanish presidios in Africa.
53
  Though no sentence against Beatriz exists, it is telling 
that authorities pursued no legal actions against her boss.      
Sometimes authorities arrested even seemingly innocent domestic traders with no 
discernible connection to foreign contrabandists.  The Caracas Company was particularly 
guilty of such overzealousness.  In 1757, even the governor of Cumaná protested how the 
Company had “cruelly menaced” a group of “poor laborers who brought plantains and 
other produce from the coastal valleys for their internal trafficking in the province.”  
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Their vessel had permission to trade these foodstuffs along the coast.
54
  Similarly, the 
Company boarded a tiny Venezuelan ship in 1768 near La Guaira whose cargo held 
nothing more than mules and a license to trade.  Juan Vincente Bolívar, the father of 
Simón Bolívar, protested this seizure from his office of prize court judge, but could not 
overturn the verdict to confiscate and auction off the vessel and its contents.
55
      
Lower class merchants felt the severity of the law more frequently than their 
wealthy peers for a number of economic, social, and logistical reasons.  First and 
foremost, well-to-do comerciantes and mercaderes had the money and power in many 
instances to buy their way out of the consequences of criminality.  As chapter four will 
demonstrate, bribes and kickbacks to royal officials were exceedingly common.  Appeals 
to the colonial bureaucracy based on personal connections also allowed rich merchants to 
avoid punishments for smuggling.  Upper class purveyors might even pay for pardons for 
their offenses.  Joseph Vincente Rodríguez was a trader from Maquetía (near La Guaira) 
suspected of illicit foreign commerce on numerous occasions.  He paid two-hundred fifty 
pesos to forgive the large, four-hundred peso haul of unlicensed merchandise authorities 
seized from him in 1752.
56
 
Royal officials could ease an administrative dilemma by showing leniency or 
feigning ignorance to the acts of men like Rodríguez.  Bureaucrats tasked with policing 
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Spanish American trade had to provide tangible results to demonstrate that they were 
doing their jobs.  However, their enforcement resources were too scarce to prevent all 
covert commerce.   
Furthermore, material necessities compelled officials to allow some illicit trade so 
that supplies would reach Venezuela.  Smuggling smoothed over the market failures 
produced by unwieldy protectionist commercial schemes.  The illicit trade with 
foreigners also brought down consumer prices throughout the Americas, mitigating 
unrest that might incite uprisings among the masses.
57
   
Protecting the rich from prosecution also concealed the society-wide nature of 
smuggling and safeguarded imperial returns from the colony.  Wealthy merchants’ 
involvement in smuggling helped them accrue vital funds that eventually trickled down 
into Crown coffers through taxes on these businessmen’s licit commercial incomes.  To 
throw the book at upper class brokers would have decimated the pantries and wardrobes 
of the colony while simultaneously depleting the royal revenues these men produced.
58
   
More selfishly, many Spanish officers declined to investigate wealthy merchants 
because these royal representatives participated in smuggling themselves.  While 
punishing the poor carried little risk, shackling elite members of colonial society (and 
potential business partners) might bring forth testimonies damning to the conduct of a 
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  Royal administrators chose to negotiate with these groups informally and to 
enforce smuggling prohibitions inconsistently.
60
   
In addition to a selective policing of the various secular strata of merchants who 
engaged in smuggling, Venezuelan officials had to decide what to do with another 
prominent faction that trafficked in illicit goods: the clergy.  As one of the most powerful 
branches of Spanish colonial society, priests, friars, and missionaries usually found their 
way into lucrative New World enterprises such as mining and agriculture.  It follows that 
the plethora of cases and royal orders regarding smuggling committed by Venezuelan 
clergymen demonstrates contraband trade’s commanding location atop the provincial 
economy.   The priesthood’s success in the business also illuminates the jurisdictional 
difficulties in prosecuting spiritual authorities.      
 Some branches of the Catholic Church were more prone to smuggling than others.  
In Venezuela and throughout the Americas, the Jesuits accrued a particularly noteworthy 
reputation for illegal trading.  Members of this order usually did not originate from 
Venezuela and therefore felt no compunction about committing crimes in their homeland.  
They traded heavily in both the legal and illegal cacao markets.
61
  At least one scholar 
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has speculated that their commercial proclivity, rather than their theological convictions, 
prompted the Crown to expel them in 1767.
62
 
Just like other Venezuelan contrabandists, the clergy had a range of motives for 
trafficking in foreign wares.  Sometimes simple greed and profitability drove their 
actions.  Two priests in 1726 attempted to take ownership and sell off the unlicensed 
goods of a dead Galician named Joseph Basadre who had brought Flemish products to 
Maracaibo (western Venezuela) illegally by smuggling them aboard register ships 
coming from Cádiz.  After Basadre passed away in Maracaibo, the governor caught wind 
of the priests’ plan and attempted to stop the sale.  Although he protested to the bishop 
about the rogue actions of the two clerics, the bishop favored his subordinates and 
refused to reprimand them.  In a letter to the king, the exasperated governor expressed his 
suspicions that many priests wielded their spiritual authority to protect worldly criminal 
activities.
63
     
In some cases, churchmen’s interactions with clandestine commerce may have 
been more benign.  In 1734, a group of Jesuit missionaries in the Orinoco River delta sent 
one of their own out in a canoe carrying a cargo of knives and money in the hopes of 
securing much-needed foodstuffs for their communities.  Officials claimed the goods the 
Jesuits’ representative carried back to the missions came from contrabandists.  The order 
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escaped punishment by pleading ignorance of this fact and insisting that blame for any 
criminal actions lay with the Venezuelan merchant with whom they had traded.
64
 
 Officials faced jurisdictional roadblocks in trying to bring clergymen to justice as 
the Spanish legal system rigidly separated secular and spiritual courts.  Priests and friars 
enjoyed a wide range of privileges and exemptions from prosecution due to a medieval 
legal franchise (the fuero) granted to them by the Spanish kings.  Under the fuero only 
separate ecclesiastical courts could try the clergy for crimes.  Additionally, authorities 
could not enter their religious buildings and domiciles without Church permission, 
making these structures safe havens for many types of people in trouble with the law.  A 
1757 case in the town of Nirgua, in the western interior of Venezuela, underscores the 
complications that could arise from investigating clerical crime.  A local judge named 
Joaquín Rivera accused the priests of his parish of harboring smuggled items in their 
residence.  Rivera ordered a search of the premises.  When residents refused their request, 
Rivera’s men broke down the door and confiscated the contraband goods.
65
  The priests 
complained bitterly to Rivera that the unauthorized intrusion represented “a sin against 
God.”
66
   
 To avoid infuriating the Catholic Church and risk the retaliation of 
excommunication, Spanish officials tread lightly when reining in clerical excess.  One of 
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the simplest means to contain smuggling by Church representatives was to be proactive: 
to prevent them from traveling routes known for illicit commerce.  One governor of 
Venezuela, for example, denied a clerical request in 1728 for a license to navigate the 
Yaracuy River near Caracas.  The Capuchin friars claimed that they hoped to cut wood 
on the river banks and to ease the transportation of iron to their monasteries by utilizing 
the waterway.  The governor refused their appeal on the grounds that the Dutch were 
currently very active in the area.
67
  Similarly, Venezuelan Governor Felipe Ricardos 
declined to allow a priest in 1751 to take wood from Venezuela to Curaҫao, which was 
technically within the Venezuelan diocese, in order to refurbish the church on the island.  
Ricardos opined that “this concession would equal an open door for contraband.”
68
   
 Even the king proceeded cautiously when acting against clerical smuggling.  A 
royal cédula in 1730 began by stating that King Philip V hoped churchmen understood 
what constituted smuggling.  He believed that clerical exemption from secular justice 
made convents and monasteries hotbeds of illicit trade where subjects perpetrated 
offenses against the Spanish commercial codes “with greater liberty” than out in the 
open.  Philip threatened exile from the Indies for any clergy member caught smuggling.
69
  
However, by 1748, Philip’s successor, Ferdinand VI had softened this stance.  In another 
cédula, he merely asked the archbishops and bishops “to remedy the disorder experienced 
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by the introduction of goods and products of illicit commerce” by warning their 
subordinates and parishioners about the criminality of smuggling.
70
    
 The incredible diversity of Venezuelan traders who engaged in illicit commerce 
prompted Spanish commercial enforcers to vary their treatment of offenders.  The 
wealthy, the well-connected, and the jurisdictionally-exempt usually escaped severe 
punishment both because prosecuting them presented social challenges and because 
smuggling on the whole was necessary for a peripheral colony like Venezuela to 
function.  Instead the burden of domestic criminality in foreign commerce fell 
disproportionately on poor and small-time traders. 
 




The practices and networks of domestic smugglers played a large part in 
determining their success or failure in criminal undertakings.  Venezuelan merchants’ 
methods mostly mirrored those performed by non-Spanish contrabandists.  However, the 
isolationism of Spanish commercial policy imposed restrictions on mobility and 
navigation that foreign purveyors did not have to contend with in their own empires.  
These constraints forced domestic illicit traders to hone their relationships within 
Venezuelan merchant and political communities.  Such connections spread the influence 
of smugglers past the marketplace and into governmental, religious, and kinship 
structures of colonial society. 
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Venezuelan contrabandists conducted business by utilizing a similar, if simplified, 
set of tactics to those employed by Dutch, English, and French commercial interlopers. 
Given that the Spanish empire permitted less inter-Caribbean trade than these nations, 
ranging freely across islands and jurisdictions proved a difficult proposition for many 
Venezuelan merchants.  Instead, foreign contrabandists had to come to them.  Merchants 
and agricultural producers alike often pooled the cacao and tobacco of a group of planters 
and brought it to the coast.  Trading occurred on the beach or aboard foreign ships with 
the receiving party often serving liquor as a show of hospitality and good faith.
71
   
Another way of avoiding prohibitions placed on travel involved a liberal 
interpretation of Spanish trading licenses.  Merchants often used officially-approved 
voyages to visit unauthorized locales.  Cuban authorities in 1784 granted one Spanish 
captain a license to bring slaves, foodstuffs, tools, and cash from Havana to La Guaira in 
exchange for cattle.  On the return trip to Havana, the merchant stopped off in Danish St. 
Thomas, returning to Havana with 15,000 more pesos worth of goods than had been on 
his ship when he disembarked from Cuba.
72
  In 1780, two merchants (one Venezuelan 
and one Puerto Rican) went so far as to forge licenses that they then disobeyed.  The 
fraudulent documents, which provided cover for their voyage, supposedly allowed the 
two men to conduct reciprocal trade between Venezuela and Santo Domingo.  Instead, 
they visited Curaҫao, buying contraband items to sell back in Venezuela.
73
   Trips like 
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these to foreign islands ultimately fostered relationships of both debt and trust as Spanish 
subjects bought on credit from foreign sellers.
74
            
 More so than foreign affiliations, domestic merchant networks connected 
smugglers to other licit and illicit traders, bureaucrats, and clergymen.  Smugglers formed 
complex rings (sindicaciones) that wielded significant power, especially in relatively 
autonomous provinces like Venezuela.  The sindicaciones commanded significant 
influence in politics and threatened the authority and safety of officials who tried to stop 
them.  For contrabandists, these informal unions helped pool resources, establish reliable 
trading ventures with foreign clients, and avoid prosecution.   
 The smuggling ring of Luciano Luzardo offers a specific case study on the 
normally veiled and nebulous relations that aided the proliferation of criminalized 
commerce in the province.  Luzardo served as a second lieutenant (alferez) of Maracaibo 
in 1715 when authorities began to discover his group of smugglers.  Luzardo may not 
have been the leader of this decentralized conglomeration.  In fact, the questionable 
veracity of typical defendant testimonies and the informal nature of many sindicaciones 
make locating their heads of operations nearly impossible.  However, the investigation of 
the smuggling ring centered about the prosecution of Luzardo, so positioning him at the 
center of analysis gathers together the many narrative strands of this lengthy case.   
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 After making a series of arrests, authorities in Maracaibo began to diagram the 
linkages between seemingly isolated criminals.  Rumors of Luciano Luzardo’s illicit 
trading had first led the governor of Maracaibo, Francisco de la Rocha Ferrer, to summon 
him in June of 1715.  Officials hauled in Luzardo along with his trading partner, Nicolás 
Rodríguez, for questioning.  They alleged that Luzardo had served as a broker, 
assembling the cacao of many producers into a sufficient quantity for Rodríguez.  
Presumably, Luzardo also used his royal office to smooth over potential inquiry into their 
illicit dealings.  Rodríguez, a merchant and ship owner in the register ship trade between 
the Spanish colonies, provided a vessel for their partnership as well as an air of legitimate 
business.  With wholesale quantities of cacao coming from Luzardo, Rodríguez could 
trade raw chocolate in Curaҫao for a range of products to import into Venezuela.  For his 
role in pooling cacao, Luzardo received a share of Rodríguez’s ill-gotten goods to 
resell.
75
   
Luzardo and Rodriguez’s arrangement enjoyed the support of at least one 
clergyman.  Friar Alonso de Galvez, the head of a monastery, allegedly allowed 
Rodríguez to store his Dutch goods in this sacred space and refused to divulge the 
merchant’s illicit activities to authorities.  In early July of 1715, Luzardo made a formal 
statement claiming that he along with many others had consigned a small amount of his 
cacao to Rodríguez but had no idea that the trader was bound for Curaҫao.  He instead 
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believed that Rodríguez planned to sell the cacao in Santo Domingo.
76
  After giving 
testimony, Luzardo abruptly fled to the safety of Galvez’s monastery.  Displaying his 
culpability in the ring, the friar who had protected Rodríguez now sheltered the 
merchant’s partner from prosecution.
77
    
The verdicts of the investigation reflected the differing manners in which the men 
defended themselves.  Whereas Luzardo immediately fled to the monastery, Rodríguez 
stayed put and marshaled many witnesses to testify to his good character and innocence.   
These developments led Governor Francisco de la Rocha Ferrer to conclude that the 
crimes of Rodríguez and the producers who sold him cacao were trifling when compared 
to those of Luzardo.  The alferez not only had smuggled, but also had tried “to obscure 
the justification for his crime with a fabricated deposition” that shifted blame onto others.  
He acquitted Nicolás Rodríguez, but sentenced Luzardo in absentia to a four-year term of 
service in the dismal Castillo de Santa María de Galvez in Pensacola, Florida.
78
 
A month after the verdict, more parts of the Luciano Luzardo smuggling ring 
came to light.  In September of 1715, Maracaibo coastguard officials stopped the ship of 
Bernardo Guillén de Saavedra.  He was a merchant, a deacon, and the cousin of Luciano 
Luzardo.  His vessel contained a sizeable amount of merchandise from Curaҫao.  Among 
the items confiscated from his ship, authorities found letters meant for Luzardo.  In them, 
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Guillén de Saavedra detailed how he planned to import the foreign wares into Maracaibo.  
The letters also expressed Guillén de Saavedra’s incorrect hunch that Governor Rocha 
Ferrer would allow him to import illegal merchandise because previous governors had 
done so.
79
  The remark revealed Guillén de Saavedra’s perception of the Venezuelan 
bureaucracy as a familiar institution that his family business could bribe.   
Governor Rocha Ferrer’s wary management of the Guillén de Saavedra case 
reflected the limits of administrative power in early eighteenth-century Spanish America.  
The governor eventually prosecuted the smuggler, but sent him to the House of Trade 
(Casa de Contratación) in Spain for final sentencing.  Avoiding public pronouncements 
of punishment for Guillén de Saavedra was essential “so that there will be no occasion 
for rebellion against me or my ministers.”
80
   
The power of the contrabandist’s family and the instability of the empire during 
this period informed Governor Rocha Ferrer’s reluctance to act.  The tumultuous 
transition from Habsburg to Bourbon rule had left the colonies unsettled.  Many 
prominent subjects still held loyalties to the old dynasty.
81
  One of these colonists was 
Bernardo Guillén de Saavedra’s uncle, Friar Agustín Caizedo.  He was an Augustinian 
friar who traveled back and forth between Maracaibo and Curaҫao.  He also participated 
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in Guillén de Saavedra’s smuggling ventures.
82
  Rocha Ferrer feared that Caizedo acted 
as a Habsburg fifth column who “no doubt sows in the hearts of inhabitants of both 
places a pernicious rift that could cause immense unrest.”
83
  The friar’s political leanings 
and his familial connection to Guillén de Saavedra signified dangerous threats to Rocha 
Ferrer’s rule.  As most governors in the early eighteenth century commanded no standing 
armies, Rocha Ferrer knew he would be ill-equipped to put down insurrection if a 
sentence against Guillén de Saavedra aroused the populace.    
It is telling that the victor of this factional conflict was the Luzardo smuggling 
ring.  Luciano Luzardo stayed in the monastery for almost three years while family 
members and acquaintances made appeals to the royal judiciary on his behalf.
84
  In 1718, 
his fortunes improved when authorities conducted an appraisal (residencia) of Rocha 
Ferrer’s governorship.  Ironically, they found that the executive himself had been 
involved in smuggling.  This discovery nullified his verdicts on commercial crime and 
left Luzardo a free man.
85
  Despite his offenses, Rocha Ferrer eventually became 
governor and president of the colony of Santo Domingo.
86
 
The complexities of sindicaciones underscore that the criminal methods of 
contraband trade not only facilitated the business’s success, but also connected various 
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branches of civil society in eighteenth-century Venezuela.  Luciano Luzardo belonged to 
a smuggling ring that typified illicit merchant organization in many coastal 
municipalities.  Prosecutors traced only the most cursory sketch of what was undoubtedly 
a much larger association of traders.   
Yet, investigators’ discoveries offer clues to the critical linkages that made such 
illicit associations viable.  First, smuggling rings courted governmental support.  Luzardo 
held a royal office and his cousin, Bernardo Guillén de Saavedra, assumed that his 
sindicación could buy off officials like Francisco de la Rocha Ferrer.  Likewise, the 
smuggling ring allied itself with representatives of the Church.  One friar protected two 
smugglers from prosecution while another’s rebellious leanings hindered judicial efforts 
to punish his nephew.  Kinship connections cemented trust within these otherwise 
unregulated criminal affiliations.  It was no accident that the blood-related trio of 
Luzardo, Guillén de Saavedra, and Friar Agustín Caizedo all played roles in the ring’s 
operations.  Most importantly, sindicaciones allowed individual smugglers who might 
have been easy prey for law enforcement officers to amplify their power and enter the 
political arena.  When confronting an association of smugglers, even governors like 






 Without Spanish subjects willing to smuggle, foreign contrabandists would have 




However, domestic smugglers were more than passive buyers of foreign goods or skilled 
professional traders.  The pervasiveness of clandestine commerce in Venezuela meant 
that they came from all walks of life.  Agricultural producers, clergymen, wholesale 
merchants, and itinerant peddlers all embodied the label of “contrabandists” bestowed 
upon them by Spanish officials.   
 A range of economic, material, and political conditions favored Venezuelan 
domestic smugglers.  Onerous taxes and oppressive commercial regimes meant that 
prices for foreign contraband merchandise undercut those of officially-licensed goods, 
while foreign merchants tendered much better offers for Venezuelan exports than their 
Spanish competitors.  Scarcity of even the most common goods produced ready markets 
for domestic traders.  Additionally, a slew of administrative reforms did little to promote 
legitimate Spanish Atlantic commerce in Venezuela.  Instead they overturned a status quo 
to which Venezuelans had grown accustomed and kept Venezuelan traders working in the 
shadows. 
 Venezuelan smugglers compensated for the dearth of profitable legal commerce 
by employing a range of tactics to avoid prosecution.  Like foreign contrabandists, they 
utilized stealth in their trading practices and manipulated existing commercial regulations 
for their own benefit.  Domestic smugglers organized networks that stretched across 
many sectors of society to maximize their collective influence and minimize risk.  While 
conducting business close to home made them less vulnerable than outsiders to the 
severity of Spanish justice, violence and imprisonment still figured prominently as 




 Not all Venezuelan illicit traders faced the same challenges or possessed the same 
advantages when confronting obstacles to commerce.  The rich and powerful might 
accomplish more and suffer less.  The empire needed smuggling to keep its peripheral 
subjects fed and clothed and to maintain revenue-producing merchant communities in the 
colony.  At the same time, its bureaucrats had to demonstrate their vigilance against 
foreign commercial intrusion.  The result was that smugglers with more humble origins 
bore the brunt of commercial enforcement.  Nevertheless, the unequal and farcical 
process by which the Spanish legal system prosecuted its own subjects demonstrates an 
empire in limbo between the idealized protectionism of its past and the commercial 
realities of its present.  In the same way, the trading practices of Venezuelan smugglers 
illustrate how deeply the roots of illegal commerce penetrated into every facet of the 




IV.  Turning a Blind Eye: Contraband and Corruption in Eighteenth-
Century Venezuelan Government 
 
 
In 1749, nearly fourteen years after first embarking for the Americas, Jorge Juan 
and Antonio de Ulloa wrote a scathing exposé from Spain on the pervasive political 
corruption that dominated South America.  The naval officers devoted an entire chapter 
of their jeremiad Discourse and Political Reflections on the Kingdom of Peru to illicit 
trade.  The two lamented that,  
officials who allow the trade to go on in return for payment of a bribe for each 
fardo are called ‘men of good will who will harm no one.’  Obviously these 
functionaries do nothing to remedy the abuses which deprive the royal treasury of 
revenue.  Although the king absolutely prohibits illicit trade, his officials tolerate 
the smuggling.  Although tax revenues belong solely to the king, his agents 
appropriate them as if they were their very own.  Not only do they fail to stop 
smuggling but they also give rise to a cynicism among the people within their 
jurisdiction when they fail to enforce the law.  Confident that the penalty for their 
offense will be commuted to payment of a tolerable fine, merchants see the 
tremendous opportunities for personal gain and are never constrained from 
pursuing them.  It is very rare to find any merchant, large or small, who has not 




Juan and Ulloa’s description emphasizes that the complicity of Spanish colonial 
officials was essential to the success of illicit trade.  Authorities actively smuggled goods 
themselves, participated as shareholders in contraband ventures, communicated directly 
with foreign merchants, and received bribes to ignore the black market dealings of others.  
Crooked administrators used kinship and professional connections to create and sustain 
intricate smuggling rings spanning multiple empires.  In Venezuela, they were integral 
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parts of a sustained parallel economy that ran counter to the trade policies of the Spanish 
Empire.   
Corrupt authorities’ pivotal support to smugglers also made the evasion of 
Spanish commercial law standard operating procedure within Venezuelan society.  The 
unscrupulous actions of colonial officials also encouraged subjects to break the law 
themselves.  Mighty governors and lowly coastguard men both ignored the illicit 
commerce taking place around them.  For foreign and domestic smugglers alike, 
partnerships with and bribes for coastal authorities mitigated the threats of imprisonment, 
loss of goods, and exile.  Bolstered by the example of their public servants and the 
knowledge that enforcement of commercial statutes was rare, smugglers and buyers of 
smuggled goods felt themselves above the law.   
Desirous of the material benefits of unrestricted free trade, colonial subjects 
overlooked covert agreements between smugglers and officials up to a point.  Eighteenth-
century Venezuela possessed a burgeoning cash crop in cacao.  Yet, the Spanish imperial 
reliance on a closed system of fleet trade presented poor prices and few markets for 
Venezuelan producers’ cacao.  Worse still, Spain’s limited manufacturing capacities, its 
rundown merchant houses (the consulados), and a monopoly company (the Caracas 
Company) more concerned with cheaply extracting Venezuelan cacao than bringing in 
European products all failed to sate consumer demand.  As even the Spanish monarch 
King Philip V acknowledged, insufficient trade between Spain and Venezuela “fomented 
illicit commerce on the coast pursued by the Dutch and other nations because the 




the Company should offer with abundance and equity.”
2
  Authorities’ complacency with 
smuggling merely facilitated the transition of goods to a population undersupplied by 
legal Spanish trade.  Thus, Venezuelans did not see the involvement of their functionaries 
in garden variety illicit trade as in and of itself morally reprehensible.  Though these 
officials’ actions were illegal, so was the majority of Venezuelan trade by contemporary 
estimates.  In the 1720s, for example, legal commerce with Caracas had deteriorated to 
one registered ship from Spain per year.
3
  In the majority of cases, locals welcomed the 
participation or complicity of willing officials in filling the void left by Spanish 
commercial stagnancy.  As one scholar has put it, “colonial officials understood, in a way 
which European authorities could not, that practice must dictate what was legal and what 
was not.”
4
   
Nonetheless, subjects’ patience for their officials’ misdeeds had its limits.  
Despite the seemingly symbiotic and prosperous relationship between bureaucrat and 
subject, Venezuelan governors frequently appeared in colonial documents as defendants 
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in extensive imperial investigations into their illicit dealings.  Complaints about 
governors usually came from one of three sources: fellow bureaucrats with an axe to 
grind, the exclusive legal trader in Venezuelan cacao known as the Caracas Company 
(Companía Guipuzcoana), or colonists themselves.  While the motivations of the first 
two groups are relatively straightforward, the interests of the locals are more difficult to 
disentangle.  Why would subjects with everything to gain from smuggling turn on 
governors involved in the trade?   
This chapter contends that Venezuelan merchants and producers negotiated moral 
and commercial thresholds calculating the amount of contraband corruption they would 
tolerate from officials.  These subjects took into account several considerations when 
evaluating authorities.  They had few qualms about administrators who enriched 
themselves and opened free trade to Venezuela by violating strict commercial 
regulations.  However, in the process of evading detection and prosecution, corrupt 
bureaucrats also could be vindictive, duplicitous, and ruthless to their subjects.  In those 
instances, the same merchants and planters would seek to overturn governors who lined 
their pockets at the expense of the community or did violence to it.  When officials 
breeched this line of excess, smuggling as a corrupt practice transformed, in the eyes of 
Venezuelan subjects, from an essential or tolerable legal transgression into a moral 
wrong.  
Within this spectrum of perceived right and wrong, space existed for parley 
between shady functionaries, the Spanish legal system, and colonial subjects.  A corrupt 




a number of variables outside of the law.  Likewise, extralegal factors determined the 
success or failure, evasion or detection, exoneration or conviction, and punishment of 
government functionaries.  An officer’s connections to networks of fellow officials, kin, 
and smugglers, his rank, and the amount he stole from the imperial bureaucracy and 
Caracas Company might determine his legal impunity.  Most importantly for 
Venezuelans and the contraband trade, these dynamics determined the degree to which 
authorities would enforce commercial law.    
To understand this alternate formation of authority, this chapter examines the role 
of bureaucratic corruption in facilitating smuggling and commercial fraud in Venezuela 
in the first half of the eighteenth century.
5
  It first outlines the dynamics of bureaucratic 
engagement with illicit trade by focusing on the criminal actions of low-level magistrates 
and military men.  The means by which officials broke commercial law are important for 
understanding how they interacted with both foreign and domestic purveyors in the illicit 
economy.  This chapter then employs two case studies of smuggling governors in early 
eighteenth-century Venezuela to explore how smuggling influenced the relationships of 
these more senior officials with the subjects they governed, their colleagues, and key 
sections of the Spanish imperial government.  If an analysis of local officials argues 
primarily that unwritten rules and procedures existed regarding official collusion with 
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smuggling, these gubernatorial case studies underscore that the violation of these 
unspoken agreements with the community could undermine an official’s regime.  Finally, 
this chapter traces the courses of both groups of corrupt officials within the legal systems 
of Spain and the Americas to emphasize the negotiation between Spanish bureaucrats, 
colonial officials, and local interest groups over contraband corruption.   Key variables 
such as factionalism, rank, and the recovery of Crown revenues determined the fate of 
crooked administrators and the enforcement of mercantile law.     
Source material for an analysis of bureaucratic corruption comes from public 
investigations (residencias), trials, sentences, official correspondence, citizen petitions 
and testimonies concerning more than thirty Venezuelan officials.  The cases presented 
here are particularly rich, yet representative, examples of governmental diffusion into all 
aspects of smuggling.  Of course, many of these sources contain distinct biases.  
Residencias were open inquiries into the conduct and actions of bureaucrats conducted at 
the end of their terms in office.  As such, they were usually rife with partisan speculation 
and struggle between rival administrative and commercial groups seeking to discredit one 
another’s representatives.
6
  The guilt or innocence of particular administrators is not the 
focus of this chapter’s inquiry.  Rather, accusations of governmental corruption reveal 
how officials in general perpetrated illicit trade, who they smuggled with, and how this 
exchange influenced the legal and commercial world of colonial society.   
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The historiography of corruption in Spanish America has proffered wildly 
different explanations as to the significance of venal government, while containing its 
investigative scope of the practice almost entirely to the administrative realms of society.  
Most works have tended to view graft and fraud as normalized and even inborn elements 
of the Spanish Empire’s bureaucratic formation.  Early studies on the subject confirmed 
that medieval governmental legacies of personalistic politics and patrimonial relations 
carried over into early modern states, slowing the emergence of dispassionate, impartial 
bureaucracies.
7
  Some revisionist arguments have contended that corruption even served 
a positive function in Spanish American government, allowing for greater flexibility in 
what otherwise would have been a brittle and unwieldy administrative system.
8
  By 
contrast, other historians have perceived fraud and deception on the part of Spanish 
American rulers as crucial elements in tipping the balance of political power and wealth 
towards the provincial elite in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  As officials 
bought royal offices and became beholden to local political and economic moguls, money 
generated from industries such as mining increasingly stayed within the colonies and 
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residents successfully co-opted royal magistrates.
9
  Scholars interested in late eighteenth-
century Bourbon responses to this corruption have documented how reformers’ efforts to 
eliminate practices such as the sale of offices and the appointment of creoles to high 
positions in the imperial bureaucracy brought political unrest to the empire.
10
  Finally, 
recent works delving into the political thought of the eighteenth century have cautioned 
against the use of the term “corruption” to describe administrative practice in societies 
where official behavior considered venal by modern standards was the norm.
11
  These 
studies have emphasized that the pervasive infiltration of merchant and bureaucratic 
networks and patron-client relations into Spanish American government made 
deciphering what “corruption” was all but impossible.  All of these studies provide a 
quantitative understanding of corruption’s structural impact on royal revenues, political 
thought, and governmental stability, but have failed to discuss the specific manner in 
which government functionaries committed indiscretions and how their actions created 
informal compacts with the subjects they ruled.   
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By uncovering bureaucrats’ engagement with illicit trade and deciphering the 
legal contours of this engagement for governors and subjects alike, this section adds 
depth to the existing body of literature on corruption.  The symbiosis between corrupt 
administrators and smugglers, shopkeepers, and coastal dwellers made mockery of 
Spanish trade policy and nurtured a culture of illegality.
 12
  In place of the law’s rigid 
dictums, authorities and subjects settled on their own rules to regulate the black market.  
As central components of circum-Caribbean contraband networks, crooked Spanish 
American officials not only facilitated smuggling, but also exemplified the power of 
corruption to energize lagging economies, accentuate factionalism, and shape community 
norms.   
 
How Bureaucrats Became Smugglers   
 
 
In the contraband-rich world of eighteenth-century Venezuela, the existence of an 
honest official was often more remarkable than that of a corrupt one.  The complaints of 
Agustín Fernández de Verastegui confirm this supposition.  In 1701, he testified before a 
Venezuelan criminal court claiming that six men with knives had accosted him on a dark 
country road and tried to take his life.  Luckily for Agustín, he fought off his attackers 
and escaped unscathed.  Since Agustín was a Basque judge in Caracas’s prize courts, he 
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rightly believed that his assailants’ hatred of his office had precipitated this attempted 
murder.  He had enforced anti-contraband policies and convicted those guilty of trading 
with foreigners.
13
  His compliance with the duties of his occupation nearly had cost him 
his life.  Agustín’s experience was not unique in colonial Venezuela.   
Particularly for local officials, following the letter of the law won neither popular 
support nor material gains.  Ensconced in isolated small towns with little administrative 
aid, many Venezuelan bureaucrats had no desire to tow the line of Spanish mercantile 
law.  A martinet might provoke threats on his life like those Agustín Fernández de 
Verastegui received.
14
  Many officials concluded that it was better to tap into the 
booming inter-imperial trade than oppose it.  In this way, those colonial officials in the 
lower rungs of imperial bureaucracy leveraged their offices for personal and familial 
enrichment.  Most of the time, Venezuela’s smugglers, producers and foreign contacts 
were all too happy to accept this bargain.  Corruption was, therefore, mutually beneficial 
as well as endemic among the lower ranks.   
Bureaucrats’ under-the-table arrangement with contrabandists belied their 
prescribed role as obedient servants of the Crown.  Their repetition of illegal behaviors 
shows that officials and Venezuelan subjects had reached a consensus on what 
constituted acceptable smuggling for public servants.  With each bribe taken, deal made, 
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or sum extorted, governors and the governed solidified these practices in everyday 
commercial exchange.  
The actions of local officials help uncover the simple mechanics of contraband 
corruption in Venezuelan ports and towns.  Compared to more senior officials such as 
governors and viceroys, who dirtied their hands with illicit trade, local officials had some 
distinct advantages.  Lower-level bureaucrats aroused less attention from the Crown and 
their superiors because they skimmed smaller quantities of goods and money from royal 
balance sheets.  Minor civil and military officials such as alcaldes, prize court judges, 
militia corporals, and coastguard men were often the only governmental representatives 
in far-flung outposts.  While the number of officers in Caracas diffused each other’s 
power, functionaries placed in Venezuela’s coastal hamlets often possessed immense 
authority over their jurisdictions.  The disadvantage to this tremendous sway was that it 
usually bound lower bureaucrats to one locality and one manner of smuggling.  These 
circumstances make their fascinating stories analytically easier to comprehend.  Though 
this chapter eventually will investigate the multi-faceted complicity of higher authorities 
towards extralegal commerce, such analysis begins with understanding the daily 
corruption of officials at the lowest rungs of government.   
What motivated administrators to participate in contraband?  From the start, the 
simple process of gaining an appointment drove authorities’ desire to profit from illicit 
trade.  Since the mid-seventeenth century, the sale of colonial offices served as a crucial 
money maker for the royal treasury.  A would-be administrator faced heavy costs 




and his family in the Americas, and often waiting years for the opening of the position.  
Thus, local offices, unlike positions with longer tenures or greater supervision, became 
entrepreneurial endeavors.
15
  The Crown recognized the inherent nature of corruption in 
the system, even going so far as levy a tax known as the media annata.  Officially noted 
as a tax on the annual salary of officials, the media annata in practice functioned as a 
means to regain revenue lost by authorities’ indiscretions.
16
   
Poor salaries exaggerated the strain on administrators’ funds and contributed to 
their involvement in illegal activities.  Pedro José de Olavarriaga, whose Instrucción 
general y particular del estado presente de la provincia de Venezuela en los años de 
1720 y 1721 revealed the depths of corruption in eighteenth-century Venezuelan 
bureaucracy, complained that lesser officials,  
lack salaries corresponding to the offices they hold.  Although many of them have 
paid between two hundred and three hundred pesos to obtain these positions, after 
a year a corporal will have one thousand or two thousand pesos in reserve.  
Certainly these men could not eat, nor maintain themselves, nor amass wealth in 
such a short time from their legitimate wages.  Thus, it is impossible for them not 
to have stolen publicly and permitted trade with foreigners.  From this they have 
enriched themselves and from this they pay and have paid the governors for their 
offices.
17
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As contraband trade represented one of the most common and profitable crimes in 




Bureaucratic traditions of graft also predisposed government functionaries to 
corruption.  Local officials encountered relatively little oversight allowing them the 
flexibility to participate in illicit schemes.  Higher authorities at the provincial level 
frequently appointed lesser officers with the mutual understanding that the chain of 
command would keep its secrets and share its ill-gotten profits.  To reinforce this 
patronage, governors allowed their subordinates to keep a share of captured contraband 
spoils.
19
   
Venezuelan authorities found many ways to penetrate mercantilist trade 
restrictions and siphon off for themselves a portion of the enormous foreign trade passing 
through the region.  At one extreme, some bureaucrats actively took on the role of 
smugglers, engaging in the direct buying and selling of contraband goods from non-
Spanish traders or their Venezuelan accomplices.  This was risky both due to the frequent 
violence that characterized illicit commerce and the higher level of exposure an official 
might incur in the direct perpetration of a crime.  However, this tactic was the most 
efficient means for bureaucrats to profit for it eliminated the middle men.  Unlike more 
senior officials, local authorities could usually keep a higher profile as they frequently 
governed areas with few other royal representatives to oversee their actions. 
                                                 
     
18
 Aizpurua, Curazao y la costa de Caracas, 55-56; Klooster, Illicit Riches, 133. 
     
19
 Robert J. Ferry, The Colonial Elite of Early Caracas: Formation & Crisis, 1567-1767 (Berkeley: 




The actions of Ambrosio Bello exemplify this type of trader.  Bello served as a 
militia corporal and prize court judge in Morón, a small town near Puerto Cabello in 
north central Venezuela.  In 1733, higher officials charged him with conducting illicit 
trade with foreigners.  Caracas Company agent, Domingo Arosteguí, specifically accused 
Bello of doing business with a known Irish smuggler named John White (referred to as 
“Juan Blanco” in the documents), whom anti-contraband patrols had captured bartering 
with Bello.   
According to White’s testimony, the corporal had used his office to orchestrate a 
complex arrangement of trades with White and other Spanish merchants.  Bello asked 
White to procure gunpowder, musket balls, shotguns, and European foods including 
cured ham, bacon, wine, and liquor from Curaҫao on credit.  When White arrived with 
these items and requested payment, Bello arranged for one hundred zurrones of cacao (a 
zurron being about a satchel-sized package often wrapped in animal skin) to be sold to 
him at the very favorable price of two pesos per zurron.  It was only fifteen days later that 
White received his payment.  Bello subsequently brought Catalan merchants in to trade 
an additional one hundred fifty zurrones with the Irishman.  It seems that Bello and his 
men kept a portion of the goods to resell in town and gave the rest to the merchants as 
payment for their cacao.  It is unclear whether Bello and his men worked as agents of the 




received commercial benefits from his voyages in the past, indicating a longstanding 
relationship with the foreign trader.
20
          
Ambrosio Bello’s connections to merchants, his military appointment, his 
reputation for discretion, and his willingness to be bought off all inspired trust from both 
foreign smugglers and Spanish American buyers.  His familiarity with an Irish smuggler 
and Catalan merchants allowed him to arrange favorable trades given his knowledge of 
circum-Caribbean commercial conditions.  In a small town such as Morón, the 
complacency of an authority such as Bello almost assured impunity.  Juan Pascual, one of 
the traders captured with the Irishman John White admitted that he and the other 
merchants only traded with White because they knew that Bello was complicit in the 
trade.  Bello could keep a secret.  Pascual stated that the terms of trade established by 
Bello mandated that the names of all merchants involved remain undisclosed to limit 
their exposure.
21
   
The smuggler White’s willingness to sell goods to Bello and his soldiers on credit 
and wait fifteen days for payment also signaled the trust he placed in the corporal.  Even 
if a deal went awry, as this arrangement did, smugglers were confident in their ability to 
placate virtually any royal representative with cash.  Several soldiers involved in 
capturing White and Bello recounted how their ambush astounded the smuggler.  White, 
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assuming these guards were as amenable as Bello, was shocked to learn that they would 
not take a bribe of two thousand pesos to let him go.
22
   
Like Bello, Felipe de Ugarte used his position as corporal to enrich himself 
through direct commerce.   Over the course of his tenure in the Valle de Capaya 
immediately east of Caracas, Ugarte became friendly with Dutch smugglers and, by local 
accounts, traded frequently with them.  Ugarte was rumored to have boarded Curaҫaoan 
ships on numerous occasions to do business and travel with the Dutch.  As evidence of 
these deals, prosecutors presented receipts confiscated from his belongings that listed 
goods he had purchased from his foreign friends and letters “signed with very distinct 
gratitude.”  This evidence made Ugarte’s defense, that he had curried the favor of the 
Dutch smugglers to eventually ambush and overwhelm their ship, ring hollow.
23
    
Though hands-on illicit trade was often the most efficient means to accumulate 
wealth from smuggling, a more passive approach to extralegal commerce was more 
common.  In this scenario, authorities from the viceregal level down to the lowliest 
corporal might accept bribes and kickbacks for looking the other way when contraband 
goods came through their jurisdictions.  Profits for tolerating smuggling ranged from 
small side businesses to elaborate enterprises.  Connivance with smuggling, while just as 
damaging for imperial trade revenues as direct exchange, was more difficult to pin on an 
offending bureaucrat. While anti-contraband forces would have been insufficient to 
handle the sheer volume of contraband passing along the coast in the best of 
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circumstances, it was administrators’ complacency with illicit exchange, not breakdowns 
in imperial defense, which enabled the business to flourish.
24
 
Some lower-echelon administrators nibbled at the edges of the contraband trade 
by ignoring the small-time smuggling of those around them.  In 1719, officials in Caracas 
prosecuted corporal Rodrigo Alvarez, who operated in the Valle de Caruao east of 
Caracas. They denounced him for his associations with both foreign and domestic illegal 
traders.  Alvarez allegedly had ignored the presence of illegal Dutch slaving vessels from 
Caruao to La Guaira and allowed them to anchor offshore and unload their human 
cargoes.
25
  As well as facilitating Dutch commerce, he supposedly aided the trade in 
illicit cacao within Caruao.  The corporal owned a store which carried, according to 
authorities, stolen cacao.  This product came to Alvarez’s pulpería by way of slaves who, 
in violation of both slave codes and commercial law, swiped discrete amounts of the crop 
from their masters.
26
  While prosecutors suspected Alvarez of involvement as a 
middleman in both of these smuggling infractions, their only evidence, other than 
circumstantial witness testimonies, was the presence of tiny amounts of cacao and foreign 
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liquor in his home.
27
  A fine of twenty pesos and the costs of his trial were the most that 
these prosecutors could muster as punishment against the corporal.
28
   
Some officials extracted much more substantial and habitual enrichment from 
smugglers.  Sebastián Medrano, the Prize Court Judge of Maracaibo in 1722, tolerated 
the presence of an elaborate smuggling ring that dwarfed the modest dealings allegedly 
perpetrated by Rodrigo Alvarez.  Medrano appointed his nephew Miguel de Medrano and 
a friend named Francisco Puche as his lieutenants.  Miguel’s familial connections to the 
prize court judge and Puche’s knowledge of the trade in contraband clothing made the 
two effective smugglers.  Under Sebastián Medrano’s neglectful eye, the two traveled 
widely throughout the regions surrounding Maracaibo, collecting cacao from many 
separate producers and selling it for illegal textiles.
29
  The governor of Maracaibo noted 
that though Miguel Medrano and Francisco Puche’s job was “to be vigilant against and 
guard the roads (celar y descaminar) against clothing introduced through illicit 
commerce,” in practice they did just the opposite.  Though the viceroy had appointed 
Sebastián inspector of the royal treasury (visitador de las reales cajas), the governor 
noted that “it was notorious and publicly acknowledged that he has done nothing in 
service to his Majesty” except collect his ten peso per day salary.
30
  With this corrupt 
man appointing them, Francisco Puche and Miguel Medrano not surprisingly believed 
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that they could simply sail their ships into port in broad daylight without declaring their 
cargos.   
In addition to the familial connection that cemented the Medranos’s smuggling 
enterprise, their business benefited from administrative and popular support.  The 
governor of Maracaibo believed that the Medranos could still count on the viceroy’s 
backing.
31
  His supposition was well-founded, as the Viceroy of New Granada, Jorge de 
Villalonga, was also involved in illegal trade and later faced charges of defrauding the 
royal treasury.
32
  The clan’s immunity to conviction provided further evidence of the 
clan’s bureaucratic favor.  Miguel Medrano presumably escaped numerous prosecutions 
over the years given that documents produced in 1740, some eighteen years after initial 
suspicions about the Medrano family, detailed his arrest for colluding with smugglers as a 
lieutenant in Maracaibo’s fort.
33
   
Popular sentiment most likely favored the Medranos as they provided a much-
needed, if illegal, service to the region.  The governor observed that before their 
smuggling, “this city and its province were so lacking and exhausted of goods that not for 
any price could olive oil, paper, iron, wax, and clothe be obtained.”  Since “the arrival of 
Don Sebastián de Medrano and his judges to this city, there has been an abundance of 
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quality products that would not have been experienced otherwise.”
34
  The governor’s 
back-handed compliment dramatized how the Medranos’s commercial misdeeds brought 
material prosperity to the area.  
As the Medranos uncle-nephew smuggling partnership demonstrates, local 
officials often had the easiest time overlooking offenses committed by family members.  
Corrupt administrators not only placed relatives in office, but also disregarded the 
smuggling of kin not on the payroll.  In small towns where one family member held an 
administrative position, a family business in smuggling might prosper.  Such was the case 
with Andrés de Tovar who held the post of lieutenant in the militia of Nuestra Señora de 
Pilar de Zaragoza, an inland village west of Puerto Cabello in western Venezuela.  
Tovar’s son Martín ran a store that sold illicit goods.  Andrés not only failed to shut down 
the shop, but also ignored his son’s frequent trips to transport illegal tobacco to the larger 
city of Carora where a Spanish merchant arranged for its passage to Curaҫao.  Martín and 
Andres’s actions clearly ran counter to Spanish strictures in Venezuela which tightly 
licensed the growth and trade of tobacco, the province’s other prominent cash crop, and 
forbid officers from participating in tobacco production.  Tovar’s reluctance to enforce 
the law stemmed not only from loyalty to his son, but also because, as one resident of the 
area flatly stated, “it is said publicly that all of the tobacco collected in this jurisdiction is 
bought by Don Andrés de Tovar.”
35
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Another strategy for officials looking to turn a profit involved embargoing and 
misappropriating contraband cargoes rather than ignoring them.  This practice went 
against the customary protocol attached to ship seizures.  According to approved practice, 
after seizing and judging a ship’s cargo to be contraband, military and civilian officials 
would sell the goods at public auction.  After port duties, sales taxes and the judge had all 
been paid (around one third of the total sum), between one half and two-thirds of the 
remaining prize would go to the royal treasury, while the crew of the anti-contraband 
patrol would divvy up the rest.
36
  Local officials who either failed to report a ship seizure 
or pilfered a portion of this vessel’s contents before declaring them significantly impacted 
royal revenues.  In some areas, goods and money from captured shipping represented a 
significant part of the local economy and was one of the only means by which the 
Spanish state would recoup any of income lost through illicit trade and tax evasion.
37
 
Not surprisingly, the imperial bureaucracy rigorously investigated this type of 
fraud as it cut into an important revenue stream.  Prosecutors accused several of the 
authorities described earlier of embezzling from embargoed contraband hauls.  The 
Medranos took illegal cuts from seized stockpiles of contraband.
38
  Felipe de Ugarte, the 
corporal of Capaya discussed earlier because of his close connections to Dutch traders, 
faced charges of misappropriating seized contraband goods in 1750.  Rather than 
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registering a detained foreign sloop and its cargo, Ugarte took it to port in Capaya, 
stripped the vessel of its contents, and distributed the loot among himself and his men.  
Don Julian de Arriaga, the governor of Venezuela, revealed that an inventory of Ugarte’s 
house and boat turned up goods as diverse as cloth, candles, Castilian soap, two female 
slaves, stockings, knives, glass, and gin.
39
  Arriaga recommended that these impounded 




Though embezzlement of small amounts of foreign contraband by officials was 
often tolerated, prosecutors were less likely to tolerate functionaries who stole from 
Spanish American producers.   In the case of Felipe de Ugarte, what caught the 
governor’s attention in the first place was not Ugarte’s embezzlement of foreign prizes, 
but rather his robbery of his neighbors under the auspices of suppressing illicit trade.  In 
1750, Juan Antonio Rodríguez de Sosa testified that Felipe Ugarte had violently robbed 
him of four hundred and sixty fanegas of cacao.  The hacendado claimed that he had 
stored the cacao in a shed on the banks of the Río Tuy while awaiting a merchant who 
would take it to be legally sold.  According to Rodríguez de Sosa, Ugarte came to his 
rancho during this period aboard one of two Dutch vessels.  Without provocation, the 
ships opened fire on Rodríguez de Sosa’s property causing him to flee into the woods.  
As he hid, he saw Ugarte and the Dutchmen carting off his crop and burning his rancho.  
Ugarte and his accomplices also stole from a Galician hacendado as well, bringing the 
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total amount pilfered to somewhere between six hundred and seven hundred fanegas.
41
  
The corporal acquired this large sum not through graft, but by outright piracy.   
Felipe de Ugarte pointed to his duties as a corporal to explain his presence at 
Rodríguez Sosa’s property.  He testified that he and his men had arrive at the rancho after 
the Dutch and rallied to capture the ship.  Ugarte’s men added that Rodríguez de Sosa 
was not the victim at all, but rather a contrabandist himself who had sold his cacao to the 
Dutch.  They believed that Rodríguez de Sosa sought to settle the score with Ugarte 
because the latter had embargoed his ill-gotten goods in the past and jailed several of his 
friends and relatives.  Furthermore, they stated that Ugarte had been in the process of 
transporting the cacao to La Guaira for proper registration when Caracas Company 
patrols stopped his ship and accused the corporal of the robbery.
42
     
For prosecutors involved in the case, Ugarte’s excuses did not hold water.  The 
collaboration of a Spanish corporal and Dutch smugglers in the bombardment of a 
Venezuelan hacendado was intolerable even within administrations given to corruption. 
The lawyer for the Audiencia of Santo Domingo accused Ugarte’s men of perjuring 
themselves to pay off their debts to him.
43
  Governor Felipe Ricardos decried the audacity 
of an “assistant of the foreigners to take by force from the produce of the inhabitants of 
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this province to make trade with these foreigners.”
44
  The auctioning of Ugarte’s ship and 
slaves as a legitimate seizure suggested that his legal position was untenable.      
Whether they served as smugglers, brokers, facilitators, or accessories in the 
contraband trade, local officials used their unique positions in the military and political 
apparatuses of small-town Venezuela to aid illicit foreign commerce into the colony.  In 
the process, such officials enriched themselves and their families, and strengthened 
smuggling rings.  Local administrators’ ability to bypass the law in their favor derived 
from their status and authority as the sole governmental representative presiding over 
trade in distant communities.  Furthermore, their enterprises benefited from these men’s 
knowledge of local conditions and connections within the legal system.  Finally, the 
subjects of undersupplied Venezuelan localities usually approved of the increased 
economic interaction with the outside world brought by crooked officials more than they 
disapproved of these authorities’ corruption.   
Civil servants and military men at the lowest rungs of governmental power 
present a unique opportunity to understand the mechanics of bureaucratically-aided 
smuggling.  Because these men exercised control over limited geographical and political 
areas, they tended to stick to only one or two facets of administrative corruption.  By 
analyzing these discrete histories, the basic processes of bureaucratic involvement in 
smuggling become clear.  In the section that follows, this chapter will analyze 
administratively-facilitated smuggling at the gubernatorial level.  These higher authorities 
                                                 
     
44




combined and permutated many of the contraband trading processes that this discussion 
of local officials has detailed already.     
 




Governors of Venezuela were significant conduits for illicit trade even as their 
illicit actions made them lightning rods for controversy in Venezuelan society.  Corrupt 
governors enjoyed far more influence in the smuggling business than local officials due 
to their power and prestige.  However they were only as powerful as their connections to 
governmental, familial, and commercial networks.  Caraqueño subjects, specifically the 
merchant class, ousted governors who threatened community moral codes or 
monopolized the contraband trade for themselves.  In the 1730s, the Caracas Company 
rose to prominence and wrestled this oversight capacity from the creoles.  The Company 
based its intrusion into Caracas politics on the need to eliminate contraband in the 
province.  Its intervention endangered a long-standing symbiosis between smugglers and 
officials and engendered the hatred of all classes of Caraqueños.
45
  This anger would later 
boil over into significant rebellions against the Company’s rule.   
This section offers two case studies of corrupt governors of Venezuela.  The 
transgressions of Jose Francisco de Cañas y Merino and Sebastián García de la Torre are 
representative of many of their peers.  Their experiences with smuggling also illustrate 
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changes in the commercial and political fabric of the province as a result of the arrival of 
the Caracas Company.  
Venezuelan governors, like Cañas and García, pursued more diverse courses than 
their subordinates in their circumvention of Spanish trade law.  Gubernatorial enrichment 
through the black market was just as common as commercial crime at the lower levels of 
government, and often employed the same processes.  However, governors ruled over 
larger geographic areas, participated in more branches of governmental affairs, and had 
more discretionary powers than local officials.  The amount of money an individual 
governor might skim off the top of imperial trade balances was also much greater than 
that of a local functionary.  As a result, the investigations of their infractions left an 
immense paper trail in the documentary record.
46
  While the diffusion of authority in 
Caracas meant that there were more Crown and city representatives to monitor a corrupt 
governor, his wide-reaching authority allowed him to participate more fully in more parts 
of the contraband business.  
One form of gubernatorial smuggling involved direct buying and selling from 
contrabandists.  Although governors in Venezuela sometimes bartered face-to-face with 
illegal foreign merchants, they engaged in this practice less frequently than their 
subordinates.  It was dangerous to appear on the coast presumably trading with outsiders.  
One governor unafraid to engage in such trading was José Francisco de Cañas y Merino 
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who served a stormy term from 1711 to 1714.  The son of a presidio sergeant in northern 
Africa, Cañas came from a middling military background.
47
  During his reign, this 
magistrate irritated the town council (cabildo), the elites, ordinary citizens, the clergy, 
and virtually anyone else not within his inner circle.   
As corrupt as he was relentless, Cañas was a first-rate smuggler.  Of the thirty 
charges enumerated against him by royal prosecutors in his 1716 sentencing, sixteen 
were linked in some way to illicit trade.
48
  Several sources catalogued his brazen trading 
with the French under the cover of the asiento.  Cañas used this institution, which 
allowed appointed foreign contractors to legally import slaves into the Spanish colonies, 
as a pretext to bring in ships from the French Caribbean that sold him contraband flour 
and other goods.  Though the governor bought flour from the asiento ships for seven 
pesos per barrel, Caracas’s starved markets allowed him to sell these same barrels for 
twenty eight pesos each.
49
  As the royal treasurer in Caracas remarked, “he has 
introduced so much clothing by way of the French that there is not a shop in town that is 
not full to the rafters with the clothing and flour of the governor.”
50
   
Cañas also used slave ships from the asiento to send his cacao to market in Spain 
even though it was illegal for these vessels to carry extraneous goods back to Europe.  
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The cacao, along with profits from Cañas’s illicit trading, crossed the Atlantic under the 
name of a notary public in Caracas to conceal the governor’s involvement in the 
extralegal shipments.
51
  In addition to crooked trafficking under the asiento, Cañas also 
carried on friendly commercial relations with the Dutch governor of Curaҫao.  This 
exchange was particularly brazen given the fact that the two colonies were formally at 
war during Cañas’s term in office.
52
   
Seized by an entrepreneurial spirit, Cañas did not limit his commercial crimes to 
transactions with foreigners.  He also purchased several oceangoing vessels and 
transported his own cacao to Veracruz.
53
  Though certain Venezuelan merchants received 
this privilege, Spanish law forbid royal authorities from directly participating in such 
trade. 
For governors, collusion formed a more sensible path to wealth than direct 
exchange.  By conniving with smugglers but not straightforwardly buying their wares, 
governors enriched themselves and kept a low profile.  The hush money paid to 
provincial executives by contrabandists helped the latter evade capture, escape from 
custody, and avoid indictment.  José Francisco de Cañas, for example, made it 
abundantly clear that he would offer safe passage to foreign merchants willing to pay for 
the convenience.  His trial identified two Frenchmen and a Valencian from Martinique 
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that he had allowed to trade in La Guaira, Venezuela’s port, in exchange for sizeable 
bribes.  One smuggler, a Monsieur Buscarons, sold the enormous sum of twenty thousand 
pesos of clothing from the French Caribbean island to traders in Caracas in return for a 
payment of three to four thousand pesos to Cañas.
54
  Though he withheld arrest and 
prosecution for these paying salesmen, Cañas vigorously extorted those who would not 
pay his kickbacks voluntarily.  Caracas’s cabildo accused Cañas of squeezing nearly 
1600 pesos in fines from the merchants of the city after threatening them with 
confiscation of their goods, which he believed to be contraband from China or New 
Spain.
55
      
Sebastián García de la Torre also excelled at this type of connivance.  García 
served as governor of Venezuela nearly twenty years after Cañas.  His brief tenure, from 
1730-1732 followed a similarly difficult trajectory, but for different reasons.  García 
lacked his predecessor’s bravado for direct smuggling.  However, he built an equally 
large retinue of illegal traders that allowed him to profit from Venezuela’s covert 
commerce.   
García’s principle offense, in the eyes of his royal superiors, was not his flagrant 
violation of the law, but rather in his tendency to do nothing.  The residencia and trial of 
García outlined numerous cases where he and his son, who oversaw military and port 
operations at La Guaira’s fort, declined to prosecute their friends and associates for 
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trafficking illicit goods.  Of the fifty charges leveled against García in his trial, thirteen 
concerned instances in which he had let known contrabandists pass through his 
jurisdiction or freed them from prison without trial.   
García seemed like an equal pardoner, forgiving foreigners, Venezuelans, Canary 
Islanders, Indians, and fellow corrupt officials.  According to the report, numerous ships 
coming into port in 1731 and 1732 with unlicensed goods from Spain, the Canaries, and 
non-Spanish Caribbean islands dropped anchor and sold their cargoes in broad daylight.  
In one case, Caracas Company officials seized a ship arriving by way of Trinidad with a 
cargo of illicit slaves and dry goods originally from Martinique.  Though many witnesses 
testified to the illegal nature of the cargo, García overruled the Company, released the 
ship’s goods, and allowed its captain to sell them under the pretext that the ship came 
licensed from Puerto Rico.  In return, the captain compensated García’s son with gifts 
and purchased one thousand pesos of his cacao.
56
   
For his tendency toward legal forgiveness, García built allegiances and received 
thousands of pesos worth of handsome compensation.
57
  The García clan became so 
notorious for their role in these pursuits that one resident of Caracas admitted that, “it is 
said that captains of ships bring gifts to the captain of the fort [Sebastián’s son, Antonio 
García] so that he will tolerate the entrance of prohibited goods.  With the help of the 
captain, there was abundant commerce in cacao sent to New Spain, Spain, and the Canary 
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  Sebastián García even released a suspected murder.  Don Francisco 
de Aguiar, likely one of García’s business associates, was a known smuggler.  Aguiar 
negotiated with a corporal in the Valley of Cata to send an assassin to murder his 
business rival, Don Eustachio Galindo.  The killer carried out the homicide of Galindo, 
yet the corporal and Aguiar both walked from jail without trial.
59
       
In addition to taking bribes for their complicity from foreign and domestic 
smugglers, colonial governors also profited illegally from anti-smuggling efforts.  
Governors could perpetrate this type of graft in ways that lower officials could not, 
because they exerted control over the distribution of military funds in the province.  Both 
Jose Francisco de Cañas and Sebastián García de la Torre lined their pockets from 
imperial endeavors to suppress the contraband trade.  One method of perverting these 
attempts at enforcement involved the embezzlement of portions of a captured contraband 
stockpile (comiso) before prize court judges could lawfully appraise and sell it at auction.  
Cañas allegedly skimmed a considerable haul of 10,200 pesos worth of goods from 
various comisos over a period of years.
60
  Similarly, García had a proclivity for 
incorrectly evaluating and reporting the values of captured goods.
61
  This deceit 
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undermined efforts to curb contraband because it diverted pieces of the meager revenue 
that the Crown was able to recover from illegal trade.  
Governors added to their ill-gotten gains from anti-contraband patrols by 
embezzling money and resources used to fund the colony’s defenses against foreign 
invaders.  Royal investigators accused Cañas of stealing gunpowder meant for the 
protection of La Guaira and selling it to private merchants.
62
  Likewise, García pilfered 
money meant to pay the salaries of soldiers patrolling the coast and instead gave these 
wages to his family members.  For an official who did very little to halt illicit trading, 
García requested plenty of support to pay for questionable anti-contraband measures.  
Ironically, the governor who declined to imprison so many alleged smugglers took 
money from the royal treasury without prior consultation to pay for repairing Caracas’s 
jail.
63
   
In certain cases, García’s less-than-honest use of defense subsidies even 
compromised the security of Venezuela.  During his tenure, authorities questioned 
García’s conduct with respect to a major trade rebellion.  In 1730, Andresote, a slave of 
mixed African and Indian origins (zambo), started a rebellion.  The slave, aided by Dutch 
arms and supplies, led fellow runaways and more than a few white Venezuelans in a 
three-year fight against the Caracas Company, its involvement in the slave trade, and 
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Spain’s commercial monopoly.  Shortly after the rebellion began, García took the 
substantial sum of four thousand pesos from the royal treasury without authorization to 
pay for a raid against the zambo chief.  After a short and ineffectual sojourn into the 
country, García returned to Caracas empty-handed, but presumably with a fatter wallet.
64
  
Though he also dipped into the Caracas Company’s funds to pay for the fortification of 
the Yaracuy River, a key point of supply for the Andresote rebels, investigations into his 
conduct concluded that he had not constructed useful defenses there.
65
  
Given the litany of bribes, frauds, embezzlements, and smuggling perpetrated by 
Cañas and García, the issue of impunity comes to the fore.  How did bureaucrats like 
these get away with such blatant violations of the law?  Who covered their tracks and 
what relationships developed out of the inclusion of royal administrators into the 
structure of Venezuela’s illicit economy?  Imperial functionaries rarely acted as lone 
wolves in smuggling.  Instead, they were aware of their social surroundings.  Governors 
used their accumulated familial, collegial, and community connections to avoid detection 
and prosecution.  These executives’ ability to evade prosecution through alliances, 
judicial power, and appeasement of their subjects’ commercial prerogatives determined 
their fortunes as contrabandists and officials.    
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Governors given to corruption greatly simplified the process of extralegal 
enrichment for themselves if they found like-minded authorities with whom to enter into 
symbiotic relationships.  José Francisco de Cañas, for example, paid for two treasury 
officials, the Urbina brothers, to falsify treasury records as he skimmed off the top of 
contraband seizures.
66
  Sebastián García de la Torre maintained similarly friendly 
relations with compromised lower officials, in one case withholding damning documents 
in a smuggling investigation against his lieutenant in San Phelipe.
67
      
Due to the highly personalized nature of politics of early modern Spanish 
America, family relations were as pivotal as bureaucratic connections for many governors 
involved in contraband trade.  Abnormally, no evidence points to Cañas using familial 
connections to advance his extralegal aims.  In contrast to his predecessor, García 
attempted to mold Venezuela’s customs administration into his family’s personal domain.  
As discussed earlier, the governor made his son, Antonio, captain (castellano) of the fort 
at La Guaira, Caracas’s port.  This appointment stirred conflict in certain Caraqueño 
merchants circles that thought the twenty-six-year-old vastly under-qualified for his 
occupation.  Despite complaints, Antonio García proved amenable to smugglers and 
maintained his father’s cover for contrabandists.  He accepted massive bribes and 
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plucked his allies from the clutches of prosecution.
68
  He also used his advantageous 
position in La Guaira to arrange for the sale of cacao acquired by his family to merchants 
who then transported it to markets in New Spain.
69
   
Sebastián García’s appointments did not stop with his son.  He placed other 
family members in salaried positions as soldiers though these men never showed up for 
muster.  García’s personal family fiefdom of customs enforcement was completely 
ineffectual in preventing smuggling, but a valuable enterprise for his clan.  Over the 
course of his brief tenure, García’s nepotism was alternately embraced by most 
Venezuelan traders and loathed by Caracas Company officials.
70
 
Yet there were limits: pliable colleagues and familial relations only could ease the 
legal pressures on a crooked governor so much.  The support of Caraqueños, specifically 
the local merchants with whom he traded, was paramount to maintaining credit within the 
Spanish imperial bureaucracy.  Unfavorable testimonies of locals could sour the 
evaluations (residencies) of governors at the end of their terms or even lead the imperial 
government to open secret investigations into a bureaucrat’s conduct during his reign.  
Heavy fines and even jail time could result from such measures.  Thus, governors like 
García and Cañas needed the approval, or at least silence, of the men with whom they 
traded and connived.  The same thresholds of corruption and smuggling set by 
Venezuelans for their lower officials applied also to their tolerance of governors’ 
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offenses.  As García and Cañas’s tenures will show, the citizens of Caracas, led by the 
commercial class, powerfully influenced the outcomes of official inquiries into 
bureaucratic corruption. 
Sebastián García’s allegiance to Venezuelan traders was so strong that he even 
protected them at points when their interests interfered with critical government business.  
He intervened in merchant affairs only to siphon off bribes from black market 
transactions.  In one such case, García failed to prosecute Pablo Bernardo Enriquez, a 
hacendado who had been trading directly with Andresote, the leader of the failed 1730 
slave uprising.  Though this cacao producer’s commerce with the rebel chief helped fund 
an insurgency that brought significant upheaval to the province, García gave him a free 
pass.
71
 On the whole, relatively few traders appeared in the records to speak ill of García.  
This absence underscores the passive and mutually beneficial role that García’s 
facilitation played in the underground commerce of these merchants.   
As Sebastián García was, on the whole, a less confrontational and more discrete 
governor than José Francisco de Cañas, he accumulated fewer enemies.  Unfortunately 
for him, the main adversary he made, the Caracas Company, became a powerful player in 
Venezuelan politics.  As part of early Bourbon efforts to make Venezuela, a marginal part 
of the empire, economically productive, the Caracas Company exercised broad control 
over the seas, prize courts, laws, and finances of the province from 1728 onward.   
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One scholar has suggested that fights over jurisdiction frequently broke out 
between government officials and Caracas Company employees because both groups 
wanted the spoils, from either captured goods or kickbacks, which came from illicit 
trade.
72
  Company representatives used their considerable clout to advocate for the 
removal of corrupt officials who threatened their interests.  Such efforts overpowered the 
Caracas cabildo and citizen petitions’ preferences regarding a particular governor.  
Suddenly, peninsular authorities began to prosecute bureaucratic corruption not when it 
offended creole thresholds, but rather when it irritated the commercial whims of 
metropolitan outsiders like the Company. 
García, who no doubt saw the Company as meddlesome to the interests of his 
smuggler friends, became a general nuisance to its operations.  Garcia’s men harassed 
Company ships in port.
73
  The governor also granted licenses to Venezuelan merchants to 
transport cacao to New Spain, the Canary Islands, and Spain all in direct violation of the 
Caracas Company’s rights.  These merchants even formed the beginnings of a parallel 
trading company with García’s blessing.
74
  Not surprisingly, encouraging direct 
competition in what was supposed to be a monopoly market enraged the Basque 
company and hastened García’s demise.  It was no accident that after an investigation 
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forced him to flee to a Caracas convent in 1732, García’s successor served as the first of a 
string of Basque-born governors of Venezuela.
75
      
Unlike García, Jose Francisco de Cañas’s interventions in the judicial process 
sought to strike against his Caraqueño competitors in the smuggling business rather than 
against a group of outsiders.  Many of the most animated complaints against Cañas came 
as a result of the scandal in which he became embroiled in 1712.  In that year, Cañas 
ordered the summary executions of eleven mule-drivers (arrieros) who had been 
smuggling cacao and tobacco from the hinterlands around Caracas.  Though the law 
allowed for contrabandists to receive the death penalty, in practice this punishment was 
exceptionally rare in the colonial period.  Despite the fact that these men were essentially 
poor, ignorant middlemen, Cañas ordered them all to be hung after a mere three-day trial.  
That three of the arrieros were minors only increased the infamy of this sentence.  The 
governor overruled an appeal from the men’s legal counsel to spare them, threatened the 
lawyer with physical violence should he continue to question Cañas’s will, and executed 
the mule drivers that day.  In doing so, Cañas not only violated judicial procedure with 
regards to the right of the accused to make appeals, but also the proper interval after 
sentencing when the guilty could be executed.
76
   
As the previous discussion of Cañas’s proclivity towards smuggling makes clear, 
this newfound zeal to prosecute contrabandists to the full extent of the law came not from 
a sudden change of heart, but rather from a more straightforward motivation: these mule-
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drivers carried the goods of his competitors.  In fact, various accounts credited Cañas 
throughout his tenure with efforts to tamp down illicit commerce.
77
  The governor’s 
leniency only applied to those traders who had cooperated with him.  Smugglers not 
willing to go into business with Cañas experienced his strict adherence to the law.
78
  As 
the citizens of Caracas made clear in a petition to the Crown, “without more cause than 
the desires of his absolute will, he has treated many of the noble vassals of this republic 
with public contempt, imprisoning and incarcerating them with shackles and chains in 
this city and in La Guaira.”
79
  
Whether out of a desire to deflect attention from his crimes or due merely to a 
petty sense of vindictiveness, the governor was given to playing the martinet in his public 
persona.  He railed against contraband trade and claimed it sprung forth from the moral 
depravity of his subjects.  He warned of the “grave harm and disorder originating from 
the many vagrants and people without residence who converge on this site [the 
hinterlands of Caracas]” and of the “unmarried women capable of causing scandal.”
80
   
After linking moral vices to commercial crime, Cañas sought to get to the 
problem’s roots.  He advocated a two-fold solution.  He would resettle immoral subjects 
and launch a sporadic series of morality campaigns that bizarrely involved the 
questioning of young women as to their sexual habits.  Cañas claimed the authority to 
enter homes, and then haul away and punish wayward young ladies.  Most shockingly, 
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the governor insisted upon administering virginity tests to determine these women’s 
virtue.  As one citizen petition to the king stated,  
he removed a measure from his pocket and invoking the name of Your Majesty in 
such an obscene action, and told them: This is a measure that the king grants us 
governors to learn who is not a maiden (doncella). Thus, [even] if she refuses, I 
will measure the lady to find out. Fearful, as they were ignorant people, they 
thought it would be an execrable crime to refuse after having heard the sovereign 





Notwithstanding the ambiguities of the text, it is clear that the tests were mere subterfuge 
for Cañas’s sexual violation of the women.   
The governor had a two-fold goal: he aimed to shift scrutiny away from his illicit 
trade and simultaneously indulge his carnal appetites.  His conduct threatened the 
marriage prospects and respectability of these women who, “having been taken before by 
popular belief for maidens, now were defamed and without credit and took from this 
occasion such an undignified label.”
82
  That Cañas successfully executed these lewd 
actions demonstrated the power a governor held over marginal provinces such as 
Venezuela.     
Despite his authority, outraged subjects skillfully and forcibly argued for Cañas’s 
removal.  The petitions of the Caracas cabildo and the citizens of the city emphasized 
Cañas’s commercial fraud and judicial meddling long before they turned to his sexual 
abuses.  The writers of such appeals undoubtedly understood that crimes against the 
king’s money and legal order mattered more to the Council of the Indies than abuses 
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against individual subjects.  The petitions’ authors stressed the violence wrought on the 
collective good, rather than simply the individual.  In their view, the governor’s virginity 
tests and public questioning of the ladies, premised on diverting attention from his own 
commercial crookedness, had done significant harm to the social order and public credit 
of the city by leaving its women unmarriageable.     
Cañas fought back against these accusations and tried to turn the tables on his 
opponents.  The governor opined that his anti-contraband operations had been received, 
“very sensitively by the residents of this province, especially the cabildo and vecinos of 
this city, because they have not been able to carry on their commerce seeing as they have 
been charged with this and other evils and offenses.”  He attributed his initial 
imprisonment in Caracas to the malevolent hatred of Don Luis Arias, who had petitioned 
for a royal cédula to take him into custody.  This was revenge given that earlier, Cañas 
had seized the assets and slaves of Arias’s sister during the prosecution of her husband, 
whom the governor believed to have defrauded the king for nearly twenty years.
 83
   
 In spite of his counterarguments, a secret investigation against Cañas eventually 
resulted in the governor’s removal, many thousands of pesos in fines, and his 
imprisonment in Spain.  He only narrowly escaped a death sentence when a royal birth 
resulted in a general pardon.
84
  Though Cañas acquired some friends from his 
involvement in covert commerce, he clearly alienated significant factions in the merchant 
community to his detriment. 
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The investigations and sentencing of Cañas and García demonstrated the divide 
between the two governors’ attitudes toward Caracas’s illicit merchants.  García’s non-
confrontational style of governing inspired no ill will from his subjects.  The governor 
never undermined the covert business of others nor sought to monopolize the smuggling 
trade for himself.  On the contrary, he was quick to provide an improper ship license or 
release contrabandists from the grasp of the law for the right price.  His complacency 
enraged the Caracas Company, a group of Basque outsiders, instead of Venezuelan 
locals.  
That Cañas’s secret investigation came about as a result of the incessant 
complaints of Caracas’s cabildo, rather than imperial authorities, highlights the rancor he 
had incited in the capital.  His ruthless intimidation, unlawful arrests, and sexual violation 
of Caraqueñas overshadowed his utility as a functionary complicit with the contraband 
trade.  Moreover, in attempting to intrude into every aspect of extralegal commerce and 
viciously cutting out his competition, Cañas threatened the lifeblood of the economy.   
The expulsion of Cañas and García by two very different authorities expressed 
how much had changed in Venezuelan politics in the twenty years between their 
appointments.  Though the two approached Caraqueño society in very different manners, 
both men served only short tenures in office followed by ignominious exits.  It was the 
cabildo and residents of Caracas that had had the last word in dismissing Cañas.  
Conversely, despite subjects’ favorable impression of García twenty years later, his 
ouster for smuggling came from outsiders to the colony.  The Caracas Company, due to 




judicial clout for a recently-formed institution.  It easily removed García and went on to 
install two Basque governors whom locals almost universally detested.  García’s 
removal, along with the appointment of his Basque successors, came to signify an 
infuriating power grab by a foreign entity.  The Company’s meddling in the compact 
between officials on the make and colonists sustained by smuggling fed a creole anger 
that questioned the organization’s right to rule Venezuelan commerce.  
 
Smuggling Officials and the Legal System 
 
 
So far, this chapter has explored the basic protocol of corrupt bureaucrats and 
their smuggling’s influence on Venezuelan societal and governmental arrangements.  
This section analyzes the legal system and its punishment of corrupt officials in further 
detail.  For administrators unlucky enough to get caught practicing or tolerating illicit 
trade, the Spanish legal system proved to be a deeply malleable apparatus.  Suspect 
functionaries based their defenses around demonstrating personal service to the Crown 
and discrediting their accusers, often by making their own allegations of smuggling.  
Their trials embodied the hyper-partisan and personalistic nature of early-modern 
governing structures.   
Administrative groups linked by patronage, friendship and kinship sought to 
dishonor rival bureaucratic clusters.  For the guilty, sentencing depended upon 
connections within the legal system and the amount they had stolen from royal revenues.  
In punishing the guilty, the imperial government focused primarily on recouping lost 




showed that, to some extent, it expected and tolerated the former.  The Spanish legal 
system’s subjective treatment of offending officials, like the illicit actions of these 
administrators themselves, served to regularize contraband trade as a standard 
commercial practice in Venezuelan society. 
 In their trials and interrogations, public servants prosecuted for their illicit 
dealings employed two well-worn defenses to exonerate themselves.  Their most 
important argument was to portray themselves as fervent guardians against illicit trade.  
Most functionaries could list a few examples where they had hauled in the guilty.  From 
these instances, officials hoped to emphasize their zealous enforcement of commercial 
law and detract from criminal accusations.  Juan de la Tornera Sota, the governor of 
Cumaná, used this strategy to downplay the claims made against him between 1726 and 
1730.  According to his accusers Tornera Sota had soured the close trading relations 
between the province of Cumaná and Margarita, the island province that adjoined it.  
They claimed that in 1726, Tornera Sota had published an order (bando) that prohibited 
trade and shipping with Margarita because the governor claimed that Margarita was in 
the midst of a smallpox epidemic.  Tornera Sota insinuated that the epidemic had arrived 
via Dutch vessels.
85
   
Despite Tornera Sota’s warnings, numerous officials from Margarita testified that 
no such epidemic existed.  The governor’s accusers charged him with intentionally 
keeping subjects of Margarita from passing to Cumaná to discourage outsiders from 
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discovering Tornera Sota’s illicit commerce with foreigners.
 86
  Furthermore, he used the 
smallpox excuse to avoid seizing and properly evaluating Dutch ships.  Tornera Sota 
even imprisoned and quarantined anti-contraband patrols from Margarita who had battled 
the Dutch.
87
   
Tornera Sota denied these accusations, but also quickly pointed to his record of 
service in the “extinction of illicit commerce with foreigners”.  He testified to persecuting 
contraband and contrabandists.
88
  He claimed to have stopped Juan de Olea, a 
Venezuelan smuggler, from going to Martinique with his cargo.  Two autos which he 
presented to the king revealed that he had captured two known British smuggling ships 
during his tenure.
89
  In particular, Tornera pointed to his prosecution of Bernabe Angel de 
Toledo, a merchant who had stolen goods from official register ships.
90
  With these 
examples of dedicated service, Tornera Sota hoped to vindicate his character and cast 
doubt on the accusations of his rivals.   
José Francisco de Cañas, the governor of Venezuela discussed in the previous 
section, also proffered his deeds as an enforcer in an attempt to nullify charges against 
him.  From Cañas’s point of view, Caraqueño society was rife with contraband.  The 
patricians of this city had made a mockery of the law, trafficking with the Dutch from La 
Guaira whenever possible.  Cañas estimated that as much as half (25,000 fanegas) of the 
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cacao that left Venezuela every year did so illegally.  From this, he deduced that the 
Crown lost around 100,000 pesos annually from duties not paid in Venezuela and 
Veracruz, the principle departure and arrival points of this cacao.   
To combat these excesses, Cañas stressed that he had put his own money into 
contraband patrols and outfitted four sailing ships with a crew of three hundred men to 
guard the coast.
 91
  He championed the formation of a pardo militia to suppress 
contraband.
92
  He even journeyed into the field to personally capture Dutchmen in 
Barquisimeto.
93
  The governor extolled capital punishment of homegrown contrabandists, 
including the execution of the eleven arrieros describer earlier, as a means of sending a 
message to those who would break the law.
94
   
There was some validity several of Cañas’s claims.  He isolated the neighboring 
island of Tucacas, a hotbed of contraband, so that the Dutch momentarily abandoned it.  
During his tenure legal cacao shipments out of Venezuela doubled.  For this vigilance, he 
found himself chained up in Caracas’s jail for eighty days because it was, in his opinion, 
“everyone’s business to destroy me.”
95
   
To reinforce their personal claims of zeal and hardships in defending royal 
commercial revenues, officials marshaled their friends and cohorts to testify to their 
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meritorious service.  Such corroboration proved a key element of a bureaucrat’s legal 
defense.  It also revealed the ways that functionaries courted the loyalty of their peers.  
Juan de la Tornera Sota, the governor of Cumaná accused of concocting a fake smallpox 
scare for his own commercial gain, brought captains of the Cumaná militias to testify to 
his sense of duty.  These men acknowledged that “they had neither seen nor made such 
considerable foreign ship seizures as in the time of Governor Juan de la Tornera Sota.”
96
  
The captains’ favorable remarks probably came as a result of the preferential treatment 
Tornera Sota gave to the militias.  His accusers believed that Tornera Sota had showered 
these military units with the spoils of his trading with the Dutch.
 97
  Furthermore, he 
allowed them to buy from his personal stores on credit.
98
  Given the precarious financial 
situation of irregular soldiers throughout the colonial period, these benefits may well 
have secured positive testimony from the militias.
99
 
Corporal Felipe Ugarte showed a similar generosity to the armed forces.  As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, Ugarte stood accused of using Dutch firepower to rob 
cacao hacendados in his jurisdiction.  According to his detractors, Ugarte had liberally 
gifted portions of his contraband seizures to the soldiers he commanded and in the 
process bought their loyalty.
100
  The soldiers corroborated Ugarte’s denial of the robbery, 
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confirmed that his accuser, Juan Antonio Rodríguez de Sosa, was a contrabandist, and 
testified to his bravery in various skirmishes with smugglers.
101
 
The second method of defense employed by besieged bureaucrats was to smear 
the reputations of their accusers.  The most popular means of doing this involved hurling 
counterclaims of smuggling upon their opponents.  In this way, corrupt officials made 
hypocrites of their enemies.  Furthermore, as contraband trade was rife in Venezuela, 
counter-accusations were sometimes true.   
Sectional considerations prompted much of the mudslinging.  Lineages of corrupt 
officials defended their interests, protected themselves from conviction, and distributed 
the riches of smuggling in Venezuela throughout their ranks.  These groups of 
bureaucrats often accused one another of facilitating illicit commerce.   
The trial of Governor Diego Portales y Meneses serves to underscore 
administrative factionalism’s importance in contraband trading, smear operations, and 
legal defense in colonial Venezuela.  Partisan politics generated fierce animosities during 
Portales’s twice-interrupted term as governor from 1721 to 1728.  Animosities began in 
1720, when the Viceroy of New Granada, Jorge de Villalonga, had sent two agents 
(jueces comisionarios) named Pedro José de Olavarriaga and Pedro Martín Beato to 
Caracas to investigate the state of the treasury and suppress contraband trade.  The 
inquiries of these men led to the dismissal of the previous governor, Marco de Betancourt 
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y Castro in 1721 for his incessant smuggling.  Diego Portales y Meneses replaced 
Betancourt in the post.   
Portales’s reign was even more conflict-laden than that of his predecessor.  In 
Portales’s first stint as governor he alienated both the viceroy and the Caracas cabildo.  
Not wanting the viceroy’s investigators to meddle around in his affairs, Portales jailed 
Pedro Martín Beato and Pedro José de Olavarriaga and then liberated the deposed Marco 
de Betancourt y Castro against the viceroy’s orders.  Faced with direct disobedience, 
Viceroy Villalonga ordered Portales’s arrest in 1723 on account of his rough treatment of 
Beato and Olavarriaga.  Yet, a royal cédula freed him from jail shortly after his 
imprisonment.   
Portales continued to stoke sectional rancor after his first arrest.  He appointed the 
Bishop of Caracas as his temporary successor, gaining a powerful ally in the clergyman, 
and began a legal vendetta against members of the cabildo and the viceregal government.  
After the viceroy’s men re-arrested Portales, he served one month in jail in 1724 before 
fleeing and taking refuge in the Bishop’s house.  At this point, both Portales’s and the 
cabildo’s supporters seemed ready to take up arms against one another to decide who 
would govern Caracas.  After a brief period in exile, Portales returned to the governorship 
with the authority of a royal cédula in 1726.  He governed unopposed until 1728.
102
   
For nearly a decade, those partial to the Caracas cabildo, the viceroy, and his 
agents Beato and Olavarriaga fought a legal battle for control of Caracas against the 
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forces of Portales and the Bishop of Caracas.  Throughout this struggle, both cadres used 
accusations of contraband trading as weapons to weaken and discredit their opponent’s 
right to rule.  Pedro José de Olavarriaga and Pedro Martín Beato accused Diego de 
Portales y Meneses of a host of infractions, but most involved some form of illicit 
commerce.  In addition to being utterly insubordinate to the viceroy, they alleged that 
Portales had used presidio troops in La Guaira for his own business purposes.
103
  He had 
also participated in cacao trading despite legal prohibitions against governors entering 
into such commerce.  Furthermore, Portales associated with known smugglers, including 




Olavarriaga and Beato pointed to their reputations and unjust imprisonment as 
proof that the governor was tangled up in extralegal trade.  Both of the agents had a 
record of incorruptibility.  Olavarriaga, quite literally, had written the book on smuggling 
in 1722.  His Instrucción general y particular del estado presente de la provincia de 
Venezuela en los años de 1720 y 1721 examined the problems inherent in commercial 
policy and its enforcement, and proffered solutions to Venezuela’s contraband crisis.  The 
two men had been integral in bringing down the former governor, Marco de Betancourt y 
Castro, and now they sought to depose Portales.  For this, Portales imprisoned them “with 
the sole goal of terrorizing us, and at the same time pleasing the illicit merchants...with 
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the violences done unto us because we had almost extinguished the foreign trade.”
105
  
Numerous testimonies from Olavarriaga and Beato as well as others reinforced the 
agents’ impeccable credentials.  During the time they had been in Venezuela, they had 
fought in pitched battles against Dutch contrabandists and recovered an astonishing 
115,049 pesos in seized goods.
106
 
Diego Portales y Meneses, for his part, brought forth allegations of Olavarriaga 
and Beato’s misconduct in an attempt to discredit the two prize court judges.  He accused 
them of embezzling more than eight thousand pesos from their contraband seizures and 
distributing this money among their fellow officers.  Portales also alleged that they had 
received kickbacks to write pardons for masters who had brought unregistered slaves into 
the colonies.  The governor enlisted the help of the Bishop of Caracas, who testified in 
his favor and stated that Olavarriaga, Beato, and a host of other officials were “united and 
congregated to wipe out and destroy the authority and respect of the king’s ministers, 
putting up litigious impediments to the observance of their duties.”
107
  Despite Portales’s 
arguments, he was unable to sway judicial opinion on Olavarriaga and Beato’s credibility 
or escape viceregal censure upon termination of his term in office.
108
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Occasionally, factional divides broke down not by governmental branch, but 
rather by province.  As the case of Juan de la Tornera Sota mentioned earlier 
demonstrates, rival provinces could use accusations of illicit trade to damage the fortunes 
of one another.  Tornera Sota’s trumped-up rumors of a smallpox outbreak on Margarita 
no doubt served to discourage trade to that island.  Margarita’s governor, Juan de Vera, 
stressed Tornera Sota’s proclivity toward smuggling and aiding foreign merchants in his 
complaints about his island’s forced isolation.  The allegations exchanged by these 
warring governors suggested the tension between their provinces.   
Partisanship and personalism marked the sentencing of corrupt officials just as it 
had affected their legal defenses.  Those found guilty received inconsistent punishments 
often dependent on a host of factors.  No codified manual determined how the culpable 
would pay.  Instead those officials with the fewest connections in high places and the 
most enemies often received the harshest sentences.  Lower-level officials convicted of 
anything more than petty smuggling frequently endured harsh punishments because of 
their lack of influence.  Justice was often more consistent and summary at the lowest 
rungs of the administrative ladder.  Conversely, those with friends and allies at the 
viceregal and imperial levels might see stiff punishments diluted into mere slaps on the 
wrist.   
Nowhere was nepotism and inconsistency more evident than in the contradictory 
punishments doled out by colonial and imperial courts.  Surprisingly, sentencing for 
contrabandist officials was often harsher in colonial courts than in the appeals stage in 




had reason to believe that this body would treat them leniently.  That the council chose to 
step in at all meant that, in some instances, these men had friends protecting them in 
Madrid.   
Diego Portales y Meneses, the governor who disobeyed the viceroy and 
prosecuted officials who might inform upon him, possessed these connections in the 
Spanish court.
109
  The viceroyalty of Santa Fe had suggested that Portales be fined three 
hundred pesos for not confirming autos and expedientes against contrabandists, 10,000 
reales for illegally taking cacao from Venezuelan producers, 15,000 reales for his insider 
trading, 2500 reales for letting various contrabandists walk away from prosecution, and 
2000 reales for not confiscating the assets of several prize court judges. Despite the 
numerous testimonies against Portales, the Council of the Indies perceived the jail time 
he had served during two separate interruptions of his term as punishment enough and 
nullified or lessened most of the fines against the governor.
110
     
In addition to the tendency of its individual councilors to protect certain suspects, 
the Council of the Indies’ metropolitan governing priorities sometimes lightened the 
sentences doled out to bureaucrats.  The Council primarily cared about the balance sheets 
of colonial trade.  Even though administrative infighting regarding contraband trade 
could make the Province of Venezuela ungovernable for spells, as it did with the 
controversy between Portales and the Caracas cabildo, it did not necessarily affect 
commercial revenue.  Thus, officials who skimmed off the top of contraband seizures or 
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accepted bribes from foreign smugglers in a petty fashion tended not to arouse the 
interest of administrators in Madrid.   
Contrarily, in contraband cases linked to widespread embezzlement from the 
royal treasury or where officials siphoned off large sums destined for imperial coffers, the 
Council of the Indies took notice.  As only bureaucrats from the gubernatorial level and 
upwards on the administrative chain possessed the clout to misappropriate such amounts 
of money, the council rarely dealt with the crimes of local functionaries.  Of the cases 
consulted in this chapter, only a handful of the rulings on local officials came from 
Madrid.  The vast majority of council sentences concerned governors and viceroys.   
As their first priority, officials in Madrid sought to recover lost funds from 
wayward colonial administrators.  After confirming the guilt of the accused, prosecutors 
sought to attack the assets and private funds of corrupt functionaries.  The documentary 
paper trail of these lengthy financial inquiries sometimes stretched farther than the trial 
itself.  The case of Sebastián García de la Torre, the governor of Venezuela in the 1730s, 
demonstrates this money chase.  Much like modern police detectives investigating a mob 
boss’s offshore bank accounts, prosecutors spent nearly the contents of an entire legajo 
deciphering where García de la Torre kept his money in both Venezuela and Spain.
111
  
The diversified geographic nature of his holdings probably originated from García’s 
myriad connections to illicit merchant networks.   
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Similarly, investigators in Caracas and Madrid traced the path of José Francisco 
de Cañas’s assets and seized what they could.  For example, Cañas had sent between 900 
and 1,000 pesos aboard an asiento ship consigned under the name of a French merchant 
with orders to remit them to a contact in Madrid.
112
  Cañas also sent his associate 59,000 
reales worth of cacao to Spain to be deposited in an account for his wife and three 
daughters.
113
  The detection of these far-flung funds indicated the Spanish imperial 
government’s priorities in the prosecution of smuggling officials.   
Repairing the social and commercial damages wrought by corrupt officials in the 
colonies was more of an afterthought for the Council of the Indies.  The governing body 
applied few physical punishments meant to teach a moral lesson such as prison terms, 
forced labor, and exile.  It often removed these castigations entirely from viceregal 
sentences.  In his study of corruption in Buenos Aires, Zacarias Moutoukias concludes by 
the end of the seventeenth century, fines had become so routine as the primary 
punishment for smuggling that “we can speak of a tax on smuggling.”
114
  With Sebastián 
García de la Torre, for instance, the council upheld 6,000 of the 8,000 peso fine charged 
to him, but cancelled a four year labor sentence at the Spanish presidio in Ceuta.
115
  In the 
sentencing of José Francisco de Cañas, the council allowed the “fathers, mothers, wives, 
children, and heirs” of thirteen arrieros and private traders he had summarily executed for 
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possession of illicit goods to sue Cañas for damages.  It did not, however, directly 
concede any benefits to them.  The government body also permitted two men, whom 
Cañas had falsely imprisoned for a period of years, to seek the same restitution.      
Only in exceptional cases, where the corruption of a governor left a lasting scar 
on the social fabric of a community, might the Council of the Indies award damages.  
Virtually every testimony and town petition summoned against Cañas spoke of his 
infamous sexual abuse of and malice towards the young ladies of Caracas.  For six 
charges ranging from his virginity tests, to the beating, kidnapping, shaming, and possible 
rape of the young women, the council forced Cañas to pay a five hundred peso fine.  To 
put this in perspective, for illegally sending one shipment of cacao to Spain (about 900-
1000 pesos worth) via the asiento, Cañas garnered the same five hundred peso penalty.  
The fines for Cañas’s sexual crimes amounted to only a small portion of the two thousand 
to three thousand pesos in charges applied to the former governor that the document 
mentions at various points.   
Nonetheless, Cañas’s offenses were heinous enough that the council initially 
sentenced him to ten years of presidio labor in Ceuta, perpetual loss of office and exile 
from the Indies, and the fines.  All this came after he had spent several years in jail in 
Madrid.
116
  As stated earlier, ministers even debated the death penalty for Cañas, though 
a royal birth during his imprisonment secured him a general pardon with other 
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  By 1720, the year of Cañas’s sentencing, his notoriety had spread widely.  
In a consultation sent to the Audiencia de Filipinas, the Council of the Indies used his 
case as an example for how to proceed against a governor in Manila.  This official, 
among other offenses, had seized several ships violently resulting in unnecessary loss of 
life, threatened his subjects, and engaged in insider trading.
118
  The legal consultation 
suggests both Cañas’s importance as a legal precedent for dealing with smuggling 
governors, but also that his was an exceptional case. 
 What then were the most common sentences issued to wayward administrators by 
legal bodies in the Americas and Spain?  Fines played the largest part in the punishment 
of offending bureaucrats.  The quantities varied dramatically.  Rodrigo Alvarez, who had 
been accused of buying and selling goods stolen by slaves from their masters, paid just 
twenty pesos for a few questionable items found in his store.
119
  At the other end of the 
spectrum, colonial authorities bled dry Juan de la Tornera Sota, for inventing a smallpox 
scare to keep his illicit trade private.  Officials in Cumaná forced Tornera Sota to pay 
8000 pesos to Cumana’s treasury for personal trading that he did with merchants in 
Veracruz and the Canary Islands aboard register ships, 3500 pesos to the treasury for 
unspecified “excesses committed during the time of his government” and 4,000 pesos to 
the real cámara for leading them to prosecute Bernabe Angel de Toledo, who was later 
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  Fines could also take the form of the confiscation of an official’s property, 
particularly when the effects themselves were suspected to be contraband. 
 Prosecutors of crooked administrators usually removed the guilty from the office 
and location in which they committed their crimes.  One member of Maiquetía’s 
coastguard suspected of tolerating and arranging illicit transactions in the port lost his 
office and his privilege to go within four leagues of the coast or the town in 1758.
121
  
Though these penalties represented the soldier’s only punishment, forced removal from 
one’s home community in early modern Spanish America represented a significant 
hardship.  Exile might be temporary or permanent depending on an official’s misdeeds, 
but prohibition from holding office was usually perpetual. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, office-holding and its illicit benefits represented a significant source of 
income for many men, which they could scarcely afford to lose.  
 Sentences of the guilty resulted in physical confinement and control less 
frequently than fines or exile.  Officials more selective use of this punishment probably 
had to do with its potentially lethal nature.  As jails in this period were mainly temporary 
and insecure holding pens meant only for use over the course of a trial, incarceration for 
long durations occurred rarely.  Instead, prosecuting authorities invoked forced labor 
drafts to castigate many offenders.  Just as foreign smugglers frequently found 
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themselves toiling away on the construction of forts and manning military garrisons in 
inhospitable parts of the New World, Spain, and Africa so did the corrupt officials 
initially tasked with stopping them.  Such back-breaking labor in malarial locales of the 
Caribbean, violent Spanish beachheads in Africa, and fetid fortifications along the 
Spanish coast, when combined with poor living conditions and inadequate diet, produced 
high mortality rates.
122
   
Officials deciding the fates of their former colleagues, perhaps mindful of being 
castigated for their own potential infractions, probably reserved this punishment for the 
most unconnected officials and egregious offenders.  José Francisco de Cañas, as 
mentioned earlier, initially received a ten-year term to work the African presidio at Ceuta, 
though the Council of the Indies later absolved this sentence.  For Andres Martinez and 
Andres de Tovar, two lower-level smuggling soldiers, a lack of higher authorities willing 
to soften their sentences probably doomed the two.  In retribution for giving safe passage 
and info to Dutch smugglers, Martinez, a coastguard official, received an eight year term 
at Ceuta.  Tovar, a lieutenant in the militia of the inland hamlet of Nuestra Señora de 
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 Though capital punishment figured as the most serious punishment an official 
could receive for facilitating smuggling, its use in practice was exceedingly rare.  Royal 
cédulas of 1706 and 1724 allowed officials to invoke the death penalty for those found 
guilty of smuggling.
124
  The frequency with which smuggling took place and its nature as 
primarily a commercial crime made capital punishment excessive in the eyes of most 
administrators.          
 Overall, the Spanish legal system prosecuted officials involved in smuggling with 
the same mix of personalistic politics and factionalism that characterized these corrupt 
functionaries’ illicit transactions in Venezuela.  Investigations, prosecutions, defenses, 
and sentencing all built on loyalties and connections running through the administrative 
chain of command.  Returning the lost funds absconded with by smuggling officials 
figured prominently in the manner that prosecutors conducted their investigations.  Both 
the accusers and the accused talked a good game about the ill effects of contraband trade 
upon the Province of Venezuela and the evils of the men who allowed it.   
Yet, for all this bluster, the cases examined here and the numerous corrupt 
administrators that evaded detection suggest that the business ventures of shady officials 
in Venezuela far outstripped the ability or will of Spanish judicial administrators in either 
Spain or the colony to punish them.  In practice, many parties negotiated commercial 
trade law and the penalties for those who broke it.  As a result, the conniving bureaucrat, 
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like foreign smugglers, and their Venezuelan accomplices, continued to feature as an 





 As this chapter has demonstrated, bureaucratic engagement in smuggling was as 
integral to illegal trade as it was to the financial wellbeing of officials.  Perhaps no 
amount of policing could have brought smuggling on the Venezuelan coast to a halt.  But 
a fully-functioning and incorruptible system of customs enforcement and prosecution 
would have crippled the business.  Illicit trading perpetrated by foreigners in the dead of 
night or out of isolated coves would have been more difficult.  The category of brazen 
smuggling that took place in broad daylight or via official apparatuses of trade such as 
the asiento or register ships would have been nearly impossible.  Unfortunately for 
Crown balance sheets, this counterfactual never came to be.   
Instead, governmental corruption’s role in the smooth operation of illicit 
commerce proves that local connections and networks greatly influenced bureaucratic 
actions in colonial Spanish America.  Alejandro Cañeque contends that if the early 
modern state existed at all, it was an “institutional expression of social relationships.”
125
  
As these Venezuelan cases make clear, most officials could scarcely be expected to 
maintain loyalty and fidelity to the commercial policy of Spanish rulers an ocean away 
when their local sphere of influence pushed them in the opposite direction.  Underpaid 
                                                 





government functionaries seized the opportunity to enrich themselves in the communities 
in which they lived.  With bribes and business partnerships, Spanish American smugglers 
removed the greatest potential obstacle toward integration within international markets.   
In navigating this atmosphere of venal government, eighteenth-century 
Venezuelans had developed, in collaboration with shady officials, acceptable norms of 
corruption.  Keeping their operations within these standards could determine a corrupt 
administrator’s longevity in office.  Most of Caraqueño society perceived no distinct 
moral wrong in smuggling nor in their governors’ use of the business to turn a profit.  
Furthermore, extralegal international trade benefitted these subjects by opening up 
necessary markets to Venezuelan cacao.   
In his examination of social responses to venial government, Arnold 
Heidenheimer divides public acceptance of corruption into three categories: black, gray, 
and white.  Black corruption signifies a majority consensus between elites and the masses 
of a society that a given corrupt practice is objectionable and that the offender should be 
punished on principle.  In gray corruption, elites would like to see a crooked act 
punished, but at least some portion of the masses view it more ambivalently.  With white 
corruption, the majority of elites and commoners resist attempts to punish a corrupt 
practice they find tolerable.
126
   
Documents detailing the prosecution of corrupt officials for their complicity in 
smuggling demonstrate that most Venezuelans interpreted this everyday business as 
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white corruption.  The incredibly frequent occurrence of payoffs, business arrangements, 
and judicial impunity in colonial Venezuelan documents confirms that illegal traders saw 
monetary kickbacks to crooked officials as a standard operating cost in their business.  
When authorities like José Francisco de Cañas crossed the thresholds of tolerable vice, 
locals quickly turned upon the abuser and used their open channels with higher 
authorities and the king to circumvent his authority and remove him from office.  Yet, as 
the paucity of such cases reveals, in most instances Venezuelans accepted the complicity 
of their administrators.   
The Spanish legal system, in its inconsistency, served to legitimize contraband 
corruption as well.  Though authorities at the regional and imperial levels sometimes 
doled out fines and other punishments in the prosecution of colonial officials, the 
administering of justice was deeply factional and nepotistic.  While those who stole large 
sums via their smuggling might pay a heavy price, common corrupt officers mostly 
received slaps on their wrists.   Lacking the capacity or will to crack down on crooked 
public servants, Spanish Empire’s courts inadvertently regularized the informal exchange 
between bureaucrat and smuggler.    The government, the governor, and the governed all 
understood the underground economy to be the rule rather than the exception on the 






PART 2: THE SOCIETAL IMPACT OF SMUGGLING 





V.  Socialized into Smuggling: Illicit Trade and the Material Culture of 
Everyday Life in Eighteenth-Century Venezuela 
 
“There is no kind of dishonesty into which otherwise good people more easily and 
frequently fall, than that of defrauding government of its revenues, by smuggling when 




-- Benjamin Franklin 
 
 Franklin’s quote reveals three important truths about contraband trade in early 
modern society.  First, that ordinary people rarely saw smuggling as a morally-repugnant 
or particularly severe crime.  Second, that they frequently bridged the divide between 
buyer and seller on the black market.  And third, that illicit trade was an incredibly 
routine means of acquiring material goods.   
Why did common people participate in smuggling so often and with so little 
regard for commercial law?  Arjun Appadurai has theorized that “the flow of 
commodities in any given situation is a shifting compromise between socially regulated 
paths and competitively inspired diversions.”
2
  Put simply, contraband trade will spring 
up wherever there exists a market for it.  In this way, illicit trade follows patterns outlined 
by scholars of consumption who give primacy to consumer desire over production output 
to account for the rise of certain goods.
3
  Broadly, this chapter examines demand as an 
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impetus for contraband trade in eighteenth-century Venezuela.  To understand demand, it 
analyzes the material goods of exchange in illicit transactions and their everyday 
meanings for Venezuelans.
4
  While it particularly focuses on the European finished 
products and foodstuffs desired by Venezuelans, it also investigates the commodity of 
cacao, the province’s principal export.   
Consumers shape demand as much as the quality and quantity of the goods they 
purchase.  While professional smugglers, merchants, and corrupt officials made the 
commerce run efficiently, the impetus for their work came from a customer base of rank 
amateurs who had little experience in criminal activities.  These middling storekeepers, 
housewives, and wage earners are the principal protagonists of this chapter.  Their 
engagement with the black market to meet their fundamental needs signifies that 
smuggling was far from a luxury business or an occasional substitute for long-distance 
legal trade.  
As a preferred schema for understanding transatlantic and transnational trade 
structures, scholars have employed the commodity chain.  Historians have assessed the 
importance of goods as varied as sugar, tobacco, emeralds, cod, and cocaine.
5
  Such a 
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model traces the various goods of sale involved in moving a product from its source to its 
final market.  It also usefully integrates various economic actors (laborers, planters, 
merchants, consumers) into the story of a single product.   
Nevertheless, commodity studies tend to portray people involved in the 
commodity chain as unflinchingly rational participants who are cognizant of all its links.
6
  
This approach subordinates the social reasons why people traded (i.e. for reasons of 
subsistence, communication between regions, and the maintenance of one’s place in a 
cultural hierarchy).  When analysis of commodity chains focuses on the most common 
and regulated means by which merchants brought goods across great distances, it 
minimizes parallel and less-orderly paths such as smuggling, raiding, and piracy.   
The dangers and hassles inherent in obtaining contraband goods demonstrate a 
desire to trade on the part of early modern buyers that extended beyond monetary and 
material reasons.  The convoluted structure of the black market also reinforces the 
commercial myopia of many actors within commodity chains.  For Spanish American 
consumers, procuring the daily products they felt they needed was neither easy nor 
straightforward.  They did not conceive of this hardscrabble process as being connected 
to the transatlantic webs of major merchants or empires.  Spanish American buyers 
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transgressed legal restrictions and risked punishment or bodily harm to obtain a range of 
items.  Their choices imply that illegal imports possessed a cultural importance set apart 
from their economic value or integrative commercial potential.   
The active pursuit of these illicit products also had a transformative social impact 
on the periphery.  Smuggling necessitated negotiating conflicts with authorities, creating 
systems of subterfuge, and reevaluating community standards of criminal behavior.  By 
acknowledging the messy and extralegal means by which New World subjects obtained 
their wares and what the process meant to them, this chapter dispels teleologies that 
envision the evolution of ever-more routine and streamlined commodity chains as the 
early modern world gave way to the modern one.   
A concentration on illegally-traded items and the consequences of their exchange 
offers new methodological approaches for the study of material culture.  This chapter 
uses records of seized contraband (known as comisos) rather than probate inventories. 
The differences between the two types of documents underscore why investigating the 
former provides fresh insights.  Probate inventories registered the monetarily-valuable 
assets of a deceased person for the benefit of heirs and debt collectors.  They have 
become the bedrock records of the social history of possessions as they illuminate 
consumer patterns and matters of taste.  Nonetheless, an analysis of catalogues of seized 
goods (comisos) fills vital gaps in the historical record left by probate inventories.   
Comisos can function as the underground probate inventories of under-supplied 
communities.  Like probate inventories, they convey a sense of the desires and 




whereas probate inventories arrange and omit goods in order to highlight valuable assets.  
Consequently comisos list cheap commercial items and perishables less likely to show up 
on probate inventories.  Seized contraband registers also record trade goods without 
necessarily knowing or considering who possessed these items.  Thus, they avoid the 
probate inventory problem of frequently underrepresenting the poor.
7
  Comisos offer a 
diverse picture of what the black market made available to a range of consumers.  They 
also provide rich contextual clues about trading practices and the market because they do 
not exist in isolation.  Since comisos frequently formed parts of larger cases that included 
testimonies, legal motions, and sentences, they document the circumstances of accused 
buyers and sellers.  Put simply, the material culture of illicit trade allows the historian to 
study consumer demand in its rawest form.   
What then did Venezuelans covet and smuggle, how did they justify this criminal 
behavior, and how did their illicit activities impact daily life in the province?  These 
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central questions inform this chapter’s three analytical sections.  The first examines the 
basic goods of illegal exchange in coastal Venezuela.  Material scarcity bred the covert 




 The cultural, logistical, and moral rationales that led many cohorts of citizens to 
engage in small-time illegal trade form the second section of this chapter.  Instead of 
surviving on homegrown and homespun supplies, Venezuelans chose the unequal trade 
relationships and risks inherent in purchasing black-market European goods.  Regardless 
of these motives, the flagrancy of unregulated commerce infuriated high-placed royal 
trade officials, who equated smuggling with treason and other morally-revolting crimes.  
A chasm separated policymakers’ convictions and those of captured petty contrabandists.   
Finally, this chapter discusses the ambivalent consequences of smuggling for 
Venezuelan daily life.  Black market trading allowed for the affordable purchase of a 
quantity and variety of goods unimaginable in the closed Spanish trading system.  It also 
facilitated a petty economy of small shops and household trade, particularly among 
Venezuelan women.  More ominously, as Venezuela became the world’s premier 
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producer of the now valuable cash crop of cacao, residents experienced increased 
policing, surveillance, property confiscation, community strife, and danger on the coast.     
 Smuggled goods determined material conditions, shaped value systems, and 
socialized subjects into criminal practices.  A range of sources including official Spanish 
correspondence, ship manifests, Caracas City Council resolutions, and traveler’s accounts 
speak to the unintended societal consequences of illegal transimperial exchange in 
Venezuela.  Inhabitants in and around zones of covert commerce gained access to a world 
of goods unavailable through legal means, but they also endured insecurity, violence, and 
isolation.  They produced inventive strategies of entrepreneurship and survival and came 
to accept widespread illegal behavior as an inherent part of their interactions with the 
marketplace. As clandestine markets coalesced around colonial scarcity and foreign 
demand for cash crops, the process of securing everyday goods became an uncertain 
business for buyer, seller, and bystander alike.       
 
Stocking Pantry and Wardrobe: Imports and Exports   
 
 
 Agricultural exports formed the sine qua non of Venezuelan illicit trade in the 
eighteenth century.  If foreigners had not coveted a raft of products produced in that 
province, they would have had no reason to visit its shores and engage in commerce with 
Spanish subjects.  Thus an analysis of what Venezuelans smuggled into their 
communities during this period first demands a survey of what outsiders extracted from 




Despite Venezuela’s later notoriety as a smuggling hub, early traders did not 
covet the commodities that later would fuel its rise from imperial economic obscurity.  
The region’s only answer in the sixteenth century to the precious metal exports that made 
Spain the envy of Europe were the lucrative, but quickly exhausted, pearl diving grounds 
of Margarita, Cumana, and Cubagua.
9
   Nor did Venezuelan eventual long-term exports 
of cacao, tobacco, and hides inspire large-scale conquest expeditions to find them or 
fleets to transport them.  Leather was a useful commodity for daily life, but it was 
nowhere near as profitable to trade as mineral riches.  Tobacco and cacao remained 
exotic goods with few markets for much of the Spanish Empire’s early history.  The 
former, at least, became a moderately valuable commodity by the early seventeenth 
century when illicit trade led the Crown to issue brief and unsuccessful prohibitions on its 
cultivation in Venezuela.
10
  Chocolate achieved popularity in Spain by the end of the 
sixteenth century, but did not make much of an impact in the rest of Europe until the next 
century.   
European attitudes toward Venezuelan exports changed in the mid to late 
seventeenth century.  As metropolitan demand for tobacco, hides, and chocolate grew, 
                                                 
     
9
 For more information on pearl diving and trade, see Molly Warsh, “Adorning Empire: A History of the 
Early Modern Pearl Trade, 1492-1688” (PhD diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 2009); Venezuela’s 
pearl past carried enough of a commercial cache that the eighteenth-century English merchant John 
Campbell’s only remark on Venezuela’s extractive prospects spoke almost exclusively about pearl 
fisheries.  John Campbell, The Spanish Empire in America (London: Printed for M. Cooper, 1747 [1741]), 
200-203.  Found at the John Carter Brown Library, Providence, RI (hereafter JCB).   
     
10
 Due to increasing levels of tobacco smuggling with Spain’s rivals in the Caribbean, the Crown issued 
a Royal Cédula in 1606 prohibiting tobacco cultivation in the provinces of Venezuela, Margarita, and 
Cumana in 1606.  The prohibition was supposed to last for ten years, but public outcry made for its repeal 
in 1612.  Eduardo Arcila Farias, Economía colonial de Venezuela  (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura 
Economica, 1946), 82;  Marcy Norton, Sacred Gifts, Profane Pleasures: A History of Chocolate and 
Tobacco in the Atlantic World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 153; Kenneth R. Andrews, The 




consumers came to esteem Venezuelan supplies of these products as some of the finest in 
the world.  Smokers considered tobacco from the interior region of Barinas superior to 
that of North America and on par with tobacco produced in Cuba.  European merchants 
appreciated the quality hides of Venezuelan cattle bred in the plains (llanos).  
Connoisseurs proclaimed Venezuelan coastal cacao as the world’s most flavorful.
11
   
By the eighteenth century, cacao came to dominate all other Venezuelan 
agricultural products as the crop enjoyed widespread popularity in Europe.  The works of 
Marcy Norton and Michael and Sophie Coe have analyzed cogently the European rise 
and consumption trends of chocolate.  While their research explores the cultural 
proliferation of chocolate in the Old World, it scarcely acknowledges the illegal trade 
routes by which much of the New World’s cacao arrived in Europe.
12
  The growing 




                                                 
     
11
 Arcila Farias, Economía colonial de Venezuela, 77-89; For late seventeenth century appraisal of 
Venezuelan cacao’s high quality, see Henry Stubbe, The Indian Nectar, or a Discourse concerning 
Chocalata (London: Printed by J. C. for Andrew Crook at the Sign of the Green Dragon in St. Paul’s 
Church-yard.  1662), 41; For a similar appraisal at the turn of the nineteenth century that also mentions the 
high quality tobacco, see Franҫois Joseph Depons, A Voyage to the Eastern Part of Terra Firma or the 
Spanish Main in South-America During the Years 1801, 1802, 1803, and 1804 (New York: I Riley and Co., 
1806), Vol. 1, v-vi; Pedro José de Olavarriaga believed that Venezuelan hides were “much esteemed by 
foreigners.” Pedro José de Olavarriaga, Instrucción general y particular del estado presente de la provincia 
de Venezuela en los años de 1720 y 1721 (Caracas: Edición Fundación Cadafe, 1981 [1722]), 13. 
     
12
 Michael and Sophie Coe mention in brief the tenure of the Caracas Company in Venezuela and the 
fact that its establishment came in part as a response to rampant smuggling of cacao in the colony.  Marcy 
Norton cites statistics on legal tobacco and chocolate imported to Spain in the seventeenth century versus 
total imports to point to the lucrative market in smuggling these goods.  She also blames contraband trade 
in tobacco and cacao on taxes.  Otherwise, neither work makes further note of the illicit character of large 
amounts of cacao entering Europe.  See Michael D. Coe and Sophie D. Coe, The True History of Chocolate 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1996), 192; Norton, Sacred Gifts, Profane Pleasures, 160-163.  
     
13
 Wim Klooster, “Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800” in Soundings in Atlantic 
History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830, ed. Bernard Bailyn & Patricia L. Denault 




The burgeoning appetite for chocolate in Europe accounted for a spike in the 
production and clandestine trade of cacao in Venezuela.  In Spain and the rest of Western 
Europe, chocolate transcended royal and noble homes and began to attract a more diverse 
consumer base.  “There are some [Spaniards] who are such aficionados that they would 
sooner go naked than give up drinking chocolate two or three times a day,” wrote Manuel 
Navas de Carrera, a physician in Spain in 1751.
14
  During the reign of Charles III, 
chocolate consumption in Madrid reached twelve million pounds per year.  In Spain, the 
daily cup (or cups) of chocolate had long been something of an obsession among the 
well-to-do.  At the end of the seventeenth century, one observer described how at the 
Spanish court, “the great Ladies drink it in a morning before they rise out of their beds.”  
However, he also noted that chocolate was “lately much used in England, as Diet and 
Phisick with the Gentry.”
15
 
A mix of connoisseurship, religious strictures (drinking chocolate circumvented 
the ecclesiastical fast), and medicinal theories all stoked European enjoyment of the 
beverage.  Chocolate was a sociable drink regularly quaffed in coffeehouses.
 16
  The 
development of these venues and the merchant class that supplied and patronized them 
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spread drinking chocolate across Europe.  Early modern, and specifically eighteenth-
century, Europeans enjoyed the warm liquid not only because it was on the menu at 
gathering places, but also because it bestowed an aura of refinement and good taste upon 
the consumer.
17
  Imbibers of chocolate might even believe that the drink regulated their 
humors, improved their moods, and augmented their sexual potency.
18
   
 Connoisseurs of chocolate coveted Venezuelan cacao and thus helped boost 
Venezuela’s reputation as the world’s premier purveyor of the commodity.  An 
anonymous English author observed that the English court accepted nothing less than 
Caracas cacao when preparing chocolate for the king.
19
  One bureaucrat tried to persuade 
the English to used Trinidad as a jumping off point for invading Venezuela in 1797 by 
arguing that Venezuela, “supplies not only all Europe with cocoa but also New Spain.”
20
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Franҫois Depons, who visited Venezuela at the twilight of the Spanish Empire, said that 




Due to European desire for its cash crop, the Venezuelan economy awoke from 
almost two hundred years of torpor.  Previous shifts in agricultural production on the 
central coast had laid the foundations for the eighteenth century cacao boom.  The 
province transitioned in the early seventeenth century from an encomienda economy 
structured on Indian tribute producing wheat mostly to feed Cartagena, to one built on 
slaves producing cacao for European and Mexican buyers.  By 1631, more than 220,000 
pounds of Venezuelan cacao per year flowed to New Spain alone.  Shortly thereafter, a 
cacao tree blight nearly wiped out cultivation altogether, but supplies rebounded in the 
second half of the seventeenth century.
22
  In 1671, the English merchant Lewes Roberts 
concluded that cacao plantations around Caracas had “of late years grown very 
considerable.”
23
   
Despite European interest in cacao and other Venezuelan agricultural exports, 
legal Spanish shipping never kept pace with demand.  Several factors ensured that 
Venezuelan commercial needs remained unmet by lawful means and that longstanding 
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patterns of material scarcity continued.  A lack of ships, imports, and metropolitan 
interest certainly played a part.   
Such at least was the opinion of Pedro José de Olavarriaga, a special appointment 
of the Crown sent to revive Venezuelan trade and one of the founders of the Caracas 
Company.  In 1722 he opined that “among all the efficacious means to enlarge the 
domains of princes, increase the riches of their vassals, and encourage a love of virtue, 
commerce is the most considerable.”  The failure of bureaucrats to heed this maxim had, 
by Olavarriaga’s estimation, led the province to a “shameful state” where a single 
unreliable register ship from Spain, another from the Canaries, and four or five from New 
Spain represented the entirety of its legitimate annual commerce.
24
   
In 1760, the Caracas Company calculated legal consumption of alcohol alone at 
two hundred barrels of wine, five thousand bottles of white wine, and twelve hundred 
barrels of liquor (aguardiente).
25
  Not even adding textiles or food items into the mix, it 
seems that legal shipping would have been seriously inadequate for the task of 
importation.  In nearby New Granada (Colombia), an area that received greater trade than 
Venezuela, the Viceroy Jorge de Villalonga worried in 1721 that “although the residents 
do not want to be accomplices in the commerce with foreigners, they currently suffer a 
total lack of goods…and everyone is walking about naked.”
26
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More factors than the paucity of ships frustrated the Spanish commercial revival.  
An assortment of taxes made arriving legal imports prohibitively expensive for many 
subjects.
27
  The protracted wars of the eighteenth century, in which British and French 
sea power frequently blockaded the Spanish territories, also contributed to the shortage in 
European goods.
28
    
Though Spanish imperial bureaucrats intended the Caracas Company to provide 
greater quantities of goods for Venezuelans, its overall impact on licit consumer culture 
was negligible.  Certainly the Company noticeably increased imports to the province.  In 
addition to the inter-imperial trade Venezuelan subjects already engaged in with Mexico 
and the Spanish Caribbean, they now received at least two ships per year loaded with 
products from the Caracas Company. 
Its official papers heralded the great bounty of items shipped into Venezuela from 
all corners of Spain including cotton, silk, wool, and taffeta fabric, ribbons and thread, as 
well as finished clothes such as handkerchiefs and hats.  The Company also brought dry 
goods including tableware, firearms, nails, paper, and wood for furniture.  It imported 
foods such as olive oil, sardines, wine, and flour.  According to Company literature, its 
shipments only supplemented private commercial goods and consumables coming from 
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New Spain, the Canary Islands, Mérida, Cumaná, Cartagena, Santo Domingo, the 
Orinoco River Delta, and from illicit Dutch sources in the Caribbean.   
All of these opportunities for trade, in the opinion of Company officials, struck 
down citizen claims that there was a despotic Company monopoly or significant material 
shortages.  Rather, officials argued that the surest way to a commercial “fatal epoch” 
would be a return to individual register ships or the movement to free trade.  In the minds 




Independent accounts of what the Company actually imported never matched the 
organization’s optimistic rhetoric.  Though lists of what the Company could obtain and 
transport from Spain were impressive, their ships rarely arrived so full.  The Crown 
frequently admonished Company officials for not importing enough foodstuffs and 
clothing.
30
   
Wartime predation inhibited the ability of private Company ships to enter and exit 
Venezuela’s ports.  When cargoes did arrive, Company merchandise sold almost 
exclusively in Company stores at prices twenty percent higher on average than Dutch 
contraband.  According to one British observer, Venezuelan consumers received in return 
“such Wares and Merchandize as probably have been lodged in their stores for 20 years a 
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  Despite the increase in legal merchandise entering the region due to the 
Company’s shipping capabilities, the province may have experienced a net decline in 
imports during the Company’s heyday (1728-1749).  This was due to the Company’s 
zealous patrolling of coastal waters for contraband cargoes.
32
   
Near the end of the Company’s tenure in 1779, a petition from the Caracas City 
Council summarized its economic reign in damning terms.  Venezuela had “suffered for 
fifty years a limited and passive commerce…at the hand of one buyer and seller.”  
Throughout this time, Company meddling had “insensibly weakened the colony’s natural 
strengths and destroyed its substance and fortitude, reducing it to its present sorry 
state.”
33
  Viewed in light of these circumstances, eminent Venezuelan historian John 
Lombardi’s contention that “every indication points to a steady, active, and prosperous 
trade system providing the inhabitants of Venezuela with the bulk of their daily needs” 
proves untenable.
34
   
Since Venezuelan producers and merchants found legal markets inadequate for 
their harvests, they supplemented licit commercial activity with contraband trade.  The 
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international black market, in addition to providing more opportunities to sell 
commodities, also increased the range of goods available to Venezuelan consumers.  It 
offered lower prices than the weak Spanish manufacturing and commercial sectors.   
Smuggling cut into potential profits from licensed trade to such an extent that 
observers came to believe that tougher enforcement of commercial law could not help but 
increase legitimate commerce.  The merchant Joseph Luis de Cisneros, in his 1764 
description of Venezuela, wrote that stronger coastal policing of contraband trade during 
those years had the potential to quintuple legal trade.
35
  Whether or not a direct link 
existed between enforcement and the quantity of licensed trade, traders like Cisneros 
rightly gauged both the voracious consumer appetite of Venezuelans and how illicit trade 
satiated it.  
What then did unsatisfied Venezuelan subjects choose to buy from the black 
market with their sought-after agricultural exports?   Given the merchandise shortfalls 
caused by anemic legal trade, it is not surprising that most items purchased illegally were 
routine, inexpensive staples from Europe.  Contraband merchants rarely exchanged 
money for products as bartering was more usual.  Overwhelmingly, slaves figured as the 
most valuable import into Venezuela given that the price of a single slave could reach as 
high as several hundred pesos.  Despite their worth, slaves appeared infrequently in most 
inventories of smuggled goods.
36
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A packet of documents (legajo) detailing forty-two contraband seizures conducted 
in small shops (bodegas), homes, streets, and forests in and around Caracas and the 
central coast of Venezuela in 1721 provides an intriguing glimpse of smuggled goods that 
trickled down into Venezuelan daily life.
 37
  While these cases serve as a detailed 
snapshot of Venezuelan contraband imports during a specific year, rather than a 
representative sample of all eighteenth-century illicit trade, the confiscations disclose 
many products commonly smuggled into Venezuelan shops and homes throughout the 
period.  These 1721 seizures are complimented by archival holdings that contain much 
smaller groupings of household seizures from the 1750s and 1790s.  Together they 
demonstrate that crackdowns on contraband at the neighborhood, town and regional level 
were routine.  A brief survey of these cases reveals similar lists of cheap, subsistence 
goods and comparable conflicts over governmental intrusion into private space.
38
  Such 
terrestrial, as opposed to shipboard, arrests bring the historian much closer to sites of 
consumption and illustrate individual buyer preferences.  This documentary record of the 
consumption patterns of Venezuelan subjects suggests that smuggling succored neglected 
communities with basic necessities and, in some cases, supplanted legal trade in the 
larger Spanish American world.   
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The 1721 confiscation lists noted that fabric for garment production was the 
single most frequently confiscated import.  Most of this cloth was coarse, of questionable 
quality, and meant to cover the body rather than appeal to the latest eighteenth-century 
fashions.  Coleta, a cheap cotton, and ruan, a lightweight and coarse linen from the 
Rouen region of Normandy used for knee britches, figured most prominently in the 
household contraband seizures.  Behind these fabrics were listado (striped linen), bretaña 
(linen from Brittany of slightly higher quality) and olandilla (pressed and dyed linen).  
As the latter two names indicate, most fabrics found among the comisos came from 
Northern Europe (France, Holland, England, and Flanders).
39
  Likewise, officials 
identified many finished apparel items including, stockings, shirts, shoes, and hats as 
being of Northern European extraction.      
In addition to fabrics and clothes, household and storefront raids in 1721 reveal a 
proliferation of manufactured European tools.  Country folk traded for machetes and 
other agricultural implements.
40
  They also bought guns and gunpowder.  
Venezuelans not only sought European textiles and manufactures, but they also 
craved Old World foodstuffs.  Regardless of the fertile soil and plentiful hunting grounds 
of the region, consumer preferences dictated that Venezuelans import food items from 
Europe.  The inflated prices and paltry stock of legal Spanish goods assured that 
Venezuelans would import many of these edibles through clandestine means.  Typical 
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confiscations in 1721 included flour, salted meats and fish, as well as alcoholic beverages 
ranging from French wine to rot-gut liquor. The presence of imported comestibles 
demonstrates that locals considered simple European foodstuffs essential for civilization 
no matter how difficult or potentially illegal they were to procure.   
Despite the heavy emphasis on cheap import staples, a few luxury products made 
their way into homes and stores.  Silk, a fabric of the wealthy, figured most prominently 
among big ticket items.
41
  Chinese satin and paper (probably to make screens) came to 
the province by way of New Spain.  The registers also document culinary treats such as 
raisins, cinnamon, and black pepper.   
The scarcity of these indulgences in terrestrial confiscation lists, however, only 
underscores the subsistence character of smuggling in Venezuela.  As other documents of 
the period testify, many smalltime Venezuelans buyers frequently chose to trade in the 
black market merely to meet personal consumption needs.   One such customer, a free 
black from the central Venezuelan town of Morón named Joseph Joachim, freely 
admitted to bartering with his cacao to obtain small amounts of cloth, thread, wax and 
gunpowder in 1732.  According to Joachim, the textiles were to clothe his children and 
the wax and gunpowder would embellish his town’s Corpus Christi celebration.
42
  Like 
many amateur contrabandists trying to extricate themselves from a bad situation, 
Joachim’s testimony stressed that he had entered into the business only to satisfy personal 
needs.           
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The goods present in household and storefront confiscations suggest that 
terrestrial smuggling, unlike the larger maritime contraband sector, catered to amateur 
customers purchasing items for individual or family consumption.
43
  First, land seizures 
contained lesser quantities of goods, particularly food and alcohol, than their maritime 
counterparts.
44
  A ship might supply many shops and homes and could use its mobility to 
protect cargo from confiscation.  Unlike inland contraband depots, seaborne smugglers 
rarely conducted just one transaction per voyage.  Therefore foreign coastal vessels held a 
mix of both imports awaiting sale and exports like tobacco and cacao.
45
   
Land-based arrests also displayed a smaller variety of goods than maritime 
seizures.  Slaves, an unheard of commodity in bodegas, showed up in shipboard 
confiscations along with luxury items like gin and castile soap.
46
  These specialized 
products imply that inter-imperial smugglers may have brought them with specific buyers 
in mind.  By contrast, the humble bodega owner sold to a range of retail consumers who 
he or she could not count on to purchase niche items.   
Contraband arrests at the stores and homes of petty traders demonstrate how the 
inability to secure cheap and reliable licit products squeezed colonial consumers.
47
  
Plebian subjects perceived bending and breaking commercial law necessary steps in the 
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struggle to meet their material needs.  Venezuelans’ difficulty in procuring goods 
encouraged violence and criminality but also the belief that they could make ends meet 
best through a combination of their own clandestine arrangements and metropolitan 
benign neglect.  
 
Why Ordinary People Smuggled: The Logic of Defendant Testimonies  
 
 
The dearth of European goods alone could not account for the petty retail sale and 
personal consumption of smuggled goods among inhabitants of the Venezuelan coast.  
Given the inherent dangers of smuggling and its possible legal repercussions, locals could 
have reduced risk by trading for stray legal merchandize or making do with items 
produced in Venezuela or the broader Spanish American dominions.  Why not just eat 
indigenous food and wear homespun cloth?   
Although European food and clothes provided no more nourishment or cover to 
colonists than their New World counterparts, creoles of European descent and newly 
arrived Spaniards linked their cultural superiority to these imports.  This belief in the 
loftier quality of European products also made them valuable merchandise for 
Venezuelan retailers hoping to resell contraband goods.  Thus Venezuelan buyers 
tolerated unequal market relationships with foreign smugglers and the criminal 
consequences of illicit trade.   
When caught, they rationalized and downplayed their participation in criminal 
activity.  Judicial officials sometimes viewed smuggling as a moral deficiency.  In 




practical and logistical excuses meant to prove their innocence or at least the innocence 
of their intentions.  In the rarer instances when the accused confronted the moral 
implications of their crimes, they questioned the very integrity of Spanish trade law, 
insinuating that it criminalized inescapable transactions in Venezuelan commercial life.   
In purely monetary terms, Spanish subjects in Venezuela conceptualized the value 
of exchange differently than Dutch, English, and French contrabandists.  The same basic 
European food and clothing considered daily staples by foreign traders represented 
luxuries for trade-starved Spanish American consumers.  European manufactures of 
questionable quality commanded far greater sums in the Americas than they would have 
in the Old World or even in the English, French, and Dutch colonies.   
Some goods sold to Spanish subjects amounted to nothing more than refuse.  The 
English merchant Lewes Roberts wrote that his compatriots looking to trade on the 
Caracas coast should bring “English Commodities, Serges, all kinds of Norwich Stuff; all 
sorts of Stockings” since “stuffs” not wearable in England “are here saleable.”
48
  Sir 
James Modyford, brother to the governor of Jamaica, composed a similar list of 
inexpensive items that could be hawked at high markups along the coast of Colombia and 
Venezuela in 1667.
49
  Moreover, foreign merchants sometimes sent “refuse slaves” who 
could not be sold in the Caribbean sugar colonies to Spanish America.
50
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Foreign plenty and Spanish dearth fostered unequal trade relationships.  The result 
was that non-Spanish merchants bought valuable Venezuelan commodities such as cacao 
and tobacco well below their European offering prices in return for basic, but 
substandard, goods.  Even so, Venezuelan traders who carried on commerce with 
foreigners received a more reliable supply of goods for their cacao than they did in 
dealing with the Caracas Company.
51
   
Venezuelan consumers and smugglers also tolerated unequal exchange with 
foreigners because they perceived more value in European goods than merely their 
monetary price.  Culturally, the consumption of European foods and textiles was crucial 
for settlers attempting to assert their whiteness and place within the colonial hierarchy.  
As Arnold Bauer argues, at the crux of Spanish American material culture, “cloth and 
clothing were, apart from precious metals, overwhelmingly the most important 
commodities, the most obvious markers of status, and the most revealing element in 
European self-identity.”  The accoutrements of white European society went into making 
a home (casa or hogar) as opposed to poor and uncivilized Indian dwellings (bohio, 
choza, jacal, or ruca).
52
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Food played a similar role.  As well as reminding Spanish immigrants of the 
tastes of home, Old World dietary products also sated their physiology and self-esteem.  
White Spanish subjects and their descendants in the New World perceived food, next to 
climate, as the most important influence on their humors.  They believed that too much 
New World food could alter their constitutions, making them more like Indians.   
Historian Rebecca Earle has argued that, for early modern Europeans, food helped 
to create bodily definitions of race that separated them from indigenous inhabitants of the 
Americas.  In the minds of colonizers, eating European food became an essential part of 
avoiding the physical corruption produced by New World environments.  Therefore a 
person perceived to have the monetary means and proper bodily constitution to eat 
European food elevated their status in the racial pecking order.
53
   
The cultural and biological importance that Europeans bestowed upon Old World 
products gave them robust resale values in the colonies.  Petty retailers and peddlers 
might buy what foodstuffs, cloth, and manufactures they could lay their hands on with the 
assumption that they could sell these items again reliably to individuals for personal 
consumption.  Thus confiscation lists of homes and small shops sometimes evinced a 
larger array of goods than what their inhabitants could or would consume.   
For all of these reasons, it was vital, even in peripheral societies like Venezuela, 
to acquire coletas, bretañas, flour, olive oil, and wine regardless of whether they were 
coarse, bitter, shoddy, or expensive.  In practical terms, reliably obtaining European 
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products in most of Spanish America meant participating in contraband trade.  For many 
contraband buyers, bending commercial law represented their first and only foray into the 
criminal world 
This reality caused both petty smugglers and those who pursued them to reflect on 
the ethics, criminality, and justifications of commonplace extralegal trade.  For officials 
not prone to the endemic corruption and graft common to the imperial Spanish 
bureaucracy, smuggling often seemed like a moral contagion.  More level-headed men 
like Pedro José de Olavarriaga understood smuggling to be the byproduct of a rickety and 
antiquated commercial system. 
In contrast, other bureaucrats lumped commercial crimes together with civil 
misdeeds.
54
   Officials interrogating Governor Francisco Xavier Moreno of Maracaibo as 
part of a wave of prosecutions in that region in 1747 illustrate this point.  The 
investigators asked Moreno, who they suspected of trading with a group of Jesuits 
involved in a smuggling ring, whether his transgressions meant that he had no respect for 
religion.
55
   
That line of questioning reflected standard interrogations of contrabandists.  
Officials routinely inquired whether they understood that smuggling was a grave crime 
“against commerce and the monarchy.” and a mark of “disorder and debauchery.”
56
  Such 
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discourse framed contraband as not just the theft of tax revenues, but also as a treasonous 
and morally-repugnant offense.   
Small-time smugglers and consumers of smuggled goods spoke of clandestine 
commerce in a more matter-of-fact manner to lessen their legal culpability.  Testimonies 
of the accused gave specific justifications for smuggling designed to mitigate stiff 
sentences.  Thus the reader must view them critically through the prism of desperate 
individuals looking to evade prison and forced labor stints.  Although it is difficult to 
discern how familiar locals were with the procedural inner workings of prize courts, 
suspects’ responses to interrogations displayed patterns suggesting a practical awareness 
of which arguments might sway prize court judges.  Defendants may have learned from 
their acquitted predecessors which details to omit, which tropes to stress, and when to tell 
a lie.   
The accused believed that in the minds of royal officials, certain rationales could 
separate particularly flagrant and damaging smuggling from occasional and innocuous 
commercial indiscretions.  Suspects emphasized the hardships that drove them to 
smuggle, downplayed their connections to habitual contrabandists, and underscored the 
extenuating circumstances of their particular cases that might point to their innocence in 
the crime.  
  Feigning unfamiliarity with the law and its particulars was the most common 
defense.  Defendants often responded that they did not realize that their trading was illicit 
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by Spanish commercial codes or that impounded goods were foreign.  Juan Cipriano 
Pérez, an Indian peasant hauled into custody near Puerto Cabello in 1755 for possessing 
illicit goods, employed this defense.  Cipriano Pérez denied any knowledge of trade with 
foreigners as he “had worked all his life as a peon on a small plot.”  According to the 
laborer, he had only come to possess a parcel of unlicensed clothing as a substitute 
payment for his usual twenty peso salary, driving cattle for a rancher.
57
  On the other end 
of the economic spectrum, Don Francisco Muxica, an account (contador official) for the 
Caracas city government pleaded his ignorance of the illicit origins of expensive silks and 
other items with which he meant to spoil his wife.  Muxica claimed to have received the 
goods as gifts from friends who had recently arrived in La Guaira by ship.
58
   
When ignorance failed as a defense, strategies of the accused often shifted to 
accentuating their inexperience in the trade and, by association, their harmlessness to 
legal commerce.  This tactic, like others mentioned here, may have reflected the truth 
about some subjects.  Nonetheless, novice and professional smugglers alike tried to pass 
as first timers.  To avoid harsh sentencing in 1765, a mule driver (arriero) named Juan 
Nicolas de Lugo testified to having conducted commerce with a corrupt mayor under 
investigation.  Yet the mule driver was quick to point out that he had traded with him 
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only once and now realized the error of his ways.
59
  Suspects admitted to not 
understanding the dynamics of contraband transactions and highlighted, if possible, the 
small quantities of contraband goods they possessed.   
Defendants also vehemently denied personally knowing their trading partners as 
familiarity could indicate their presence in larger smuggling networks.  In instances 
where negating such a relationship proved impossible, many defendants expressed shock 
and embarrassment that their longtime associates were capable of committing criminal 
acts and or involving them in the sordid business.  This sense of not-so-believable 
chagrin permeated the testimony of one Choroní landowner who blamed the existence of 




Finally, when presented with inescapable culpability, subjects might resort to 
justifications based on their material circumstances or request leniency due to their legal 
statuses.  Captured traders claimed poverty and want as the reason they entered into black 
market exchanges.  Other suspects said they engaged in black market transactions to 
provide for their dependents.  As prize courts rarely doled out harsh sentences to women, 
female buyers emphasized prescribed feminine gender roles as mothers and household 
managers in their testimonies.  Defendants of indigenous or African descent likewise told 
prize court judges stories stressing these groups’ stereotypical characteristics as simple-
minded, poor, and easily-deceived peons.  In the case of four Indians, who helped Dutch 
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and Spanish contrabandists shepherd a large shipment of cotton cloth to shore, this 
strategy paid off.  While the captain of the Spanish ship received an eight-year labor term 
on a presidio, the indigenous men’s involvement only cost them six months of 
compulsory service on public works projects (obras reales) in Caracas.
61
     
The diverse legal strategies chosen by defendants demonstrate not only a 
sophisticated understanding of the prosecution’s mindset, but also the realization that 
these approaches worked.  Pleading ignorance, amateurism, or poverty could secure 
freedom or at least a favorable sentence.  It is important to keep these realities in mind 
when parsing the thoughts of illicit buyers and sellers regarding their crimes.               
Despite their sometimes formulaic quality, suspects’ testimonies reflected 
important truths about Venezuelan material society and should not be dismissed as 
entirely fallacious.  The statements of the defendants indicated that they realized the 
judicial deck was stacked against them.  They could not question the nature of the 
commercial system in court.  They could only deflect accusations that they had 
transgressed it.   
Defendants’ words also betrayed that, in Venezuela, illicit trade’s participants 
were numerous and connected to many levels of society.  How else would captured 
contrabandists and subjects have learned the well-worn and effective talking points 
necessary to placate authorities?  Furthermore, smugglers’ continual rationalization of 
illegal trade as a means to allay poverty and want suggested their belief that even prize 
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court judges could grasp the conditions of material scarcity that characterized eighteenth-
century coastal Venezuela.   
In the infrequent instances when illegal traders and their accomplices reached 
beyond stock rationales and vocalized the deeper ethical contexts of smuggling, they used 
their testimonies to portray black market commerce as a morally-relative act of the 
masses.  Some smugglers, such as Joseph Morales Guachico, questioned the degeneracy 
and illegality of smuggling by highlighting how common the business was in Spanish 
American society.  Morales Guachico, who stood accused of illegal trading with 
Governor Moreno in Maracaibo in 1764, responded to questions of whether he 
understood smuggling to be a crime by stating that “although in some manner this grave 
insult and offense could not be hidden,…it occurred to everyone to buy from the ships 
that frequently and publicly traded on the coasts of Carigua and Puerto Mayor.”
62
   
It was the popular belief in Venezuela that illicit exchange hurt nothing and no 
one except for royal revenues.  Franҫois Depons related how decrees from the Crown 
“order the bishops to announce to the faithful, that the contraband is a mortal sin… There 
is no time worse employed than that which the priest spends in making this publication; 
for there is no act in the whole ecclesiastic liturgy which makes less impression on the 
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  As Thomas Truxes’s elaborate study of colonial New York’s illicit trade 
with the enemy French during the Seven Years War demonstrates, the impulse to view 
unlicensed trade as a benign offense was not unique to Venezuela.
64
 
The large cohort of coastal inhabitants whose common purchases included 
contraband goods identified customs officials as martinets attempting to suppress a crime 
of necessity.  Bureaucrats upholding the Spanish mercantile system tried to tar 
contrabandists with the same brush they used for murders and thieves, but the 
characterization never stuck.  Adam Smith neatly summed up the gulf between trade law 
morality and actual commercial practice in the Atlantic World:  
to pretend to have any scruple about buying smuggled goods...would in most 
countries be regarded as one of those pedantick pieces of hypocrisy 
which...[would] serve only to expose the person who affects to practise them to 
the suspicion of being a greater knave than most of his neighbours.  By this 
indulgence of the publick, the smuggler is often encouraged to continue a trade 
which he is thus taught to consider as in some measure innocent; and when the 
severity of the revenue laws in ready to fall upon him, he is frequently disposed to 
defend with violence, what he has been accustomed to regard as his just 
property.
65
       
 
 
The Impact of Smuggling and Smuggled Goods on Daily Life 
 
 
 As Smith’s quote implies, smuggling and smuggled goods not only dominated 
commercial circumstances in the Americas, but also intervened in community dynamics 
at the local level.  In Venezuela, surveillance and policing of the population increased in 
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the eighteenth century to keep pace with illegal foreign commerce.  Coastguard and 
militia investigations could turn neighbor against neighbor.  In other instances, people 
protected and sheltered the contrabandists who were more a part of their world than legal 
traders or Company officials.  Women, who rarely smuggled or traded for black market 
goods on the water, figured prominently in accounts of raids of homes and shops inland.  
As a low-intensity war raged between smugglers and law enforcement, sporadic violence 
plagued maritime occupations and disrupted long-standing trade relationships between 
Venezuelan subjects and their non-Spanish neighbors.  Turbulence engulfed the “social 
life of things”
 
in the province when minor merchants and producers found themselves 




 The transition from Hapsburg to Bourbon rule ushered in more stringent policing 
and surveillance of Venezuelan coastal inhabitants and their commercial tendencies.  
Beginning shortly after the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the Crown and 
Venezuelan royal officials expanded sea patrols.  These coastguard forces multiplied with 
the entrance of the Caracas Company’s private forces in the 1730s.  Around this time, 
colonial governors throughout Spanish America increased the use of spies and inspectors 
in large numbers to keep track of residents’ purchasing habits and guard against the 
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diffusion of illicit goods.
 67
  In the Company’s first years, Pedro José de Olavarriaga 
proposed the addition of “both public and secret guards and spies in the places and paths 
where they [the contrabandists] turn up.”  He also defended the right of Company 
officials to search any house or store in the province.
68
  Governors of Venezuela sent 
forth more spies to patrol the colony during times of crisis, most notably during the Juan 
Francisco de León Rebellion (1749-1751).
69
   
More rigorous patrols meant inconveniences and hassles for interregional trade.  
By the end of the Company’s tenure in the 1780s, one foreigner lamented the plight of 
Venezuelans in the inland plains (llanos) who had to make a one hundred league circuit 
around the Orinoco and Guarapiche Rivers to purchase clothes and avoid patrols which 
“entirely cut off all former communication and rendered the wretched Inhabitant still 
more miserable.”
70
 Foreign observers often produced exaggerated depictions of Spanish 
colonial authoritarianism and commercial disorder in order to convince their governments 
that inhabitants of these territories favored new imperial masters.  Despite the 
questionable credibility of some of these depictions, the attention so many of them 
devoted to Venezuela indicated that its stringent royal authorities had a reputation for 
stifling even licit trade.    
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 Just as the llaneros found their trading routes cut off in the backcountry, coastal 
consumers also dealt with limited mobility.  Imperial surveillance of consumption led to a 
clampdown on access to some provincial paths and waterways.  For many years, colonial 
officials had considered routes that ran inland from the sea to be suspicious.  Dispatches 
spoke of cacao and illicit goods trafficked on secret paths carved out of the wilderness by 
contrabandists.
71
  Official accounts also portrayed trails and rivers as sites of potential 
ambush by foreign interlopers.  For example, Agustín Reinaldo, a coastguard officer, 
described how he and his men found harvested cacao on one of these trails near the Tuy 
River in 1723.  A much superior Dutch force surprised Reinaldo and his patrol as they 
were in the process of confiscating the illicit wares and forced the authorities to flee the 
site.
72
   
To prevent such attacks and lessen covert commerce, the royal government 
worked hand-in-hand with the Caracas Company to regulate Venezuelan transportation.  
Officials mandated that newly-founded towns and older settlements wishing to retain 
their charters curtail access to the sea and tributary waterways.
73
  Notwithstanding strict 
prohibitions on freedom of movement throughout the province and region, smugglers and 
travelers alike continued to construct unregulated pathways for commerce and 
transportation.  Joseph Luis de Cisneros wrote in 1764 that San Felipe, a town inland 
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from Puerto Cabello, was “a refuge of contrabandists” because “its center is three short 
leagues from the Yaracuy River which can be navigated easily to the sea…while many 
paths penetrate its rugged mountains.”
74
  Regulation of roads and rivers limited 
communication, transportation, and trade for many Venezuelans.  Their resistance to this 
intrusion demonstrated the limits of state control.   
For policing to succeed at the town and local levels, it had to infiltrate neighborly 
relationships of trust and conflict.  Such was the case of María Francisca de Espinoza, a 
Caracas widow arrested for possessing foreign cloth.  Acting on the tip of an anonymous 
informant (denunciador), authorities failed to find anything in her home, but later 
discovered over one hundred yards of cloth in the home of a neighbor.  When questioned 
about how she came to own the cloth, María Francisca said that a man she had never met 
came to her home late one night asking her to store temporarily a bag containing the 
textiles.  Her neighbor, in turn, volunteered to look after the goods.  Both María Francisca 
and her neighbor claimed to be unaware that the rolls of cloth were contraband.
75
  
While the veracity of Espinoza’s tale seems doubtful, her case confirms how 
magistrates’ successful entry into community politics could help authorities uncover 
smuggled goods.  It was not uncommon for small-time contraband busts, such as the 
Espinoza case, to include the presence of informants paid by royal officials.  
Denunciadores might receive anywhere from ten percent to one-third of the proceeds 
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from the sale of impounded illegal wares.
76
  Though the identities of these individuals 
almost always remained anonymous in court records, it is a reasonable assumption that a 
combination of fiscal gain and previous grievances toward the accused motivated them.  
That an informant would turn in María Francisca Espinoza despite the small monetary 
value of her cloth indicated that she probably had made her share of local enemies.  
Investigators deftly engaged these antagonists to indict the accused.  
Conversely, the passing of goods in Espinoza’s case demonstrated how neighbors 
formed networks of obfuscation to throw officials off the trail of illicit transactions.  Petty 
clandestine trade, in particular, relied upon trust between trading parties who often knew 
one another.  Espinoza was willing to hide the cloth for the man who came to her door 
just like her neighbor agreed to harbor it for her.  Assuming that Espinoza would not 
accept a parcel from a total stranger, she also chose to conceal her familiarity with the 
unidentified man.  Or perhaps the man never existed in the first place.  Espinoza may 
have crafted her story to manipulate for her own benefit gendered assumptions that she 
could not possibly be a willing participant in intricate criminal activities.  This tantalizing 
glimpse into covert distribution chains raises more questions than it answers.  
Nonetheless, the Espinoza case implies that the number of buyers and sellers involved in 
the processes of smuggling was much larger than what authorities netted in raids.    
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Subjects who handled contraband goods became savvy about the law and how to 
negotiate a favorable place within it.  Espinoza, like many other minor contraband 
buyers, was almost certainly aware of the legal repercussions of possessing illicit 
products though her confession feigned obliviousness in the matter.  She probably knew 
the package to be smuggled goods and had formulated her series of defenses accordingly.  
Why else would she be so willing to accept the bag’s contents yet so hesitant to let the 
goods continue to reside in her house?  Denying knowledge of the items’ illicit nature 
was presumably a calculated strategy to lessen punishment.   
On the other hand, Espinoza’s open admission that she had had substantial contact 
with the goods most likely signaled that she considered her crime trifling and did not 
expect a harsh reprimand from the law.  Her calculations proved accurate.  Given that she 
was an old widow with only small quantities of contraband goods, authorities released 
Espinoza, confining her punishment to a few already-served days of jail times and the 
confiscation of the cloth.
77
    
Given that contraband policing did not observe the boundaries between the home 
and public space, it is not surprising that women like María Francisca de Espinoza 
sometimes ran afoul of the law over their consumer preferences and entrepreneurial 
decisions.  Plebian women in colonial society managed their households, but also 
contributed to their family well-being through a range of short-term strategies that 
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  As the following cases will show, women often viewed 
contraband goods as raw materials for professional use, surplus income, or financial 
assets.  
The presence of women as defendants in smuggling investigations showcases the 
extent to which smuggled goods penetrated domestic economic routines.  For women in 
particular, contraband goods often represented the fundamental supplies of artisanal 
production.  In 1721, authorities found a cache of foreign fabric rolls and swatches, yarn, 
and thread under the bed of María Candelaria Jaramillo.  The great variety of small 
quantities of illicit textiles at her home indicated that she was probably a seamstress who 
had purchased the contraband items as fabric for her occupation.
79
   
Just as unlicensed trade could augment a woman’s income or means of 
production, it could also prove financially detrimental if detected.  Because authorities 
viewed illicit goods as part of an individual’s personal wealth, they usually froze all of a 
suspect’s assets.  One wife in the town of San Sebastian de Ocumare wrote to the 
governor of Venezuela in Caracas complaining that her husband had been in jail as an 
alleged smuggler for a month.  During this time, officials had embargoed all the family’s 
assets, including her slave and the goods that comprised her dowry.  Whether or not the 
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smuggler’s wife was aware of her husband’s misdeeds, she felt the hardships of his 
punishment in her home.
80
 
In most routine arrests involving women, magistrates’ gendered understandings of 
criminality meant that female suspects enjoyed more leniency than their male 
counterparts.  It is difficult to parse exactly the thoughts of judges from their terse 
comments.  However, their sentences for female suspects suggest that judges either 
considered women incapable of habitual participation in illicit activities or were 
unwilling to reprimand them harshly.  Authorities concluded proceedings in days and 
deemed the confiscation of extralegal items, a small fine, and a few days in jail 
sufficient.
81
    
However, in the few specific instances where officials suspected that women 
associated with more powerful smuggling interests, colonial justice might not operate so 
smoothly.  María Joseph de Escurra of Maracaibo sold small amounts of her own cacao 
to a middleman trader in exchange for china and glassware.  The go-between transported 
her cacao, along with a much bigger shipment belonging to Second Lieutenant (alférez) 
Luciano Luzardo, to Curaҫao for sale to the Dutch.  Luzardo, as detailed in chapter three, 
ran a large smuggling ring in Maracaibo.  When authorities uncovered her business 
arrangements, Escurra claimed she had purchased the goods in order to resell them and 
care for her sick mother with the profits.  She denied knowing that the goods were 
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contraband or that her cacao was headed for Curaҫao.  Escurra effectively marshaled 
witnesses to testify to these points and to confirm the hardships she had endured in 
supporting her mother.   
More importantly, Luzardo possessed a larger fiscal share of the confiscated 
shipment than Escurra and his behavior was particularly suspicious: during the 
proceedings he sought asylum in a convent.  The governor of Maracaibo eventually 
pardoned Escurra, declaring her “free of wider involvement” (libre de sindicación) in 
criminal networks.  The case indicates that even though María Joseph de Escurra’s 
contact with large-scale smuggling might have been incidental and subsistence-oriented, 
it almost cost her dearly.
82
   
As the prosecution of smuggling at the household level confirmed, contrabandists 
might be friends, neighbors, or kin.  Therefore, it is not surprising that sections of the 
Venezuelan populace protected smugglers.  One Spanish bureaucrat wrote to José de 
Gálvez, the Minister of the Indies, that “the Spanish in Caracas punctually advise their 
Dutch friends in Curaҫao of the numbers of the coastguard, the date of their embarkation, 
and the course they chart.”
83
  Smugglers’ popularity contrasted to the hostility many 
minor Venezuelan producers and storeowners felt toward legal traders and particularly 
Caracas Company merchants, whom they viewed as exploiters.  Franҫois Depons noted 
that smuggling had a “blind protection which no Spaniard, rich or poor, refuses it.—A 
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vessel driven by a storm on the Spanish coasts, is robbed and plundered by the country-
people, if the cargo is covered by legal papers: they succour and protect it, if 
contraband.”
84
   
For coastal inhabitants, the consequences of aiding or associating with 
contrabandists proved unpredictably violent due to sporadic warfare waged between 
smugglers and customs officials.  Coastguard patrols and foreign ships engaged one 
another in skirmishes, ship seizures, and theft throughout the eighteenth century.  The 
rules of ship confiscations insured that coastguard sailors received a greater percentage of 
a prize if they had faced violent resistance in capturing it.
85
  All factors encouraged the 
escalation of conflict in the Caribbean.  “The clandestine trade is so prodigiously 
advantageous that they [English merchants] will venture estate, body and soul” reasoned 
an English governor in Bermuda.  The presence of these foreigners encouraged the 
Spanish coastguard’s cruelty toward them.  The governor concluded that Spanish 
atrocities inspired indiscriminate piracy and low intensity warfare.
86
   
Cycles of war worsened relations and entrapped Venezuelan consumers between 
marauding parties and retributive attacks.  Lauren Benton has theorized that  
because effective imperial control was defined by sets of narrow corridors and 
clusters of enclaves, multiple imperial powers could operate in the same region 
without producing abutting or conflicting spheres of control.  The reach of 
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jurisdiction could follow a snaking pattern of travel and trade routes that might 
cross or parallel other passages without entanglement.
87
   
 
As an example, relations between the Spanish and the Dutch rarely reached 
“entanglement” as defined by a declared war over smuggling.  Yet, it would be difficult 
to follow Benton’s logic and argue that Venezuelan subjects caught between competing 
commercial spheres avoided being “entangled” in random violence.  By consuming 
goods that required foreign commerce, Venezuelan coastal inhabitants unintentionally 
positioned themselves in the crossfire between warring factions.   
Inter-imperial skirmishes over commerce bred disorder and made the threat of 
conflict ever present, even between willing traders.  The French Jesuit, Jean-Baptiste 
Labat, was no stranger to illicit trade.  He described a typical meeting between French 
and Spanish contrabandists as a polite, but uneasy standoff where both sides calculated 
each other’s fighting capabilities:  
The merchant and a few men, all well-armed, stand behind this counter, and are 
guarded by armed members of the crew on the poop.  The captain and the rest of 
the crew, all armed to the teeth, remain on deck to welcome the visitors, give 
them drinks, and see them politely into their canoes as soon as they have made 
their purchases… above all it is necessary to be on your guard, and also to be 
always the stronger, for if the Spaniards see a chance of seizing the ship it is very 




Encounters with extralegal commerce might be just as anxiety-ridden for small-time, 
individual traders.  La Guaira patrols arrested one such novice, a family man named Don 
Miguel Ruíz.  Ruíz had bought a measly three and a half pesos worth of smuggled 
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textiles to clothe his family.  The unfortunate amateur almost failed to complete the 
purchase “as he suspected that he might be robbed by the contrabandists.”  Ruíz arrived 
armed to the transaction site as it was “an unpopulated area far from any 
neighborhood.”
89
  The unregulated and persecuted trade in daily goods transformed the 
act of provisioning the home into cloak-and-dagger affair. 
 Conflicts over material consumption also impacted less commercial aspects of 
daily life like transportation and residency.  Stricter enforcement of Spanish commercial 
law affected not just inland subjects moving through the province, but also 
inconvenienced coastal inhabitants who used the Caribbean Sea as a waterway.  As 
smuggling ships were plentiful and tended to follow the coast, many Venezuelan 
residents knowingly or unknowingly used them for passage between points.  Ubaldo de 
Arcia, a free pardo living in Mochima on Venezuela’s eastern coast, employed such a 
strategy.  Arcia and his wife sought transport from their home to the city of Cumaná to 
get treatment for an undisclosed illness the two had contracted.  Without their knowledge, 
the ship they traveled in carried smuggled goods.  The two were the only occupants not to 
flee the vessel when coastguard officials seized it, which suggested their innocence.
90
   
Passengers on other coastal journeys walked a finer line between the role of 
bystander and contrabandist.  A Spanish coastguard patrol stopped Alejo Almario aboard 
a ship carrying Venezuelan cacao and hides between Isla de Aves and Curaҫao.  Though 
Almario claimed to be simply a passenger, his presence aboard a vessel carrying cargo 
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destined solely for illicit inter-imperial commerce cast doubt on this contention.
91
  
Likewise, authorities were loath to believe Pedro Mariño de Lovera, a native of Coro.  He 
claimed he had embarked on a voyage to Santo Domingo to place his daughter in a 
convent and only became involved in contraband shipping to secure his passage back 
home.  Mariño de Lovera’s circuitous course, which included stopovers at several foreign 
islands and an arrest in Cumaná on the far opposite coast from Coro in the west, sullied 
his defense.
92
   
 The policing of consumption in the province influenced where subjects could live 
as well as how they traveled.  Laws designed to keep suspicious people out of regions 
prone to smuggling could be rigid.  A French surgeon and apothecary named Pedro Vigot 
petitioned the governor of Venezuela and the Spanish Crown to allow him to stay in 
Caracas.  Vigot had lived and worked in the city for fourteen years, married a Spanish 
woman, fathered two children, and donated medicines to the poor in the local hospital.  
Yet a law published in 1736 to reduce smuggling mandated the expulsion of all 
foreigners from the province within sixty days.  Authorities in Spain eventually made an 
exception for Vigot, but not before his wife and children temporarily went into hiding to 
avoid expulsion themselves.
93
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 The extenuating circumstances of enforcing commercial law on the Venezuelan 
coast produced a chaotic existence for colonial consumers.  Caught between mercantilist 
laws that inhibited their acquisition of goods and underground commerce that exposed 
them to violence and criminal prosecution, Venezuelan subjects adapted to their situation.  
They created ruses to cover up illicit activity and used particular circumstances in their 
cases to argue for leniency.  They sought to avoid danger, but also developed contingency 
plans in case it came looking for them.  Finally, they exploited the chaos and illegality of 
smuggling to facilitate transportation and profit for themselves and their families.  
Smuggling was not an ideal gateway to material provisioning or peaceful daily life, but it 





Although it is tempting to view smuggling as an elaborate game of cat and mouse 
between black market merchants and law enforcement, both sides lacked a raison d’etre 
without consumer demand.  The desire for cacao in Europe and European textiles, food, 
and manufactures in Venezuela stimulated contraband trade along commodity chains that 
stretched across the Atlantic.  In the colonial context, smuggling allowed for the 
provisioning of culturally-favored products, but also infused daily life with conflict and 
uncertainty.   
 Records of illicit trade in Venezuela add much to the study of consumer behavior.  
The meanings human beings attach to objects form the crux of material culture and 




the cultural significance embedded in extant objects or inventories of the deceased.  This 
research frequently encounters biases of class and status.  With some exceptions, only 
monetarily valuable objects tend to appear in wills or to be treasured across great spans of 
time.  Yet, in their efforts to suppress contraband trade, coastguard patrols and prize court 
judges unintentionally left a lasting record of the everyday goods and consumer behaviors 
of lower class Venezuelans.  As most Venezuelan imports and exports from the 
eighteenth century were comestibles or cheap consumer goods, they have long since 
disintegrated into nothing.  As a result, criminal cases documenting the exchange of illicit 
wares represent some of the only persistent markers of their (and their owners’) 
existence. 
 The deeper contextualization of these goods within trading relationships and legal 
systems can help uncover how they impacted the communities in which they were 
exchanged.  Here, cases of clandestine commerce, which tend to offer detailed notations 
of the circumstances surrounding sales and consumption, are particularly instructive.  For 
petty Venezuelan buyers and retailers, smuggling was a business filled with violence, 
risk, and hassle, but also the potential for monetary and material gain.  Most of these 
individuals were novices unlikely to commit more serious crimes.  Consequently, their 
involvement in illicit trade and their relationships with canny, professional smugglers 
underscore how thoroughly popular commerce deviated from laws codifying permissible 
exchange.  In the colony, the eighteenth century marked not an orderly progression 
towards a rational Atlantic trading system, but rather a hard scramble to free trade 




Everyone from unassuming storekeepers to cut-throat pirates-cum-contrabandists 
were socialized into smuggling.  Venezuelans at the lower rungs of the economic ladder 
freely ventured into the illicit commercial world in myriad ways.  Buying a new shirt, 
cooking with olive oil, or trimming weeds with a fresh machete were all behaviors that 
could imply knowing or oblivious participation in the clandestine economy.  Venezuelan 
consumers’ willingness to alter patterns of daily life in the pursuit and consumption of 
material objects demonstrates on one hand, conditions of extreme need in Venezuela, and 





VI.  Contraband, Slavery, and Citizenship on the Venezuelan Coast 
 
 On the afternoon of April 21, 1763, Spanish corsairs captured a Dutch trading 
sloop off the coast of Cuyagua, a small port in central Venezuela.  The Dutch captain and 
his fellow white officers escaped to land while three Dutch sailors of African descent 
stayed aboard.
1
  With the contraband vessel boarded and brought to port in Puerto 
Cabello, Spanish officials began the routine business of appraising and selling the prize.  
Along with these tasks, officials questioned and sentenced the prisoners taken from the 
Dutch sloop.   
 Government functionaries learned from the declaration of one of the 
crewmembers, a black sailor named Juan Pedro Antonio, that the vessel came from 
Curaҫao with a Dutch license to trade and a cargo of clothing and textiles belonging to a 
Curaҫaoan merchant.  The ship had exchanged goods freely with residents of the central 
Venezuelan littoral until the Spanish patrol had captured it.  As a sailor guilty of illegally 
trafficking foreign wares in the Spanish overseas kingdoms, Juan Pedro Antonio received 
the customary punishment of a year and a half’s worth of forced labor in the royal factory 
(Real Fábrica) of Puerto Cabello.
2
  Upon completing his sentence, he lived as a free man 
in Venezuela.
3
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The case of Juan Pedro Antonio illustrates several salient themes regarding the 
linkages between men of color and contraband trade in maritime colonial Venezuela and 
the larger seafaring Caribbean world.  Men of African descent often took to the seas 
between empires, navigating the short distances and immense political and legal divides 
separating Caribbean colonies.  The robust contraband trade between these dominions 
offered Africans an unstable means to flee to freedom or ameliorate the harsh conditions 
of chattel slavery.  On illicit voyages between the Spanish, French, Dutch, and English 
Antilles, both free blacks and slaves found an independence and freedom of movement 
unthinkable to their land-bound counterparts.  As mariners, porters, supercargoes, traders, 
and go-betweens, they became integral, if not always voluntary, participants in extralegal 
seafaring commerce.   
Men of African descent involved in contraband trading also encountered 
enormous dangers in addition to those that their white counterparts would face.  Covert 
commerce between Spanish America and rival European colonies in the Caribbean defied 
mercantilist policies at the bedrock of the colonial Spanish economy even as it benefited 
many Latin American subjects.  Not surprisingly, foreigners and Spanish subjects alike 
faced stiff penalties when caught in the act of smuggling.  Black contrabandists took on 
the risks of capture, enslavement and forced labor while negotiating overlapping societies 
that generally shared a belief in white dominance and held independent people of color 
under suspicion.  The seizure of their smuggling vessels in Spanish waters brought into 
question non-whites’ status, their citizenship, their occupational identity, and their ties to 




plantations brought many people of African descent to Venezuela in the hulls of ships as 
smuggled goods rather than the bearers of illicit cargo.   
To understand the gradations between bondage and liberty that black 
contrabandists and slaves faced, sometimes over the course of a single voyage, it is useful 
to dig deeper into Juan Pedro Antonio’s case.  The documentary record of Juan Pedro’s 
story might have ended there had his past not caught up with him.  Five years after his 
arrest, a letter arrived in Caracas from a French subject of Martinique named Juan 
Antonio Marión.  Marión claimed that Juan Pedro belonged to him, provided papers 
proving ownership, and asked that the slave be returned to him.
4
  Shortly thereafter, 
officials in Caracas hauled in Juan Pedro, who had been living in both Caracas and Puerto 
Cabello for the past three and a half years doing odd jobs and living as free man.  
Authorities questioned him about the details of how he had come to Venezuela. 
Inconsistencies between Juan Pedro’s two testimonies began to emerge.  In his 
initial statement of 1763, he claimed to be the slave of José Garabato, a Frenchmen who 
had left Martinique for Curaҫao to avoid the brief 1762 English occupation with Juan 
Pedro in tow.  Garabato had hired out Juan Pedro for ten pesos a month to the Dutch 
sloop on which he was captured.  Juan Pedro also stated in his first testimony that his 
name was actually Carlos Antonio Méndez and that Juan Pedro Antonio was not his 
name, but that of his father.
5
  In his second testimony in 1768, Juan Pedro claimed to be 
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the slave of Marión, not Garabato.  The story of his migration and employment aboard 
the Dutch sloop remained largely the same.
6
     
 Santiago Francine, Marión’s lawyer in Caracas, seized on the contradictions in 
Juan Pedro’s declarations.  According to Francine, Juan Pedro had not found employment 
aboard the Dutch sloop with his master’s consent.  Rather, the slave had fled Martinique 
alone, changed his name, and passed himself off as a free man aboard the Dutch ship.  
The lawyer sought to discredit Juan Pedro’s accounts by pointing out that in his two 
declarations, the slave claimed that two different men were his master.  Francine then 
chastised the Caracas Company, the monopoly company whose patrols caught and 
punished Juan Pedro, for selling the fugitive into forced labor when they should have 
returned him to his master.  In Francine’s opinion “the slave should not be believed in 
testimony he gives against his legitimate master because he is his master’s mortal 
enemy.”  To smooth over the legal conflict, Marión’s lawyer suggested that his client 
would be willing to buy back Juan Pedro at the going market rate in Caracas.
7
   
 Royal officials arbitrated the case by offering Juan Pedro an extremely 
uncomfortable ultimatum.  In response to Juan Pedro’s accusations that Marión had 
cruelly mistreated him, the governor of Venezuela gave the slave six days to find himself 
another buyer.  If he could not find a buyer within this time frame, the governor would 
sell him back to Marión.  With no other option, Juan Pedro, a formerly free man, began 
the process of selling himself into slavery.  An appraisal of the slave by court authorities 
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put his value at nearly half that of a healthy male slave due to an unspecified injury.  
Given his life’s trajectory, it is possible that Juan Pedro sustained physical damage either 
as a result of his master’s cruelty or the harsh labor conditions of his time in the Real 
Fábrica.  Notwithstanding his condition, exactly six days after the governor’s order, Juan 
Pedro produced a local Caracas merchant willing to purchase him.
8
   
Despite his seemingly expedient solution to the dispute, Juan Pedro’s 
maneuverings came to nothing.  Marion’s lawyer was not satisfied.  Whether out of spite 
or some other reason not mentioned in the documents, he petitioned the governor not to 
accept the Caracas merchant’s proposal and also withdrew his client’s offer to purchase 
the slave.  Instead, he asked that the Juan Pedro be remanded to La Guaira, Caracas’s 
port, to work on the construction of fortifications there.  The governor accepted 
Francine’s petition and ordered what probably represented a death sentence by sending 
the injured Juan Pedro to an indefinite labor term in La Guaira.
9
   
Juan Pedro’s story represents the possibilities and perils for men of color caught 
up in the smuggling trade with Spanish America.  This chapter uses eighteenth century 
prize court records and company papers from the Compañía Guipuzcoana to examine 
blacks’ involvement in contraband trade.  It first discusses the social history of foreign 
black mariners and smugglers trading in Venezuela.  It then turns its attention to the 
slaves and servants who aided their Venezuelan masters on the Spanish side of 
contraband dealings.   Finally, this chapter transitions from stories of willing colored 
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participants in illicit commerce to an assessment of Venezuela’s thriving eighteenth-
century black market slave trade, an institution which converted people of African 
descent themselves into contraband goods.  While several works have dealt with seafarers 
of color in the Anglo-maritime world or Venezuelan slaves, scholars have not examined 
the substantial role of non-white sailors and slaves in the Spanish American smuggling 
trade.
10
    
Illicit commerce between foreign colonies and Venezuela made possible non-
conventional work arrangements for men of color in the Southern Caribbean.  These jobs 
were simultaneously autonomous, empowering, and dangerous.  Trading along Tierra 
Firme could lead to freedom, some degree of personal wealth, or less cruel forms of 
human bondage.  It also left people of color subject to capture, imprisonment, forced 
labor, and enslavement.  Added to this misery, inter-imperial slave smuggling represented 
the means of entry into Venezuela for thousands of Africans.  Though men of African 
descent might carry illegal cargos across the Caribbean, their rights within one empire 
often disappeared as they crossed into another.  
 
Foreign Afro-Caribbean Contrabandists in Venezuelan Smuggling  
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 Throughout the eighteenth century, English, French, and Dutch merchants bound 
for the Venezuelan coast widely employed Afro-Caribbean sailors to man their ships.  
Both slaves and freedmen served aboard small vessels trading for the cacao, tobacco, and 
hides that the province produced in excess.  Blacks and mulattos labored side-by-side 
with whites on sloops usually crewed by no more than twenty men and averaging closer 
to twelve.  The substantial presence of Afro-Caribbean mariners aboard these vessels 
challenged the economic logic of Caribbean colonies that featured supplicant African 
labor as a mainstay in the agricultural production that made their fortunes.  Why would 
societies that saw populations of African descent as plantation chattel and the natural 
enemies of their masters allow these men to take to the sea, drop anchor in foreign lands, 
and exchange the precious cargo of white men virtually unsupervised? 
 The answer to this question involves a complex mixture of Caribbean 
demographics and economic production as well as the nature of the contraband trade 
itself.  A boom in African populations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on 
Caribbean islands left colonial officials looking for ways to employ these non-whites.  In 
Curaҫao, Venezuela’s most prominent contraband supplier, people of color were a 
majority by the 1660s.
11
  By 1789, the free black population on the island outnumbered 
that of its white inhabitants.
12
  Shipping and the slave trade powered the economy of the 
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  Bereft of fertile soils yet blessed with a prosperous transit trade, 
Curaҫao’s whites began to introduce freedmen and slaves as sailors onto contraband ships 
to make productive use of the island’s labor force.  By 1741, two-thirds of sailors 
residing in Curaҫao were either slaves, free blacks, or mulattos.
14
   
Like their Dutch counterparts, English Caribbean merchants similarly introduced 
people of color into their maritime trade.  In the eighteenth century, the British colony of 
Bermuda experienced a comparable increase to Curaҫao in its African-descended 
population as it grew into a shipping colony.  Michael Jarvis’s profile of enslaved sailors 
in Bermuda suggests that as it came to depend on maritime trade for its economic 
sustenance, the island had one of the highest percentages of non-white sailors in its fleet 
at one in four by the 1740s.
15
  Both of these communities relied on contraband trade with 
Spanish America and Venezuela in particular as a part of their commercial enterprises.  
Even among islands reliant on plantation agriculture, Afro-Caribbean sailors became a 
common sight in the eighteenth century.  Edward Long, the eighteenth century historian 
of Jamaica, estimated in 1773 that fifteen percent of Jamaica’s 170,000 slaves were 
tradesmen, sailors, fisherman, and domestic employees.
16
   
In addition to demographic explanations, the hazards of the trade further induced 
whites to bring aboard Africans as regular crewmen on contraband voyages.  As well as 
the continual threat of capture at the hands of coastguard patrols, deals between foreign 
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and Venezuelan merchants occasionally turned violent.  Robbery and extortion by both 
traders and coastguard sailors frequently left foreign contrabandists bereft of their goods.  
Thus, white contrabandists often sent non-white sailors ashore rather than putting 
themselves at risk.
17
   
Ease of recruitment also factored into the decision to hire Afro-Caribbean sailors.  
Unlike whites, who generally saw sailing as a dishonorable profession, most men of color 
regarded it as a step up from jobs on land.
18
  The famous narrative of Olaudah Equiano, a 
slave who traversed the Caribbean and Atlantic Worlds in the eighteenth century, offers a 
rationale for this preference.  Even as a sorrowful young boy crossing the Atlantic for the 
first time as a captive, Equiano expressed wonder over the technology and strangeness of 
the ship.  During the middle passage, he,  
asked how the vessel could go?  They [his fellow slaves] told me that they could 
not tell; but that there was cloth put upon the masts by the help of the ropes I saw, 
and then the vessel went on; and the white men had some spell or magic they put 
in the water when they liked, in order to stop the vessel.  I was exceedingly 




Though his master initially forced Equiano, like many slaves, into sailing, he grew to 
enjoy the profession’s itinerant nature.  He described a stint working on a plantation as “a 
new slavery; in comparison of which, all my service hitherto [as a sailor] had been 
perfect freedom.”
20
  While the travel of seafaring placed Equiano in harm’s way (in his 
years at sea, he fought in naval skirmishes, fell victim to kidnapping by slavers, and got 
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into fights with sailors and port dwellers that left him beaten and bloodied), it also offered 
him the means to buy his freedom.  Equaino earned a wage, but also made money by 
buying glassware and other trinkets on one Caribbean island and then selling them for 
profit on another.
21
  This combined income exceeded that of most land-dwelling slaves.   
For both free and enslaved mariners of color, pay served as a crucial impetus for 
joining a contraband voyage.  In contrast to agricultural work, where compensation often 
came in the form of credit for provisions and shelter, sailing put a man of color in control 
of coin rather than credit, thus lessening the influence of slaveholders.  To counteract this 
freedom, masters forced bondsmen to surrender around two-thirds of their earnings.
22
  
Even though seafaring wages for men of African descent were below those of their white 
counterparts, monetary compensation at any rate attracted men like Olaudah Equiano to 
work under the masts.
23
   
Yet the promise of a sailor’s pay was never a certainty.  It sometimes lured free 
black mariners aboard the ships of duplicitous captains.  In 1771, a coastguard ship 
captured four free blacks on the coast near Puerto Cabello.  The Dutch smuggling ship’s 
supercargo, a white man identified as Miguel el Mallorquin, had sent the men ashore to 
trade for cacao.  When interrogated, all four sailors confessed to being aboard the 
contraband ship, but each claimed Miguel had tricked them into serving on the vessel by 
offering a wage of eight pesos per month to fish.  The mariners accepted this paltry sum 
only to find out once under sail that their ship was full of clothing and other wares to 
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trade in Venezuela.  Though all four sailors professed their ignorance as to the ship’s 
itinerary along with their regret at signing up for the journey, the governor of Venezuela 
was not swayed.  After an extremely brief hearing, he condemned the sailors to five years 
of hard labor in the Presidio of Puerto de Varcón.
24
 
Whether hired aboard a smuggling vessel by means of an honest contract or a 
captain’s sleight of hand, Afro-Caribbean sailors followed itinerant routes common to 
illicit trade.  Rather than heeding borders artificially imposed by metropolitan 
bureaucrats, merchants ignored the nationalist commercial rules of European powers in 
the Caribbean and followed currents of commercial advantage.  Foreign ships skirting the 
Venezuelan coast commonly and illegally stopped in the region after first purchasing 
trade goods in multiple empires.  The importance of obtaining the right wares for a given 
market forced ship captains, and the mariners of African descent who made up part of 
their ship rolls, to stop at the ports of many empires in their quest of merchandise.  Covert 
commerce on the Venezuelan coast, though typified by a relatively fixed list of goods, 
was often haphazard in nature.  While a smuggler occasionally prearranged meetings 
with Venezuelan production rings, foreign ships often cruised the coast in search of 
prospective buyers for their clothing, textiles, foodstuffs, liquor, and arms.
25
  Despite the 
chance character of these interactions, foreign merchants had very little trouble securing 
trading partners in the colony.   
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Blacks traversing the Venezuelan littoral on these covert trading voyages 
encountered work arrangements that were among the most autonomous available to men 
of color in the eighteenth century.  In addition to receiving a wage for their labor, sailors 
of color sometimes worked without an overseer.  While some masters went to sea with 
their slaves, others hired off their charges to merchants or ship captains.  At sea, men of 
color labored under minimal supervision and their workload was considerably lighter that 
field labor on Caribbean plantations.   
The case of eleven men of African descent seized in Los Roques in 1775 
underscores the unusual labor relations produced by the contraband trade.  An English 
captain deposited the men on the chain of islands off the Venezuelan coast to fish and 
gather salt.  The eleven blacks included seven slaves and three freedmen from Curaҫao 
and one slave from the island of Saba.  English and Dutch merchants, as well as the 
widow of an Englishmen residing in Curaҫao, loaned these slaves to the ship’s 
complement.  For a week, the Afro-Caribbean sailors worked on Los Roques under the 
supervision of one unarmed white mariner.
26
  This arrangement shows that the owners of 
the slaves clearly had no reservations about leaving them alone or fears of their escape.  
As Spain had laid claim to Los Roques and wished to prevent the archipelago from 
becoming a hotbed of contraband, officials promptly deported the sailors back to Curaҫao 
with a stern warning never to return.
27
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The independent work arrangements available to Afro-Caribbean contraband 
sailors opened a window of opportunity to seek their freedom.  Jeffrey Bolster’s path-
breaking scholarship on African-American mariners concludes that, “the very vessels that 
carried Africans to New World slavery not infrequently became a pipeline to freedom for 
slaves on the lam.”
28
  The contraband trade in Venezuela strengthens the validity of 
Bolster’s supposition.  Illicit commerce not only separated slaves from their masters, but 
also allowed them to cross into foreign waters where a slave owner’s previous 
jurisdiction did not necessarily apply.  Spanish royal provisions in 1704 and 1711 freed 
slaves from Protestant colonies who fled to Venezuela and converted to Catholicism.
29
  
Venezuela was not unique in offering religious refuge to runaways.  Non-Spanish slaves 
in the Caribbean took advantage of similar decrees in Cuba to escape plantations in 
Jamaica and in Puerto Rico to flee slavery in the Dutch Lesser Antilles.
30
  These 
provisions provided a legal path to freedom, even if Spanish officials frequently blocked 
it by failing to distinguish between runaways and Afro-Caribbean smugglers.   
The working autonomy of the smuggling trade furthered an identity formation 
among Afro-Caribbean seafarers defined more by their occupation than their status as 
freedmen or slaves.  Slaves toiled next to free blacks and whites.  Though men of color 
rarely became ship captains or merchants and no doubt faced discrimination from their 
white fellow seamen, they transcended many of the rigid color lines dividing black from 
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white in the Caribbean by taking to the sea.  Some men of African descent even worked 
as crew aboard slave ships.  Whites almost certainly differentiated these fellow, if 
unequal, sailors from the shackled and un-acculturated human beings populating the slave 
ship’s hold.  On many slaving vessels, for example, even unfree mariners of color 
received the authority to discipline enslaved cargoes.
31
  Emma Christopher, in her work 
on slave ship sailors, has noted that paradoxically, “Seamen became more accepting of 
Africans as colleagues than other occupational groups of the time – at the same time 
sailors continued to be directly involved in the enslavement process which had resulted in 
such extreme racial inequality.”
32
   
This shipboard conflict between racial bigotry and the common bonds of 
seafaring can be seen again in Olaudah Equaino’s narrative.  As mentioned earlier, 
though this iterant African sailor met unscrupulous sailors, captains, and dock dwellers 
that attempted to and in some cases succeeded in kidnapping him into slavery, Equiano 
still remembered fondly the compassion of fellow Tars who came to see him off with 
oranges and small presents.
33
  He reflected that Richard Baker, a white sailor became “a 
faithful friend; who, at the age of fifteen, discovered a mind superior to prejudice.”  
Despite his color, Baker “was not ashamed to notice, to associate with, and to be the 
friend and instructor of one who was ignorant, a stranger, of a different complexion, and 
a slave.”
34
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Life aboard the Esperanza, a Dutch schooner captured by a patrol boat of the 
Compañía Guipuzcoana off of Los Roques in 1775, confirms how rigid racial and status 
divisions might become subordinate to the demands of maritime work.  Three white 
Dutchmen, three black Dutch slaves, one Venezuelan ex-slave, and a French captain 
comprised the Esperanza’s crew.  The former slave, Juan Livorro, had fled Caracas for 
Curaҫao with a fellow runaway aboard a Dutch ship three years before the Esperanza’s 
capture.  Confiscation of the ship and its contraband cargo assured that Spanish officials 
would return Livorro to his master.  In his testimony, Livorro, along with the other three 
blacks, insisted that aboard the schooner “no one knew him as a slave.”  Two of his 
fellow sailors stated that their manumission was impending, but that their masters let 
them serve as freemen aboard the Esperanza.
35
  There was thus a hazy understanding 
existed on the decks of the Esperanza as to who was slave and who was free.   
Such ambiguity concerning free and slave status was not unique to the Esperanza.  
In a separate case, a free black Curaҫaoan mariner who had worked in the contraband 
trade off and on for sixteen years told royal officials that he was ignorant of the number 
of slaves working on board his vessel because “we don’t treat them as such, but rather as 
sailors.  They come aboard with a license from their masters and for this reason we write 
nothing more about them in our rolls than their names.”
36
  No one at sea could deny that 
these men—whether slave or free—were sailors and integral parts of the contraband 
vessels they served.    
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  Despite the more egalitarian nature of race relations in contraband maritime 
labor, the seizure of a ship in Spanish maritime waters could separate freedmen from 
slaves and blacks from whites.  Confiscation threw Africans’ legal status into chaos.  As 
the situation of the French mariner Juan Pedro Antonio from this chapter’s introduction 
demonstrates, proving freedom or a master’s consent to sail was exceedingly complicated 
from a Venezuelan jail cell.  In some cases, prize court judges returned runaways to their 
masters, while in other instances, they forced the fugitives to serve as cheap labor for the 
state.   
Spanish officials had difficulty determining whether a foreign mariner of African 
descent was free or slave, an active participant in smuggling missions, property of the 
ship, or even part of its cargo.  Conflicts over jurisdiction and prize money between 
Venezuela’s provincial government and the Compañía Guipuzcoana only added to this 
uncertainty.  Although no printed regulations existed for Spanish judges concerning what 
to do with enslaved sailors, circumstances usually dictated the magistrates’ actions.  If a 
slave master was not involved in smuggling and could be found, government 
functionaries usually returned the slave.  If a master was unavailable or complicit in the 
trafficking of contraband merchandise, possession of the slave usually reverted to 
Spanish authorities.  The Compañía Guipuzcoana might force slaves into manual labor on 
coastal fortifications or sell them at auction to a private citizen with proceeds of the sale 




practice.  Dutch magistrates in Curaҫao often auctioned off as slaves the colored 
members of Spanish crews that they happened to capture, regardless of their status.
37
   
As in many arenas of the Atlantic World, free blacks found their citizenship status 
the least stable.  Scholars have noted the precarious place of freedmen in the Americas, 
particularly in the eighteenth century when laws began to limit manumissions.
38
  
Equiano, a sailor who had passed many times between being free and enslaved, went so 
far as to state that free blacks, “live in constant alarm for their liberty; which is but 
nominal, for they are universally insulted and plundered, without the possibility of 
redress; for such is the equity of the West Indian laws, that no free Negro’s evidence will 
be admitted in their courts of justice.”
39
  Although this passage does not express the 
universal plight of freedmen before Caribbean courts given that Spanish courts, unlike 
those of many other empires, regularly allowed men of color to testify, it agrees with the 
historiography regarding their woes and incongruousness within slave societies.
40
   
In contrast to their circumstantial deliberations over slaves, Venezuelan judges 
followed no distinct precedent in sentencing free blacks convicted of illicit trading.  The 
                                                 
     
37
 Expediente sobre los insultos de los Olandeses e Yngleses de Curazao: años 1753 a 1756.  Consejo 
de Indias.  Madrid.  May 3, 1756.  AGI, Audiencia de Santo Domingo, 792. 
     
38
 David W. Cohen and Jack P. Greene, “Introduction,” in Neither Slave Nor Free: The Freedmen of 
African Descent in the Slave Societies of the New World, ed. David W. Cohen and Jack P. Greene 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 17; David Barry Gaspar and Darlene Clark Hine, 
“Introduction,” in Beyond Bondage: Free Women of Color in the Americas, ed. David Barry Gaspar and 
Darlene Clark Hine (Urbana: University of Chicago Press, 2004), xi. 
     
39
 Equiano, The Interesting Narrative, 107. 
     
40
 Roger N. Buckley, “The Admission of Slave Testimony at British Military Courts in the West Indies, 
1800-1809,” in A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean, ed. David Barry 
Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 227; Elsa V. Goveia, 
“The West Indian Slave Laws of the 18
th
 Century,” in Chapters in Caribbean History (Eagle Hall, 




arbitrariness of such decisions is evident in the case of Juan Tomás, a freedman from 
Curaҫao.  In 1755, sailors aboard a Compañía Guipuzcoana patrol ship captured Tomás’s 
boat in the midst of a trading voyage to the western coast of Venezuela.  Several days 
prior to his arrest, the anti-contraband forces had seized an unrelated Dutch trading canoe 
manned by a black slave named Nicolás.  Officials at the prize court in Puerto Cabello 
tried the cases of Juan Tomás, a freeman, and the slave Nicolás together.  Though 
magistrates of the prize court observed the distinction between the two sailors, Juan 
Tomás probably suffered from the fact that Compañía Guipuzcoana forces captured and 
tried him at the same time as Nicolás.  The cultural assumptions associated with their 
shared skin color probably trumped their difference in status.  While a judge confirmed 
Nicolás’s status and gave him to the Company as a slave, freeman Juan Tomás faired 
little better as the judge remanded him to the Castillo de Puerto Cabello to work as a 
personal servant for company officials.
41
   
The case of another captured contraband ship from Curaҫao demonstrates a 
similar tendency on the part of Spanish colonial officials to lump together foreign seamen 
of color captured together.  In 1738, a storm shipwrecked Sebastián Atorneo, a free black 
mariner, and his fellow crewman, a slave named Manuel, as they piloted a rowboat in a 
desperate attempt to save a sailor who had fallen overboard.  Spanish officials discovered 
Atorneo’s status, yet doubted it despite repeated claims from the captive that “he says 
that he is free” (“que dice ser libre”).
42
  After deducing that the two sailors were part of a 
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contraband expedition, the governor of Venezuela sold the slave Manuel to Spanish 
America’s licensed slave provider, the British Real Asiento.  Though the documentation 
does not reveal Atorneo’s punishment, a notation where the case cuts off says that 
Manuel’s penalty would likely apply to him.
43
   
In contrast to these cases, in which free blacks found themselves treated like 
slaves, Spanish prize commission judges might, occasionally, dole out the same sentence 
to men of color as their white counterparts.  The entire multiracial crew of the Esperanza, 
referred to earlier, received the sentence of four years’ hard labor on Puerto Cabello’s 
fortifications regardless of their citizenship status or race.
44
  
Despite outlying judicial results like the Esperanza, in the majority of cases, 
justice was usually anything but blind.  Men of color found themselves rushed through 
trial and without appropriate legal resources.  Though Spanish officials allowed men of 
African descent to make statements in court, a right not always allowed in other empires, 
these authorities sometimes condemned and sentenced hastily and without proper 
evidence.  Non-whites gave shorter testimonies than their white fellow sailors.  White 
lawyers, such as Santiago Francine, discredited the defendants’ statements based on their 
race.  In the end, Afro-Caribbean contrabandists usually received longer and harsher 
sentences than their white counterparts.  While crossing the political and legal lines 
between empires aboard smuggling ships offered opportunities for work, wages, dignity, 
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and freedom, the authority of Spanish coastguards and judges could negate these hard-
won gains.   
 
Spanish Slaves and Smuggling Masters         
 
 Men of color not only brought cargoes from sea to shore, but also participated in 
the transfer of goods on land from seller to buyer.  Colonial documents regarding the 
prosecution of domestic contrabandists reveal a significant number of Venezuelan slaves 
and servants complicit in commerce with foreigners.  Many Afro-Venezuelans 
transported their masters’ harvests to port to exchange for foreign goods.  Others 
functioned as security details for hacendados looking to protect their products from the 
vagaries of contraband trade.  Venezuelan men of African descent also served in coastal 
militias given to corruption and theft of the illegal goods they confiscated.  Like Afro-
Caribbean sailors plying the wares of foreign merchants off the coast, Venezuelan blacks 
might negotiate labor arrangements providing greater independence due to their 
participation in illicit trade.   However, their involvement in covert commerce usually had 
more to do with their masters’ wishes than their own volition.  Regardless of their 
motivations, these bondsmen played a critical role in the smooth performance of complex 
coalitions of Spanish smugglers and producers that facilitated extralegal international 
trade and the gradual separation of the Venezuelan economy from strict Spanish control. 
Venezuelan slaves and servants frequently toiled as porters who ferried their 
masters’ exports to the homes of smugglers or down to the docks for direct exchange 




with outsiders through a broker.  When a grower came to an agreement on price with the 
broker, he sent his crop via one of his slaves.  Fear of being caught trading outside of the 
official Spanish cacao market and contempt for this menial labor compelled cultivators to 
send their slaves alone with their cargos.
45
   
The use of slaves for product transportation implies not only the trust that 
Venezuelan planters and smugglers bestowed on their slaves not to run away or steal, but 
also a belief that these laborers were unlikely to inform on their master’s illegal activities.  
In 1734, Spanish officials broke up an extensive coastal smuggling rendezvous 
comprising over thirty cargos of cacao from many haciendas around Higuerote, a town 
east of Caracas.
46
  Among the testimonies of suspected smugglers and producers involved 
in illicit cacao trading were two slaves, a moreno named Joseph and a mulatto named 
Vincente.  The pair belonged to Juan Sánchez de Yelamos, a Caracas merchant and 
planter that brought together the cacao harvests of many hacendados for sale to French 
contrabandists.  Yelamos loaned out Joseph and Vincente, along with a mule driver 
(arriero) and several mules to a planter named Sebastian de la Oliva so that they might 
collect Oliva’s cacao to bring to the French ship.  Yelamos’s slaves testified that they 
helped Oliva bring his crop to port, forcing the cultivator to confess his guilt in the case.
47
  
After Oliva later fled from jail, the governor discussed condemning him to death if 
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authorities could recapture him.  The slaves’ silence about Yelamos, along with his 
connections to Caracas’s merchant elite, probably accounted for his relatively light 
punishment of four years’ exile from the coast and a seven hundred peso fine.
48
            
The discrete task of transporting contraband products was both similar to and 
unique from other slave duties.  Like any other aspect of bondage, a slave’s compliance 
with the illegal assignments presented to them was obligatory.  However, the haulage of 
illicit items allowed slaves to travel sizeable distances with minimal supervision and 
escape the drudgery of plantation work.  In this regard, smuggling was more akin to 
occasional slave activities such as going to market, selling labor for a wage, or toiling as 
an artisan than field labor.  Scholarship of land-based slavery has asserted that 
independent production, artisan labor, and market interaction provided a range of benefits 
for slaves including greater control over labor processes and organization, more access to 
material goods and cash, a healthier standard of living, and even increased opportunities 
to purchase their freedom.
 49
  Venezuelan slaves almost assuredly reaped some of these 
gains through their participation in contraband trade.  
Despite the benefits slaves incurred in transporting illicit goods, this commerce 
necessitated both an agile mind and a stout heart to overcome its logistical challenges.  
Venezuelan slaves navigated complicated smuggling rings where satisfying the needs of 
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producers, merchants, and foreigners required multiple exchanges.  Slaves functioned as 
their masters’ middlemen and representatives on these missions.  A lone slave might take 
the gathered cacao of many hacendados downriver to the coast in order to give it to a 
broker.
50
  In turn, this broker would sent the slave back with a variety of goods meant to 
pay back each of these planters.
51
  Convoluted arrangements like these were standard 
practice in the contraband trade.   
Slaves not only executed transactions, but also protected their owners and these 
men’s goods.  In the uncertain world of contraband trade, masters employed their slaves 
as muscle to avoid being robbed or to perpetrate theft themselves.  Slaves became ad hoc 
forces if deals with foreigners turned violent.   
Conversely, men of color bore arms to prosecute as well as to protect illicit trade.  
Both free and enslaved blacks and mulattos filled the ranks of mixed-race (pardo) 
militias that enforced Spanish trade restrictions and captured contrabandists.  Though the 
work of these militias in fortifying Spain’s late eighteenth century imperial defenses has 
been documented, their participation in anti-contraband patrols remains more obscure.
52
  
The captain of one such pardo militia detachment, Nicolás Gutiérrez, was instrumental in 
prosecuting a smuggling cabal consisting of Venezuelan merchants, planters, slaves, and 
arrieros as well as Dutch smugglers.  Gutiérrez’s testimony that, as a militia captain 
roaming the valley of Valencia, he familiarized himself with the trading patterns of two 
                                                 
     
50
 “Glossary” in Klooster, Illicit Riches, front matter.  
     
51
 Sumaria contra un negro llamada Andrés, esclavo de Pascual Nuñez de Aguilar, por llevar varias 
fanegas de cacao de su amo a boca del Rio de Tuy a comerciar con los holandeses.  Caracas.  January 3, 
1752.  AGNV, Comisos, Tomo XXV, f. 244-248. 
     
52
 Allan J. Kuethe, “The Status of the Free Pardo in the Disciplined Militia of New Granada,”  The 




of the principle Venezuelans engaged in commerce with the Dutch helped prove the 
suspects’ guilt.
53
  Integrated contraband patrols, like the one Gutiérrez served in, 
sometimes fulfilled their mission, but also were susceptible to corruption.   
Blacks necessarily had intimate contact with officials who took part in illicit 
trade, sometimes even living with them or profiting from their misdeeds.  The 
transgressions of Don Diego de Matos Montañez affirm the level to which both free and 
slave blacks often involved themselves in the misdeeds of corrupt authorities.  Matos held 
the office of judge of prize courts (juez de comisos) in 1718 when a group of his men, 
comprised mostly of six free pardos and one free black attacked a Dutch ship trading for 
cacao off the coast of Puerto Cabello.  In the process, they killed two non-resisting 
officers and a cabin boy aboard the foreign vessel.  Rather than taking the ship’s goods 
through the proper legal channels of appraisal and resale, Matos’s soldiers lined their 
pockets with the vessels cargo of arms, gold work, money and clothing.
54
  Though these 
men of color claimed that the killings had occurred in their struggle to subdue the ship’s 
crew and zealously exercise their duties, the testimonies of officials and Matos’s 
neighbors painted a different picture.
55
  One alcalde described how “Don Diego lives 
with his sons, soldiers, and slaves in a house that is a refuge for delinquents indifferent to 
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any concept of justice.”
56
  A sum of more than 4,000 pesos found in the house of one of 
Matos’s pardo underlings three years later suggests that the robbery of the Dutch ship 
was not an isolated incident.
57
   
Neither was Mato’s use of non-whites as active and trusted participants in under 
the table deals.  In 1723, he sent a mulatto slave alone to shepherd nine mules burdened 
with cacao, liquor, and clothes to trade with a Dutch ship near the port of Nirgua.
58
  
When finally prosecuted, Diego de Matos attempted to blame the transaction on his 
slaves, but the questions of an examining alcalde forced him to admit that “a master was 
responsible for his slave’s actions.”
59
  
Private citizens, like dishonest authorities, often employed their slaves to perform 
similar acts of violence and robbery in order to profit from the contraband trade.  Soldiers 
found the cacao of Juan Tirado and Simón Marcano in the town of Ocumare immediately 
before contrabandists loaded it onto a Dutch smuggling vessel in 1727.  Authorities 
deciphered that the cacao belonged to Tirado and Marcano only after the suspects and 
several of their accomplices attacked three guards protecting the impounded cacao on the 
first night after the seizure.  The bandits, a mixture of free whites, mulattos, blacks, and 
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slaves employed as muscle by Tirado and Marcano, stabbed one of the guards to death 
and made off with their illicit goods after the rest of the guards retreated.  Though 
authorities took this brazen attack on anti-contraband forces seriously and promised grave 
punishments for the culprits, they ultimately arrested no one from the smuggling party.
60
     
Given the obvious and immediate connections between white Venezuelan 
contrabandists and their slaves and servants, Spanish authorities prosecuting these 
smugglers regularly confiscated their slaves along with other assets.  Thus, in an ironic 
twist of events, a slave who had contributed to a smuggler’s means of production in a 
semi-independent manner became, in legal terms, just another piece of property.     
Spanish policymakers were keenly aware of the centrality of Afro-Venezuelan 
slaves and employees within their masters’ illicit commerce.  In 1678, King Carlos II 
reminded his governor in Venezuela that many of those transporting cacao to foreigners 
were of African descent and that he should “make an example out of both master and 
slave if they are found guilty.”
61
   A century later, in 1772, contraband had reached such 
proportions that the governor of Venezuela issued a proclamation guaranteeing freedom 
and monetary compensation for any bondsmen that offered information leading to the 
arrest of their master for this “abominable vice.”
62
  In spite of the deep racial anxieties 
characteristic of a society with a substantial slave population, such as Venezuela, the 
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governor’s bold measure signaled how deeply embedded Afro-Venezuelans were in the 
extralegal activities of merchants and planters.  
 
Slaves as Contraband Goods 
 
 Slaves from Venezuela and outside of Spanish America not only served as 
conduits and go-betweens in the contraband trade that characterized the majority of 
commerce on the Venezuelan coast, but also were cargo in this illicit flow.  Contraband 
cut both ways in the life courses of the enslaved.  While both Venezuelan and non-
Spanish owners sent their slaves to labor in non-licensed trade, providing opportunities 
for greater working autonomy for these men, the contraband trade in Venezuela also 
transported thousands of Africans into bondage.   
In terms of goods, the illegal slave trade along the Venezuelan littoral was unique 
among contraband activities.  Contraband slavers in this region usually sold mundane 
goods in addition to their human cargoes.  Enslaved Africans, however, represented the 
only wares aboard a ship’s manifest that might cease to be cargo.  Unlike holds full of 
cloth, liquor or foodstuffs, slaves confined within smuggling vessels were animate 
commodities capable of betraying their carriers.  They might rebel aboard ship.  If 
captured by Spanish coastal patrols, slaves who spoke a European language often 
testified in court to being contraband.  Even slaves of “mala entrada” (illicit introduction) 
that smugglers successfully managed to traffic onto Venezuelan haciendas, sometimes 




them.  Despite their high value among contraband goods, when detected by anti-
contraband forces, slaves left an indelible record of a smuggler’s activities.   
Understanding the development of underground slave trafficking in Venezuela 
requires a basic knowledge of Venezuelan slavery and the legal slave trade to the colony.  
Slave populations never exceeded ten percent in Venezuela.
63
  Though not a “slave 
society” like many of the Caribbean islands it traded with, the province still had a 
sizeable number of forced laborers and a majority mixed race (casta) population.
64
  In 
addition to their labor within the contraband trade, described earlier in this chapter, 
Venezuelan slaves also commonly worked as domestic servants and artisans in Caracas, 
Puerto Cabello, and several other smaller towns and as field-hands on the cacao and añil 
plantations that dotted the coast.  The production of cacao, Venezuela’s most valuable 
cash crop, required intensive manual labor to cultivate and pick cacao pods, but little 
specialized equipment or skills.  By the late seventeenth century, cacao cultivation came 
to dominate the Venezuelan economy and slave labor in the region.
65
  However, given the 
demand for workers, slave labor served as the only profitable means to grow cacao.  
Planters of the crop continually desired more slaves than they could reasonably procure.
66
 
Much of the difficulty planters faced with securing sufficient slave labor came 
from the inefficiency of the slave trade to Venezuela.  Since the end of the sixteenth 
century, slaves entering Spanish America had come from the Asiento de Negros.  To 
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overcome Spain’s lack of African possessions or trading forts from which to extract 
slaves, the asiento allowed private traders and companies to enter into contracts with the 
Spanish Crown for exclusive rights to supply Spain’s New World dominions with slaves.  
Though the king initially gave the asiento to private traders of both Spanish and foreign 
nationalities, by the last quarter of the seventeenth century, state companies of the 
English, French, and Dutch nations had replaced private traders in competing for this 
monopoly.   
Though the asiento assured Spanish America some supply of slaves, Spanish 
regulations and quotas made slave transportation, distribution, and sale cumbersome.  
Before entering Caracas, asiento slaves from foreign Caribbean ports had to pass first to 
Cartagena or Portobelo and then be re-exported.  Spanish laws meant to prevent the 
smuggling that often accompanied asiento ships set rigid terms for purchasing slaves that 
handicapped both buyer and seller.  Until the late eighteenth century, payment for slaves 
could occur only in specie.  This proved burdensome to Venezuelan planters who were 
frequently cacao rich, but cash poor.  Slaves came to these planters at costs much higher 
than the going rate throughout the non-Spanish Caribbean due to Spanish royal tariffs and 
transportation costs.  For foreign asiento traders, legal profits remained small as a result 
of Spanish strictures on where they could trade and a Crown order mandating that their 








In addition to these restrictions on trade, companies holding the asiento 
compounded the problems of hacendados by failing to comply with their contractual 
obligations.  Asiento companies rarely imported the number of slaves they promised to 
the Spanish government.  Even when companies honestly tried to meet specified 
numbers, the vagaries of procuring and transporting human beings from Africa 
complicated the trade.  Slave acquisition in Africa and the Caribbean was not an exact 
science by any means.  Political conditions in Africa, European naval wars, and local 
market conditions all affected the supply of Africans.
68
  Disease aboard insalubrious 
slave ships also decimated the slave populations available for trade.  Numerous customs 
declarations spoke of quarantining or refusing entry to slaves infected with smallpox.
69
   
Most asiento companies, however, did not make such good faith efforts.  In the 
case of the English asiento (1713-1739), South Sea Company factors in charge of the 
contract had a much greater interest in opening up both legal and contraband trade with 
Spanish America than in providing slaves.
70
  One historian believes that between 1730 
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and 1739 as much as ninety percent of illicit goods entering Spanish America came 
through the asiento.
71
   Spain gave the English asiento the privilege of taking one 
thousand tons of non-slave shipping each year to Spanish America.  These so-called 
annual ships, along with goods smuggled aboard slaving vessels, became a backdoor 
method to flood Spanish markets with English goods and contributed to the destruction of 
the Portobelo trade fairs.  British contraband trade through the asiento forced Spain 
eventually to revoke the South Sea Company’s contract and served as a key impetus for 
the War of Jenkin’s Ear (1739-1742).
72
  Though the English asiento, like the many 
agreements before and after it, brought some slaves to the Americas, foreign slaving 
companies neglected this facet of their business in favor of more lucrative illegal 
pursuits.
73
     
These factors greatly constricted the availability of legal slaves in Venezuela 
throughout the colonial period and led to a number of Venezuelan governmental pleas for 
slaves as cacao production flourished in the eighteenth century. In 1707, the sargento 
mayor of the island of Margarita urged the Captain General of Trinidad to comply with 
the king’s orders and allow the French asiento to bring more slaves to the island of 
Margarita.
74
  Little had changed throughout the eighteenth century when, in 1773, the 
governor of Cumaná wrote that “one of the major impediments to the development of 
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these provinces has been the lack of slaves to work the land and cultivate agricultural 
products.”
75
  Despite Crown orders to bolster the number of slaves being introduced 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, planters wishing to purchase slaves 
legally remained handcuffed to an awkward and insufficient means of distribution.
76
 
Thus, the same conditions of material scarcity and insufficient trade that made 
Venezuela a central hub for foreign contrabandists trading in general goods also provided 
a ready market for smugglers who sought to supplant the asiento and break Spanish slave 
trade regulations.  Since the famous voyages of Sir John Hawkins to Tierra Firme in the 
1560s and 1570s, a plethora of slave traders had come ashore in Venezuela to peddle 
their human cargos.  Hawkins gained notoriety for sometimes trading with Venezuelans 
in coastal towns at the point of his cannons, but also for using the ruse of force and thus 
allowing colluding Venezuelan authorities to pretend they had no other choice but to 
trade with him.
77
  A century later, as cacao production and consumption took off and the 
need for slaves increased, foreign merchants no longer needed to “force” inhabitants of 
the Venezuelan coast into trading for slaves with foreigners.  Though accurate counts of 
illegally-introduced slaves are obviously impossible to come by, one Venezuelan 
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Venezuela’s proximity to formidable slave trading centers further eased the 
introduction of unlicensed slaves into the colony.  Slave depots in Jamaica, Martinique, 
Barbados and Curaҫao existed a stone’s throw away from Venezuela.  The Netherlands’ 
dominant involvement in the slave trade from the mid-seventeenth century until the 
English acquisition of the asiento in 1713 depended on eager Spanish markets through 
both the Dutch asiento (1662-1713) and less legal means.  Curaҫao became a free port in 
1675, making it easy for Venezuelan ships to make the forty mile journey to the island.  
When not in control of the asiento themselves, the Dutch functioned as middlemen, 
supplying foreign asientistas with slaves to take to Spanish America.
79
  Additionally, a 
settlement of Dutch Jews in Tucacas, a formerly uninhabited island off the coast of 
western Venezuela, played an active role in illegal slave trafficking until Venezuelan 
authorities made an effort to eradicate the colony in the mid-eighteenth century.
80
   
Both colonial authorities and the King of Spain noted the prevalence of the illegal 
slave trade between Venezuela and these foreign ports and enacted legislation that sought 
to curb it.  In 1705, Philip V, at the behest of the French Royal Guinea Company, issued a 
royal cédula lamenting, “the ease with which the English and Dutch fraudulently 
introduce their slaves from the islands of Jamaica and Curaҫao into Caracas as well as all 
the coasts of Venezuela.”  As a deterrent to potential buyers, the king ordered a three 
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hundred peso fine for and the confiscation of each contraband slave a master owned.   
Recognizing how deeply embedded Venezuelans were in the contraband slave trade, 
Philip V also offered a means to legalize illicitly-introduced slaves.  For one hundred 
pesos, an owner could buy a pardon (indulto) to legalize his slave.  This pardon also 
extended legalization at no additional cost to any children of that slave.  Finally, the king 
encouraged his subjects to abide by the laws of trade by offering monetary compensation 
for free men and freedom for slaves who denounced owners for keeping illegally-
trafficked slaves.
81
  Both the severity of punishments and the date of the cédula (almost 
seventy years before the governor of Venezuela would promise freedom for slaves who 
informed on their masters for general contraband trading) revealed the seriousness of the 
contraband slave trade in the king’s eyes.  The embarrassment and financial obligation 
associated with the Spanish king’s own subjects breaking binding contracts he had signed 
with foreign companies no doubt compelled Philip V to appreciate the gravity of the 
offense.   
The indulto system of slave legalization became both a prevalent and pragmatic 
means to cope with the influx of contraband slaves into Venezuela.  By offering a means 
to purchase amnesty, the royal treasury actually recouped money from slaveowners’ 
contraband purchases, something it rarely accomplished through punitive measures.  
Furthermore, the self-confession of slave masters required none of the costly naval 
patrols, militias, or court cases commonly used to reduce illicit trading.  King Carlos II 
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admitted as much when he encouraged his governor in Maracaibo to promote the indulto 
as an easier, more expedient means to minimize contraband’s pernicious economic 
effects.
82
   
The indulto also became a useful tool for slaves who understood the legal process 
to escape cruel masters by informing on them and becoming the property of the state.
83
  
Records of indultos show that the procedure was used frequently in Venezuela.  For 
example, between 1716 and 1719, ninety-one slaves were legalized in Caracas via this 
method.  Only Panamá and Portobelo had a higher number of indultos among Spanish 
possessions where the pardon existed.
84
  The willingness of slaveowners to use this 
system perhaps speaks a dearth of legal slaves for purchase rather than their reluctance to 
buy slaves through legal means.    
Beyond legislation and softer measures designed to contain the contraband slave 
trade, Spanish officials employed the same guardacosta patrols and Compañía 
Guipuzcoana ships that chased regular contrabandists to hunt slave smugglers.  In the 
1730s, the right of the Company to stop, search, and impound smuggling vessels came 
into conflict with the desire of English asiento ships not to be disturbed in their trade.  As 
noted earlier, the English slave merchants participated in substantial amounts of 
smuggling under the banner of the asiento.  It was little wonder then that they complained 
about Guipuzcoana ships searching their holds.  Not wanting to alienate either side, the 
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king issued two orders in July and October of 1731 which specified that Guipuzcoana 
vessels had the right to stop any ship, but could not search asiento vessels.
85
  This 
contradictory policy diluted the authority of Guipuzcoana patrols to combat the asiento’s 
smuggling in any meaningful way.  
Leaving aside asiento merchants, the slave smugglers who sought to evade 
Spanish coastal patrols differed little in their methods from other contrabandists on the 
Venezuelan coast.  Unlike the asiento companies’ massive ships, independent slave 
smugglers sailed small sloops, brigs and coastal schooners and usually carried no more 
than twenty slaves.
86
  Contrabandists involved in the slave trade rarely sailed solely with 
human cargo.  To appeal to the widest possible market, a trader might combine slaves 
with whatever mundane European goods would fetch a decent price along the coast.   
A textbook case of this sort of multipurpose smuggling is the story of the 
Catalina.  The Spanish coastguard stopped this small craft on its way between Curaҫao 
and La Guaira, Caracas’s port, in 1770.  The ship’s crew, composed of mostly Spaniards, 
had purchased ten creolized slaves in Curaҫao from their Dutch masters with the intent to 
sell them in La Guaira.  The slaves, a mix of men, women, and children, were only part 
of the ship’s wares.  The Catalina also brought European cloth to sell covertly.  Just as 
the crew of the ship saw the slaves as just another part of their cargo, authorities in port 
drew the same conclusion, auctioning off the people of color side-by-side with the 
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impounded fabrics and the vessel.
87
  However, contrary to the rest of the goods in the 
ship’s hold, the slaves of the Catalina told a story in their testimonies that linked the 
Venezuelan crew of the ship to Dutch traders in Curaҫao.
88
  Given the incriminating 
details these slaves knew of the smugglers’ habits, it is hardly surprising that they jumped 
ship before the Spanish could come alongside the Catalina.    
Like the sailors of the Catalina, contrabandists engaged in the trafficking of 
slaves almost never went directly from Africa to the Venezuelan coast.  Most slavers 
brought their ships first to Caribbean way stations like Jamaica, Curaҫao, or Martinique 
before then proceeding into Spanish America.  The dangerous and disease-ridden nature 
of the middle passage necessitated time to refresh slaves, crew, and ship in a friendly port 
before proceeding with the covert passage along the coasts of Tierra Firme.  Smugglers 
also took on excess trade goods and sold off a portion of their slaves in non-Spanish 
Caribbean ports.  A stopover in the Caribbean was also useful to pick up “refuse slaves.”  
Illicit traders frequently took on these sickly or recovering slaves at discount rates to then 
re-sell on the black market.
89
  The contrabandists correctly calculated that due to high 
prices, general scarcity, and the risk of capture and confiscation, Spanish American 
customers buying in secret were less discriminating than their counterparts who 
purchased Africans legally from the asiento.   
More than the simple contrabandist, the slave smuggling captain needed an 
extensive knowledge of market conditions in many corners of the Atlantic World and the 
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flexibility to adapt to the unforeseen circumstances that human trafficking presented.  
The experience of John Maddock, an English slaving captain captured in 1764, sheds 
light on these traits.  A Compañía Guipuzcoana cruiser overtook Maddock’s frigate near 
Tortuga, an island off the eastern Venezuelan coast.  The Company’s authorities accused 
Maddock of going toward Venezuela to trade his cargo of twenty slaves and European 
clothes from Barbados.  Maddock claimed merely to be refreshing his supplies of 
freshwater before sailing the slaves to Maryland.   
Parceling out whether or not Maddock told the truth proves difficult based on 
available documentation.  However, when pressed by interrogators, Maddock revealed an 
itinerary of startling complexity.  He had left London a year earlier with wheat to drop off 
in Tenerife.  He exchanged the wheat for wine.  From Tenerife, he steered toward 
Senegal where he offloaded the wine and took on provisions.  After several stops along 
the Gambia River trading European guns and liquor, Maddock had amassed one hundred 
slaves to bring to Barbados.  He arrived in the Caribbean with seventy slaves.  Of these, 
he sold fifty in Barbados.  According to Maddock, the remaining twenty slaves were 
destined for Maryland plantations.
90
  The inventory of his frigate’s hold contained a 
laundry list of goods, including sugar, cotton, tobacco, añil, ginger, brazilwood, rice, 
naval timbers, copper, gunpowder, and hats.  In addition to his slaves, Maddox clearly 
possessed wares to peddle for nearly any situation.
91
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Captured slave traders often proffered excuses similar to Maddock’s for why they 
found themselves in Spanish coastal waters.  Re-supplying exhausted provisions or 
freshwater was a common justification that was protected under treaties between Spain 
and most European powers.  Likewise, international agreements covered putting ashore 
to repair a vessel after squalls.  Smugglers also claimed to have lost their way navigating 
or due to storms. 
Spanish prize court judges evaluating these rationales rarely believed the stories 
of contrabandists.  Contrary to the court experience of black contrabandists, whose 
testimonies were often brief, forgettable affairs in the eyes of Spanish interrogators, the 
words of slaves being transported as cargo frequently carried more weight than those of 
their white captors.  Slaves, unlike contrabandists, had no reason lie about their voyages.  
Even so, a slave’s ordeal aboard a confiscated ship usually ended much the way his or her 
life in bondage had begun: with evaluation, appraisal, and sale at public auction.  
Depending on who had caught the smuggler, proceeds from the sale of contraband slaves 
went to either the provincial treasury or the coffers of the Compañía Guipuzcoana.  In a 
few cases, the slaves themselves served as a sort of currency, being given to labor on the 
company’s fortification projects as payment for services rendered.
92
   
Despite investigations, seizures, and confiscations, the efforts of coastal patrols 
and pardons to stem the tide of illegal importation of African slaves were ultimately 
ineffectual.  Venezuelan planters and contrabandists reacted to slave scarcities and 
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anticipated, by their illicit transactions, the policy changes to come.  By the last quarter of 
the eighteenth century, the Spanish Crown began to reduce tariffs on slaves entering 
Venezuela and the rest of Spanish America through the asiento.
93
  In 1791, a royal decree 
finally ended the asiento and opened up the slave trade in most of Spanish America to all 
nations.  Spanish subjects would also be allowed to go abroad to foreign colonies in 
search of enslaved laborers.   
Ironically, the free trade in slaves came too late to late to be useful for Venezuela, 
where the cacao boom had mostly passed by 1791.  Venezuelan planters had prefigured 
the royal decree opening the slave trade with more than two hundred years of illicit trade 
with foreigners.  By the time of the cédula, many hacendados had already transitioned to 
peasant (peon) labor for cacao production as a cheaper alternative to procuring and caring 
for slaves.
94
  In many ways, the cédula had also occurred a generation too late for planters 
and officials traumatized by the upheaval of the Haitian Revolution.  Slave imports 
waned in many Caribbean colonies as a result of the long shadow cast by the only 
successful slave revolt in the Western Hemisphere. In 1792, the Intendent of Caracas 
prohibited the buying or selling of French slaves, even if they were recently arrived 
Africans on French ships.
95
  To Spanish officials, the Haitian contagion presented a threat 
not to be taken lightly.  Similarly, the Intendent of Caracas turned away a cargo of 31 
creolized slaves from Curaҫao because he believed that “creole slaves or those educated 
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in the foreign colonies are prejudicial to these provinces.”
96
  Although fears of a second 
Haiti stunted slave sales for a time, the unprecedented break with Spanish mercantilist 
trade policy, brought on by the contraband slave trade, acknowledged the sad centrality 
of African labor within emerging Caribbean plantation societies and fueled the nineteenth 





 Whether mariners aboard foreign ships, porters of goods for their masters, 
soldiers in anti-contraband operations or captive cargoes in the holds of outlaw slave 
ships, freedmen and slaves of African descent formed an integral part of the thriving 
illicit trade that contributed to the formation of a Venezuelan economy distinct from that 
of the Spanish Empire.  These men trafficked the wares of others between empires in 
direct violation of Spanish mercantilism.  Many also came across the Atlantic unwillingly 
and in secret as chattel.  Through their experience with these commonplace, yet 
dangerous, transactions, men of color understood far better than colonial policymakers 
the extent to which profit trumped patriotism in matters of international commercial 
exchange.  
 Venezuela’s flourishing contraband trade created contradictions between freedom 
and slavery that challenged rigid distinctions of work, citizenship status, and property 
rights in the slave societies of the Caribbean.   The illicit and informal nature of the 
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business allowed for working arrangements of greater autonomy for men of color both in 
Venezuela and at sea.  Non-whites of Spanish, French, Dutch, and English nationality 
escaped the drudgery of plantation labor for jobs in which they were entrusted with 
valuable cargo and bargaining power.  As a plethora of cases involving runaways 
demonstrate, this escape frequently defied the wishes of white slave masters.   Moreover, 
the criminality of unregulated trade sometimes worked in favor of slaves, winning them 
their freedom when the colonial justice system punished masters for illegally purchasing 
unlicensed slaves. 
On the other hand, Venezuela’s illicit commerce presented thorny legal questions 
for men of African descent caught up in it.  Royal officials were inconsistent in the 
prosecution of non-white contrabandists and smugglers.  Capture by Spanish anti-
contraband forces might throw the carefully cultivated freedom of seafaring men of color, 
like the Frenchman Juan Pedro Antonio, to the wind.  For other slaves, confiscation of 
their vessels merely served to exchange a foreign master for a Spanish one.  Though 
Spanish officials might capture cargoes of illegally trafficked Africans, these seizures 
rarely halted their sale to hacendados.  Creolized Venezuelan slaves often morphed from 
smugglers’ accomplices into seized assets in the eyes of the Spanish authorities who 
caught their masters.  This difficulty in separating contraband participant from human 
property defined the uneasy status of black contrabandists in the imperially-fluid early 




VII.  Smuggling and Popular Protest in Mid-Eighteenth-Century 
Venezuela 
 
On the afternoon of April 20
th
, 1749, a force of between four to six-hundred 
armed men amassed on Caracas’s central plaza.  Entering the city under blue and white 
flags emblazoned with red crosses and to the sounds of beating drums, the deployment 
comprised a cross-section of Venezuela’s races, social classes, and occupations.
1
  They 
followed Juan Francisco de León, a cacao planter and small-town official, and shouldered 
their weapons as a popular protest “in the name of the city [of Caracas], the nobility, and 
the masses.”  Disregarding the potentially ominous specter of so many armed insurgents, 
Caraqueños instead overwhelmingly welcomed León’s troops with open arms.  As one 
observer remarked, everyone in the city from shopkeepers “to the nuns give thanks to 
León, wishing him success and commending him to God.”
2
   
Royal officials and Caracas Company employees living in the city, however, felt 
none of these cordial sentiments.  For the rebels, with León as their mouthpiece, declared 
as the central aims of their uprising the extermination of the joint stock company and the 
expulsion of its hated Basque employees from the province.  Approximately four hundred 
Basques fled the city and the rebels put the governor of Venezuela under de facto house 
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arrest while they presented their demands.
3
  Several days after entering Caracas, the 
hapless Governor Luis Francisco Castellanos acceded to the rebels’ terms, suspending the 
Company and formally expelling the outsiders.  On April 23
rd
, a slave named Florenzio, 
the property of Simón Bolívar’s father Juan Vincente Bolívar, read the news to a large 
crowd in the plaza central.  When he rhetorically asked three times who had demanded 
the expulsion of the Caracas Company, the crowd enthusiastically cheered “the whole 
province!”
4
  By August of that year, rumors circulated that León’s forces numbered 
between four and seven-thousand men throughout the province.
5
  It would be the largest, 
and arguably the most important, revolt witnessed in Venezuela before the independence 
wars.   
How did the Venezuelan colonial relationship reach this fever pitch of near 
insurrection?  What passions and convictions brought Venezuelans from throughout the 
province into the streets of Caracas to upend the Caracas Company, the region’s 
dominant commercial, economic, and political entity of the mid-eighteenth century?  The 
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answers to these questions are entwined deeply with Venezuela’s coastal history of 
smuggling and marginality. 
With the rise of the Caracas Company in the second quarter of the eighteenth 
century, Venezuelan subjects experienced commercial transformations that dramatically 
altered the centuries-old expectations about overseas trade relations.  The Company 
stimulated cacao production and exportation and an overall increase in legal trade.  This 
sudden attention to Venezuela’s commercial opportunities did not, however, do much to 
improve the material prospects of ordinary Spanish American subjects.  With the aid of 
its near monopoly over Venezuelan cacao, the Company began to exploit producers by 
depressing cacao prices.  At the same time that it excluded hacendados from a 
competitive legal market for their cacao, the Company used its own private fleet to ramp 
up contraband policing on the coast.  These actions threatened illegal, yet previously 
tolerated, patterns of subsistence through smuggling.   
The historiographies of both Venezuela and Spanish America have neglected the 
León Rebellion and its connections to illicit trade.  Scholarship on the major late 
eighteenth-century rebellions in Spanish America seem ignorant of the existence of 
León’s revolt or only reference it obliquely.
6
  To my knowledge, only two English-
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language works devote more than a couple of sentences to the uprising.
7
  Many 
Venezuelan scholars have investigated the León Rebellion as part of their broader 
projects, but only Francisco Morales Padrón, Enrique Bernardo Nuñez, and Lucas 
Guillermo Castillo Lara have made it the central theme of their studies.
8
  Among 
Venezuelan historians, the traditional interpretations of the rebellion’s causes have 
emphasized it either as a proto-nationalist struggle, a battle between Basques and Canary 
Islanders for control of the province, a result of economic hardships, or a fight strictly 
over the fate of the Caracas Company.
9
  None of these treatments have emphasized 
sufficiently the role of contraband trade in the rebellion’s development.   
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The uprising’s causes, events, and consequences are complex and demand 
multifaceted coverage.  The first part of this chapter will delve into the pre-rebellion sea 
changes occurring in Venezuelan trade as a result of the Company’s overarching presence 
in the province.  Company control over commerce, politics, and economic practice 
angered colonists, sparked several protests early on in the Company’s tenure, and 
alienated the province from metropolitan directives.  Following this treatment, a second 
section will examine the events of the León uprising itself.  The unique developments of 
this trade rebellion allowed Venezuelan subjects, via popular protest, to participate 
informally in the colonial political arena.  The third and final part of this chapter will 
analyze petitions and correspondence of the insurgents to reveal elements of their moral 
economies, political thought, and communal identities.    
The León Rebellion brings into sharp focus the interplay between community 
standards of economic fair play and contraband trade frequently overlooked by scholars.  
Too often, historians have marginalized transnational illicit exchange as tangential to the 
interests of empires and as the purview of wealthy individuals seeking luxury goods.  
Many have conceptualized smuggling also as an act of naked self-interest thereby 
discounting the worldviews and politics of those involved in the trade.
10
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Contrary to these understandings, early modern smuggling in the Caribbean was, 
in many cases, a subsistence practice of the needy designed to compensate for inadequate 
legal trade.  Investigations of prize court records are far more likely to find sacks of flour, 
bolts of coarse cloth, and cheap wine among lists of confiscated contraband than fine 
china, jewelry, or silks.  Otherwise loyal Spanish subjects, such as the León insurgents, 
benefitted from everyday illegal trade and used popular protest to defend it against 
commercial concessions that encroached upon smuggling’s central position in the 
colonial economy of makeshifts.   
Contraband commerce was also political.  Though illegal traders were not a 
formal political faction themselves, they heavily influenced how provincial elites reacted 
to metropolitan orders.  Illicit trade represented a disdain for the mercantilist commercial 
policies of empires and for metropolitan ignorance of local conditions. Those who 
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smuggled or benefitted from smuggled goods were equal parts political reactionaries, in 
their wish to reinstitute a Hapsburg period of salutary neglect, and forward thinkers, in 
their desire to create free trade from the bottom up.   
Finally, clandestine trade was an indicator of a strong sense of colonial autonomy 
and self-identity.  Venezuelan contrabandists and their accomplices were notoriously 
hostile to outsiders’ attempts to enforce anti-smuggling ordinances.  They identified most 
strongly with their Venezuelan homeland, although in the mid-eighteenth century very 
few harbored any desire to be politically independent of Spain.  From a position of creole 
commercial autonomy, Venezuelan traders and producers formed close trading 
partnerships and alliances with merchants of foreign empires despite strict Spanish 
prohibitions against such contact.  Though Venezuelan subjects looked to Spain for much 
of their cultural and political allegiances, they reached out to non-Spanish traders to fill 
their shopping baskets and bring their produce to market.  The tension in this dichotomy 
of colonial character manifested itself in the actions and words of León and his 
insurgents.  
Historians of Venezuela and Spanish America should not assume that either 
León’s uprising or contraband trade was politically and ideologically inert.  Anthony 
McFarlane has argued forcefully that uprisings of the late eighteenth century in Spanish 
America, including the Quito, Comunero, and Tupac Amaru rebellions, were not just 




possessed basic political ideologies grounded in the defense of community rights.
11
  The 
revolt of 1749-1751 in Venezuela, the predecessor of these more well-known protests, 
was no different.  As a politically-charged event, it shed light on tendencies and 
characteristics in Venezuelan society that were a product of illicit trade.  In the León 
Rebellion and the popular protests that preceded it, smuggling transcended its simple 
definition as an illegal economic exchange and became a pivotal building block for 
informal political expression and local identity formation.   
 
The Caracas Company and its Malcontents 
        
The early Bourbon kings realized that, due to the province’s peripheral status 
within the Spanish Empire and its abundant cacao, Venezuela was uniquely situated to 
join the illicit international economy. Its long coastline was full of secluded coves and 
rivers running to the sea from inland.  Years of neglect and the War of Spanish 
Succession (1701-1714) had defanged any threat posed to smugglers by coastguard ships.  
All of these factors made the Venezuelan central coast a perfect environment for 
smuggling.  In short, bringing Venezuela’s potentially profitable cacao reserves into the 
Spanish state’s revenue stream would require drastic action.  
As mentioned earlier, the Crown decided in 1728 to use an economic platform 
(the royal trading company) that was very much in vogue at the time.
12
  Among the 
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commercial privileges given to the Caracas Company were royal protection, exclusive 
rights to the shipping of cacao between Venezuela and Spain, reductions in port duties, 
and freedom from disembarking their goods at the House of Trade (Casa de 
Contratación) in Cádiz.  Fourteen years later they added to these concessions by securing 
rights to ship to New Spain, Venezuela’s other major legal trading partner.
13
   
The Company’s carte blanche control over Venezuelan ports ushered in the 
province’s first substantial legal trading system, dramatically increased royal revenues 
coming from the colony, and generally brought Venezuela to the economic attention of 
Madrid for the first time.
14
  During the first twenty years of the Caracas Company’s 
existence in Venezuela, it improved the ports, defenses, and roads of major coastal cities 
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and towns to facilitate smoother commerce.
15
  Annual Venezuelan cacao exports to Spain 
between 1700 and 1730 averaged approximately 21,000 fanegas (or about 2.3 million 
pounds in today’s measurements).  From 1730 until 1748, during the first eighteen years 
of the Caracas Company, annual Venezuelan cacao exports to the mother country more 
than doubled to around 50,000 fanegas (5.5 million pounds).
16
   
To accommodate this increased cargo and patrol for interlopers, the Company 
used its own private fleet for all commercial traffic and coastguard activities.  The fleet 
insulated the Company somewhat from both the vagaries of shipping costs and more 
pronounced governmental oversight into their patrols.
17
  The Company’s initial tenure in 
Venezuela witnessed the most stringent anti-contraband measures in the colony’s history.  
A paramilitary fleet of between ten and twenty ships and several hundred men a year 
patrolled coastal waters harassing foreign and domestic shipping alike suspected of illicit 
trade.
18
   
The Company quickly became the primary governing force in the province as 
well.  It handpicked the governor, usually from among Basque candidates.  The governor 
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then received a yearly payout of between two and four-thousand pesos from the 
Company for his role as an arbiter (juez conservador) for the venture in Venezuela.  His 
secretary received one-thousand pesos annually to defend the legal suits and rights of the 
Company.  At the lower administrative rungs, the Company helped appoint prize court 
judges to rule over ships seized by its maritime forces.
19
  These sudden and far-reaching 
manipulations quickly made the province’s judicial and administrative systems intolerant 
of anything contrary to the Company’s interests, including Venezuelan smuggling. 
Despite the Caracas Company’s promises of greater prosperity for Venezuela as a 
whole, locals rapidly came to resent the intrusion of these outsiders.  Elites saw the 
Company’s meddling in government as a threat to their political control over the province 
through the cabildo.
20
  Moreover, both elite and petty merchants perceived the danger to 
their interests posed by the Company’s ascendancy in the cacao trade.  With their 
dominant share of the province’s legal commerce, the Caracas Company depressed the 
prices it would pay producers for their cacao.  From a pre-Company rate of around 
twenty-two pesos per fanega (a fanega equaling 110 pounds), the going price paid for 
cacao during the Company’s initial twenty years plummeted to an average of eight pesos 
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per fanega and, in some cases, as low as four to five pesos per fanega.
21
  Company ships 
set sail only after their intentional delays forced planters and merchants into bad deals.  
Company buyers purchased only what the overseas market would buy at a high price and 
left excess cacao to rot in port.
22
  The inability of Venezuelan producers to sell their crop 
legally at anything approaching a fair market price decimated their fortunes.   
Locals were also dismayed by how the Company shirked its responsibilities to 
provision the colony.  Complaints of inadequate, substandard, and prohibitively 
expensive goods and foodstuffs were common.  On several occasions during the 
Company’s first twenty years, lapses in Company shipping forced Venezuelan residents 
to petition to buy flour from neighboring colonies.
23
  Just five years before León’s 
uprising, King Philip V wrote to Caracas Company directors regarding Caraqueño 
complaints of a dearth of wheat flour, liquor, and clothing.  The monarch scolded 
Company officials for allowing conditions in the province to reach a point where “the 
necessities of eating and clothing themselves oblige residents to take from foreigners 
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what this company should be offering them in abundance.”
24
  Notwithstanding this 
admonishment, clothes became so scarce that the rector of the university in Caracas in 
1749 issued an impassioned plea for additional supplies.  The province’s population of 
140,000 needed roughly one million pieces of clothing “to cover their nudity.”   He 
opined that just as “the laws of god and man oblige one to solicit covering for beasts, so 
do they for the necessity of the human condition.”  The rector chastised the Company that 
“since its establishment has allowed for a continual dearth of the most common and usual 
goods, of foodstuffs and supplies...subjecting [the province’s] inhabitants to an 
intolerable nudity and compelling them by necessity to look for a remedy wherever the 
possibility presents itself.”
25
  When Company merchandise did reach Venezuela, price 
gouging frequently put it out of the populace’s reach.  One complaint noted that the 
Company bought barrels of flour at ten pesos each and then sold them to the general 
public at twenty-three pesos per barrel.
26
      
At the same time that Venezuelans went without basic supplies, the Company 
hauled in tidy profits.  Shareholders earned dividends between twenty and thirty percent 
for the 1730s and 1740s.  A twenty peso difference between the Company’s buying and 
selling price on cacao per fanega easily covered overhead expenses.
27
 
                                                 
     
24
 El Rey a los Señores Directores de la Real Compania Guipuzcoana de Caracas.  Madrid.  September 
30, 1744.  AGI, Caracas, 928. 
     
25
 Petición del Sr. Rector de la Real y Pontificia Universidad.  Caracas.  June 12, 1749.  AGI, Caracas, 
419. 
     
26
 Interrogatorio.  Undated.  AGI, Caracas, 418. 
     
27
 Garate Ojanguren, La Real Compañía Guipuzcoana de Caracas, 46; Vivas Pineda, La Aventura 




These developments fueled a shared anxiety among Venezuelan coastal 
inhabitants that the Company had come to monopolize the province’s economic and 
political resources for its own extractive gain.  Local merchants and planters felt cut out 
from their own province’s wealth and commercial boom.  Undergirding this anxiety was 
the Caracas Company’s role in smuggling enforcement.  Whether through neglect or 
commercial restrictions, Venezuelans were used to sparse legal trade opportunities.  
However, the Company’s patrols gradually tightened the provincial safety valve of 
smuggling.  Most scholarly estimates of Venezuelan illicit trade say it dropped during the 
first twenty years of Company rule.
28
  Coastguard ships rounded up contrabandists in 
record numbers (their prize court cases filled up forty-two volumes in Venezuela’s 
Archivo General de la Nación).  The regulations of corsairing allowed maritime patrols to 
collect between one-third and one-half of the value of impounded contraband.
 29
  
Coastguard men therefore had the incentive to seize goods whether they were illicit or 
not.  In addition, Company coastguard patrols frequently assaulted both foreign and 
domestic smugglers causing colonists to view them as dangerous.
30
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Tighter enforcement of illicit trade by the Company did nothing to quiet 
Venezuelans’ persistent whispers that Company officials themselves were deeply 
involved in smuggling.  Tax fraud resulting from Company ships transporting undeclared 
cacao to Spain and untaxed luxury items to Venezuela was common.  Mariners and ship 
captains frequently overloaded these vessels with undeclared items to such an extent that 
the ships became unseaworthy.  In 1738, customs officials in Spain seized one Company 
ship that had failed to declare 40,000 pesos of Mexican silver.
 31
  Company men in port 
proved no more scrupulous than their seafaring counterparts.  Juan Francisco de León 
himself would later accuse one Company employee of working at a store full of Dutch 
goods known as the “warehouse of Curaҫao” and another of illegally importing slaves 
into Venezuela under the pretext that they were captured goods.  He included transcripts 
of letters between Caracas Company factors and Dutch merchants summarizing their 
transactions as further proof of criminal commercial activity.
32
   
Venezuelan subjects thus viewed Company employees not only as hypocrites, but 
also as pernicious monopolizers of the vital black market.  Aline Helg has observed that 
subjects on the periphery declined to rebel against the colonial order “because they could 
live on its legal or geographical margins—either by smuggling or by surviving 
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semiautonomously in the backlands.”  John Elliott politicizes this dynamic, noting that 
rather than formally refusing to import licensed European goods as in British North 
America, Spanish American subjects protested their empire’s commercial policies by 
enthusiastically engaging in illicit trade.
33
  The Caracas Company’s intrusion into the 
underground economy snuffed out these modes of passive resistance to Spanish 
commercial regulations.  Though subjects would cloak their complaints about the 
Company in the appropriate language of lost legal trade opportunities, it was the 




In order to protect its image in Spain, the Caracas Company parried Venezuelans’ 
criticism with its own perspective on the previous twenty years of history.  Numerous 
letters to royal officials offered a full-throated defense of Company patrols as “the brake 
on illicit trade” and the only real military measure against foreign invasion.
35
  More 
importantly, at the height of the León Rebellion several senior Company officials led by 
its director Joseph de Yturriaga published a manifesto defending the Company’s 
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continued presence in Province of Venezuela.  The document is notable for its measured 
tone and orderly arguments, which contrasted sharply with the impassioned pleas of 
creole petitions.  It minimized the rebellion’s importance, claiming that a few bad apples 
(mostly elite Caraqueño merchants and foreigners) had led an otherwise loyal populace 
astray.  In the view of these Company men, the minority that hated the Basque merchant 
venture did so because it enforced anti-smuggling prohibitions.  The Manifesto rejected 
the idea of the Company as a malevolent monopoly, reasoning that colonists could legally 
trade with Mexico, the Canary Islands, and the interior provinces outside of the 
Company’s control.  Moreover, the Company had benefitted the region.  The authors 
pointed to increased cacao production, the construction of deep harbors and forts, and 
defensive outlays of 15,000 pesos annually as proof that the Company had Venezuela’s 
best interests in mind.  These gains were not, as petitioners had misconstrued them, the 
result of “tyranny, oppression, mistreatment, or poverty, but rather advantages that gave 
help, assistance, opportune aid, and fecundity to the province.”
36
   
This rubicund portrayal to Madrid notwithstanding, coastal Venezuela was the 
scene of frequent unrest prior to the 1749 uprising.  León’s revolt did not constitute the 
first armed protest against the Company.  Venezuela’s coastal inhabitants voiced their 
dismay through two previous tumults.   
The first of these civil disorders, the Andresote Rebellion, flared up virtually from 
the moment of the Caracas Company’s installation in 1730.  Named after Andrés Lopez 
de Rosario, an ex-slave of African and indigenous descent (zambo), the amorphous 
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uprising lasted nearly two years with sporadic skirmishes occurring in Nirgua and 
Barquisimeto.
37
  Andresote led sophisticated smuggling rings, which traded from the 
coast near Puerto Cabello deep into these interior towns to the southwest by way of the 
Yaracuy River.  His rebellion comprised many slaves and free blacks and a few whites.  
His followers fired on Company officials and troops and destroyed the homes and 
property of several authorities and planters loyal to the Basques.  Andresote’s men 
received arms and logistical support from the Dutch, who were his trading partners and 
stood to gain from the destruction of the Company.  The rebel leader used Dutch ships to 
hop between Venezuela and Curaҫao where he was, according to one observer “received 
with great applause and satisfaction by the residents [of Curaҫao] and especially their 
governor who bestowed on him magnificent hospitality at his country estate.”
38
  When 
royal troops finally put down his rebellion for good in 1732, Andresote fled to Curaҫao, 
presumably remaining there in exile for the rest of his life.   
Nine years later, another anti-Company protest broke out in San Felipe, a city 
near the site of Andresote’s uprising.  The uprising started in 1741 when San Felipe’s 
inhabitants expelled Don Ygnacio Basaraval, a Company-backed justicia mayor known 
for his zealous prosecution of contrabandists.  The protestors took control of the town and 
plotted various actions against the Caracas Company, including setting fire to a nearby 
Company factory.  Like the Andresote rebels, San Felipe’s insurgents received arms from 
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the Dutch.  After several months, royal soldiers put down the revolt, entered the city, and 
reinstalled Basaraval.
39
   
Although both the Andresote and San Felipe uprisings represented popular anger 
with the Caracas Company’s active commercial policing, several factors explain why 
neither rivaled Juan Francisco de León’s rebellion in size and scope.  First, both revolts 
lacked a distinct, driving ideology.  San Felipe protesters rallied around the idea of 
expelling their local judge, but never moved much beyond these personal politics.  The 
Andresote Rebellion developed a split personality that vacillated between freedom for 
contrabandists and the empowerment of Afro-Venezuelans.  The rebels frequently 
pursued no greater cause than the survival of their own insurgency.
40
   
Both revolts also failed to encompass a broader base of support and most 
importantly the aid of elites.  This was the case in San Felipe because the rebellion never 
reached outside the confines of the city.  Andresote’s insurgency initially held sway over 
local elites involved in the contraband trade.  They saw the rebel chief as their puppet.  
However, as the uprising progressed, white planters and traders became horrified by 
black rhetoric proclaiming that “the time has arrived when the whites will serve them or 
they [the blacks] will kill them all.”  Though the veracity of these declarations is 
uncertain given that royal officials included the racially-charged language in their leading 
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questions to witnesses of the uprising, the documents demonstrate nonetheless that elite 
opinion of the Afro-Venezuelan-led rebellion had soured.
 41
   
Furthermore, the San Felipe and Andresote uprisings never attained the critical 
mass of León’s rebellion because they never reached Caracas.  The short duration and 
small geographical scope of the San Felipe riot failed to attract significant attention in 
Caracas.  Andresote’s two year revolt owed its longevity more to the guerrilla tactics of 
its perpetrators and the rugged jungle terrain of its setting than to any province-wide 
participation or sympathy in the capital.
42
  Ultimately, these two protests had little impact 
on the Caracas Company’s control over Venezuela, but rather indicated the consistent 
current of unrest that Juan Francisco de León would channel later into a substantial 
movement. 
Like León and his followers, Spain’s competitors acutely recognized local 
frustration with the Caracas Company and sought to capitalize on the underlying anger.  
This chapter has noted the prominent interventions of the Dutch in pre-León uprisings.  
English subjects also sympathized with anti-Company protests.  One Boston newspaper 
cheerily recognized the bravery of “Andrew Scoso [Andresote], a Mulatto agitated by a 
generous Passion of relieving his distress’d Countrymen.”
43
   
In addition to continuing illicit trade with Spanish subjects and thus undermining 
the Caracas Company’s cacao monopoly, foreigners made several overtures to 
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Venezuelan coastal inhabitants encouraging them in rebellion against the Company and 
the Spanish Crown.  The English, in particular, employed this tactic.  During the War of 
Jenkins’ Ear, English Admiral Charles Knowles sought to create a fifth column of 
Venezuelans disaffected by the Company to aid his invasions of La Guaira and Puerto 
Cabellos in 1743.  He sent leaflets in Spanish ahead of himself to both ports explaining 
that the war between the English and Spanish had begun only out of need  
to reprimand the insolence of these pirates commonly called coast guards (guarda 
costas) of which the Viscayans are particularly noteworthy.  They practice acts of 
cruelty and barbarism not just against the English, but against their own 
countrymen, the Spanish, treating them worse than Turks, jailing them, violating 
their ancient right to trade with other nations, and daily throwing them into the 
galleys.  
 
Knowles proposed to establish a British colony at Puerto Cabello and promised 
protection from marauding Company forces.
44
  One British officer involved in the 
campaign against both ports recalled Knowles’s orders to his subordinates that they were  
to let the Inhabitants of the Country know, that the English did not come there to 
take from them their Rights, Religion, or Liberties, but that they would from us 
enjoy them with great Certainty, and more Happiness, than when under the 
Tyranny and Cruelty of the Guiapesco Company, which we were now come to rid 
them of.
45
   
 
Six years later, during Juan Francisco de León’s rebellion, the rebel chief received a letter 
from a British captain named Ian Burr lamenting that the province’s inhabitants found 
themselves “enslaved and impeded from trade and commerce” and offering the military 
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aid of his convoy of three ships if León’s forces would swear allegiance to the British 
sovereign.
46
  That neither of these plots succeeded in swaying imperial loyalties 
confirmed the strength of Venezuelan fidelity to the Spanish Crown.  Nonetheless, they 
also demonstrated that locals’ rage over the Caracas Company’s control over the 
province’s commercial, political, and military resources had become fierce enough to be 
felt across imperial boundaries.  
 
Marching on Caracas: The Rebellion of Juan Francisco de León 
 
 
Nowhere was creole frustration over the Basque monopolization of Venezuela 
more palpable than in Panaquire.  This town, formed early in the eighteenth century from 
the boom in cacao production, was the bedrock of Juan Francisco de León’s rebellion.  
Located in the fertile Tuy River Valley just inland from the coast, Panaquire was an ideal 
place for Canary Island immigrants to settle and grow cacao.  Numerous ships brought 
Canary Islanders or Isleños to populate what had been jungle at the turn of the century.  
They found fellowship with Isleños who lived in the Candelaria district of Caracas.
47
  
Though the Crown initially encouraged the efforts of these small cacao planters, the 
Caracas Company and governors beholden to it viewed the Isleños as a nuisance.  
Numerous officials connected them to illicit trade and portrayed them as shifty, lazy, and 
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rebellious.  For example, the interim governor of Venezuela, Fray Don Julian de Arriaga 
y Rivera, in 1750 conflated  
zambos, mulatoes, negroes, Ysleños, deserters, and other elements of vagrants 
(gente vaga) that only obey the alcalde if they like and if not, they laugh at him 
and the priest.  Most of them make a living combining the bounty of the haciendas 
and throwing themselves into [illegal] commerce on the coast.
48
   
 
Such characterizations sprung from the isolation of the Tuy River Valley and the ease 
with which cacao could be shipped downriver and out to coastlines frequented by Dutch 
smugglers.   
To combat the perceived lawlessness of the region, authorities restricted trade and 
movement through new laws.  In 1735, Governor Don Martín de Lardizabal, a Basque, 
issued an order banning any commercial activity on the coasts of the Province of 
Venezuela east of La Guaira, Caracas’s port.  Instead all cacao would have to be trucked 
overland across poorly maintained roads that became impassible in the rainy season or 
brought by Company ships to La Guaira.  The restrictions did not even allow commercial 
fishing on the coasts.  They came on the heels of earlier decrees that had mandated that 
all cacao haciendas be planted at least fifteen leagues from the river and that boat 
building be prohibited.
 49
   
Orders designed to slow contraband commerce, via restrictions on how Tuy 
Valley residents and other coastal dwellers could conduct legal trade, instead caused 
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poverty and pushed subjects into the black market in increasing numbers.
50
  Other 
subjects felt a similar squeeze on their commercial freedoms.  A petition from the citizens 
of Caracas attributed their plight to living in a dysfunctional province where “there are 
many sellers and abundant produce, but few or only one buyer.”
51
  Clergy complained 
that tithes and contributions from cacao-producing parishes were insufficient to support 
their churches.
52
  One priest summed up the unintended consequences of increased 
policing of trade, arguing that closing down ports would “prohibit residents from 
exporting cacao by way of legal commerce and, as a consequence, open the danger of 
illicit trade because only criminals (vasallos de mala ley) and foreign ships would come 
to these less-traversed ports.”
53
  
Officials from Caracas wishing to impose their will on inhabitants of the Tuy 
Valley and other primarily Isleño areas met stubborn resistance.  The local government, 
ruled by Lieutenant (Teniente) Juan Francisco de León, a cacao planter who had been 
instrumental in Panaquire’s founding, was incredibly pro-Isleño and reviled the Basques.  
Governor Lardizabal’s successor, Don José Gabriel de Zuloaga, responded to continued 
illegal settlement and trade on the banks of the Tuy River by threatening to prohibit cacao 
cultivation in the area and to redact Panaquire’s charter in 1743.
54
  Official investigations 
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hinted at plots to depose or assassinate both Lardizabal and Zuloaga.
55
  An uneasy 
standoff developed as the Basque governors’ desire to rein in contraband suffered from 
Isleño disobedience and local governmental autonomy.  
By the end of the 1740s, Panaquire’s simmering frustration would boil over into a 
province-wide rebellion due to new Company attempts to assert governmental control 
over the Tuy River Valley.  On April 3, 1749, Martín de Echeverría arrived in Panaquire 
to assume the position of prize court judge of the town.  As an outside official 
handpicked by the Caracas Company to judge captured contrabandists, Echeverría’s 
appointment drove the townspeople to revolt.  Juan Francisco de León, the lieutenant of 
Panaquire, met the official and informed him that the town would not allow him to accept 
Echeverría as a prize court judge.
56
  When Echeverría pressed the issue, León’s forces 
fired on him and the latter withdrew.  León’s rebellion had begun.    
The uprising, which lasted from 1749 to the beginning of 1752, can be broken up 
roughly into four phases.  In the first phase, León marched with an army of between six 
to eight-hundred armed men for Caracas.  Three quarters of León’s forces were Isleños or 
Spaniards by ancestry, while the rest were blacks, mulattos, zambos, and a few Indians.  
Protestors’ social classes ran the gamut from wealthy planters, to middling tradespeople, 
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  León’s forces won this broad base by convincing Venezuelans not involved 
in cacao production that the expulsion of the Caracas Company would serve their 
interests as well.  One of León’s subordinates told a group of “tailors, barbers, cobblers, 
and other tradesmen” that 
though they did not own a cacao hacienda or plant tobacco, by expelling the 
company they would enjoy benefits in the purchase of their goods and in the 
compensation for their work.  The barber normally given a half real for each 
haircut would now receive two because there would be more money [in the 
province].
58
   
 
On the other end of the socioeconomic spectrum, León received anonymous letters of 
support from elite Caraqueños who later fed and sheltered his men when he got to 
Caracas.
59
   
León sent letters of protest ahead of him as he marched airing common 
grievances.  He accused the Caracas Company of impoverishing the province by 
lowering cacao prices to levels that forced producers to abandon their haciendas.  He also 
charged individual Company officials with setting obscenely high prices on food and 
goods, smuggling, and generally abusing Venezuelan subjects.  León demanded the 
immediate extinction of the Company and the expulsion of all Basques from the 
province.
60
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Although the invaders conveyed the appearance of an armed revolt, the initial 
stages of the León uprising in Caracas occurred in an orderly fashion.  By April 19, 1749 
León’s forces were outside the city limits of Caracas in the Isleño-dominated 
neighborhood of La Candelaria.  As Governor Luis Francisco Castellanos had no 
standing army, León held him as a de facto hostage.  Despite the rebels’ dominant control 
of the city, no looting or violence took place.
61
  All correspondence and public 
proclamations from León’s men asserted their loyalty to the king and agreed that the 
uprising’s only mission was the destruction of the Company.  León and the governor 
declared a cabildo abierto or open town council to voice complaints over the Company.  
Ninety-seven members showed up for a meeting that normally produced no more than a 
dozen people.
62
  The cabildo’s show of solidarity and his own captivity persuaded 
Governor Castellanos to declare the expulsion of the Company and all Basques.  After 
fifteen days of captivity, the governor disguised himself as a friar and fled to La Guaira 
on the night of May 3.  He immediately joined Company employees, many of whom had 
already retreated from Caracas.  Like ruling officials in the Comunero revolt of 1780-
1781 in Colombia, the governor of Venezuela quickly declared all proclamations he had 
made in Caracas null and void and commenced to wait for reinforcements.   
Castellanos’s flight changed the dynamics of the uprising.  No longer could it 
simply be classified as a protest, for León’s men had run a Crown-appointed official into 
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hiding.  The correspondences of León and his men thus shifted blame onto the governor 
for running away and thus leaving the province vulnerable to slave revolts and other 
tumults.  They attempted to legitimize their protests and petitions with the help of notary 
publics and asked for legal counsel to be brought to them.
63
   
Though they continued to petition for an end to the Company and its abuses, the 
insurgents sensed the urgency of the moment.  They blockaded the road to La Guaira to 
starve Company partisans of inland supplies and fought several skirmishes in late July 
1749 with Company troops between the two cities.  León’s supporters now held Caracas 
with a force estimated to be between four to seven-thousand men.
64
  The arrival of new 
interim governor Julián de Arriaga and reinforcements in November of 1749 altered 
negotiations.  Arriaga was more conciliatory than Castellanos.  He conceded to the rebels 
that the king would re-evaluate the Caracas Company and fix the worst of its abuses.  
Shortly after assuming command, Arriaga marched to Caracas and met with León.  By 
this time, the rebel leader’s forces had become fearful of the consequences of being 
labeled traitors.  In December of 1749, they were more than willing to take the pardon 
extended to them by Arriaga as long as the Company’s demise seemed assured.
65
   
In the second phase of the rebellion, a year and five months of tense peace settled 
over Caracas.  León’s army disbanded and went home.  Governor Arriaga still worried 
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about their potential return.  His term ended in May of 1751 with the appointment of his 
successor Phelipe Ricardos.  Ricardos took command and immediately began to execute 
his orders to capture Juan Francisco de León and his accomplices and re-establish the 
Company under new terms.  Despite more favorable provisions for colonists, the 
Company’s return in any form was intolerable for León and his closest supporters.
66
  
 The third phase of the uprising saw the destruction of the peace as León began 
his second uprising by marching toward Caracas in August of 1751.  The province was 
abuzz with rumors of pro-León forces numbering in the thousands in various separate 
cacao-producing districts.  However, this new revolt lacked the crucial support of the 
elite, who had come dangerously close to being branded traitors by León’s first 
rebellion.
67
  This fact, combined with the troops assembled by Arriaga and Ricardos, 
frustrated León’s plans of a second trip to Caracas.  León’s men ran into forces that the 
governor had sent to apprehend him and fought a skirmish in the small outlying town of 
Caucagua, wounding a royal officer.  The incident represented the turning point in the 
second uprising.  The governor’s troops nearly surrounded León’s party.  After escaping, 
León’s men, who feared the governor’s overwhelming forces, began to desert in large 
numbers.  Their leader escaped capture by catching passage aboard a Dutch ship that 
transported him east down the Venezuelan coast.   
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From this point onward the fourth stage of the León Rebellion commenced.  The 
Leonistas began to resemble more a group of hunted men than an army.  On September 
13, 1751, the governor published a decree offering a reward for the capture of León and 
his men.
68
  The governor’s forces pursued the fugitives for more than four months.  
Finally, in January of 1752, León, who was hungry, beaten down, and tired of running, 
turned himself in along with several of his supporters and sons.  Other rebels were 
apprehended later.  The weary leader wrote in a final letter to Governor Ricardos that the 
deck had been stacked against him by a government run by Basques who “declared me 
culpable and…pursued me.  They have dishonored me and taken my livelihood as well as 
that of my sons, my wife, and the rest of the poor in this Valley of Panaquire.”
69
  
The aftermath of León’s rebellion produced tremendous upheaval for both its 
participants and the province as a whole.  Company ships carried León and his sons in 
chains to Spain.  León died of disease in prison shortly after his arrival in Cádiz.  His 
sons served lengthy terms in the presidios of Spanish North Africa.  Spanish judges 
exiled and condemned to forced labor twenty-eight other close confidants of León.  The 
specified destinations of these ardent followers (sentences sent them to presidios and 
fortifications in Spain, North Africa, Havana, Vera Cruz, and the Canary Islands) confirm 
the need to separate and isolate the dangerous instigators of unrest.  Authorities also 
executed more than ten Leonistas.
70
  In addition to dispensing justice, colonial officials 
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also sought to make an example of León by way of several heavily symbolic gestures.  
The governor’s forces left the heads of several slaves executed for their part in the revolt 
on León’s door during the last days of the rebellion.  Preceding the punitive ritual later 
performed on the memory of the Andean rebel Tupac Amaru, royal officials tore down 
León’s city house in La Candelaria, salted the earth so that nothing would grow on the 
land, forbid the utterance of his name, and placed a plaque on the site declaring his 
infamy as a traitor to the king.
71
  
Alterations to the colony’s defensive strategy followed punishment of rebel 
instigators.  The instability produced by open revolt and continued vitriol directed at the 
Caracas Company convinced colonial bureaucrats of the need for an increased military 
presence in the province.  Robert Ferry has pointed out correctly that the Bourbon push 
for standing armies in Spanish America may have origins in the events of 1749-1751 in 
Caracas rather than the siege of Havana a decade later.  After the dust settled from the 
uprising, Governor Phelipe Ricardos installed a permanent garrison of troops in Caracas 
at a cost of 100,000 pesos annually.  Authorities paid for this contingent, as well as other 
projects, by more than doubling the alcabala tax from two percent on all goods to five 
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  No doubt prompted by memories of the chaos of the uprising, successive 
governors continued to maintain this standing army
73
 
Furthermore, the León uprising spurred important administrative reforms.  The 
king and council were now mindful of the province’s hatred for the Caracas Company.  
They made changes to the Company that mandated more imperial oversight to prevent 
future rebellions.  To open up the Company’s books and practices, the Crown ordered its 
headquarters transferred from Pasajes to Madrid.  The king also stipulated that a 
commission consisting of the governor, a Company factor, and a representative (regidór) 
from the Caracas cabildo would set new annual price lists on European goods and cacao.  
As a result, the price paid to Venezuelan producers for their cacao increased.  Mandatory 
changes also put Venezuelans on the Company’s board of directors and allowed them to 
be stockholders.  For Venezuelan producers and merchants, the Crown abrogated the 
Company’s rights to trade cacao with New Spain and reserved one-sixth of all Company 
ships to transport producers’ cacao on their own accounts.
74
   
Regardless of these newfound privileges, most Venezuelans still hated the 
Caracas Company.  They viewed it as an outside intruder that prosecuted colonists and 
their foreign trading partners for their role in the smuggling economy and that attempted 
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to monopolize all trade for itself.  Although estimates are problematic, it appears that 
despite the post-León legal trade opportunities presented to Venezuelans by the reformed 
Caracas Company, contraband trade occurred with greater frequency given the 
Company’s weakened position.
75
  The Caracas Company continued in Venezuela 
unhindered by further rebellions against its control until its demise in 1784.   
It was not revolt, but rather trade liberalization that broke the Company’s back.  
The comercio libre (free trade) decrees of 1778 signified a monumental shift in imperial 
commercial thought.  For the first time, a range of Spanish American ports as well as 
peninsular ones outside of Cádiz and Seville would be able to trade legally with one 
another without needing to obtain special permission.  Key Bourbon reformers involved 
in the creation of these laws, such as Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes and José de 
Gálvez, singled out the Caracas Company as a symbol of commercial backwardness.  
From the time of his appointment in 1777, José de Ábalos, the first Intendant of 
Venezuela after the reorganization of the Spanish Imperial bureaucracy, argued that 
demolishing the Company would unleash Venezuela’s economic potential.
76
  On the 
heels of the comercio libre decrees, the Crown retracted the Company’s monopoly over 
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Venezuela’s cacao trade in 1781.  This was the death knell for an organization that had 
ceased to be profitable a decade earlier. 
 
Ideologies of the Insurgents 
  
  
The petitions and correspondence of the León rebels demonstrated complex and 
cohesive economic, moral, commercial, and communal belief structures.  In his study of 
peasant unrest in colonial Mexican villages, William Taylor has noted that “in unstable 
circumstances many social elements that are taken for granted in everyday life, such as 
ideologies and social values, rise to the surface of consciousness and are documented in 
written records.”
77
  Unlike many insurgents, León and his forces had the time and space 
to express, in many cases through their own words, what their protest meant to them.  
Their writings and actions showcased at least four worldviews.  These ideologies testify 
to the complexity of the revolt and also reveal the transformative impact that contraband 
trade had on Venezuela.  
First, the abundance of smuggling in Venezuela produced a distinctive brand of 
economic thought that was both reactionary and forward-thinking.  On one hand, citizen 
petitions both before and during the rebellion called for a return to the pre-Company days 
of limited metropolitan commercial involvement in the region.  Despite an appalling lack 
of legal trade in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, few subjects 
complained of the way things had been before the rise of the Basque venture.  Rather, a 
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1750 Caracas cabildo petition called for the return of register ships as the only trade from 
Spain.
78
  It was the unstated assumption of the cabildo’s request that the reappearance of 
this system would lead to an economy dependent on smuggling.  
At the same time that illicit trade’s hold on the province produced a certain 
intransigence toward change, it also, paradoxically, pre-figured the liberalization of trade 
to come in most of the Caribbean.  Juan Francisco de León’s own designs for an ideal 
trade system harbored many of the principles of free trade.  He believed that Venezuelan-
produced cacao should find its way to market by the most expedient means.  In return, 
goods should come to Venezuela from many separate places but with no obligation for 
Venezuelans to buy any of them.
79
  Others colonists spoke of the benefits of a plurality of 
merchants in commercial matters.
80
  These tendencies toward unrestricted commerce 
were not lost on the governor of Venezuela, who noted that “untold numbers of Canary 
Islanders are vendors and petty merchants.  They are, in my eyes, the contrabandists of 
the coast and it is liberty that they love.  As the majority of them are not married, nor in 
possession of haciendas, they foment revolt with little risk.”
81
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It is worth noting that though Venezuelans’ commercial modus operandi involved 
trade with foreigners, they maintained fidelity to the monarchy and the conventions of the 
Spanish legal system.  The rebels did not see their protest as treasonous.  Like the 
Comunero or Quito rebels to come, the rebels appealed to an earlier governing pact that 
legitimized limited self-government and the right to rise up when entities outside the 
monarchy challenged community rights.  For Spanish Americans, this threat existed in 
Bourbon policies which altered their position in the transatlantic relationship from one of 
equal kingdoms in a monarchy to the more pejorative status of colonies in an empire.
82
  
The Caracas Company’s burdensome presence in the province only highlighted for 
Venezuelans the need to cut out this cancer.  Doing so would reaffirm their proper role in 
the Hispanic world to which they felt affinity.  Hence rebels, in the very act of 
surrounding the governor’s palace, pledged that for the king “we sacrifice and will 
continue to sacrifice our throats.”
 83
   
The insurgents also obsessed over the notarization and legal representation of a 
nearly bloodless uprising.  They called together committees (juntas) of Caracas’s most 
elite subjects to confirm the legitimacy of their protests.  Juan Francisco de León even 
sent one of his lieutenants, Miguel de Fuentes y Abreu, on a voyage to Spain to deliver 
petitions directly to the king.  Ironically, the governor of Cuba captured Fuentes y 
Abreu’s papers, which proclaimed the loyalty of the supposed insurrectionists to the 
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Crown, en route across the Caribbean and prevented them from reaching Madrid.
84
   
Though they carried weapons, the insurgents clearly believed that the nature of their 
actions differed little from sending a complaint letter to the king 
Second, the León rebels legitimized the decision to take up arms by claiming that 
they were bound by conscience to protect the province’s moral economy.  Petitions to 
royal officials or the king could not directly advocate unrestricted commerce with 
foreigners.  This kind of appeal would brand the petitioners as lawbreakers.  Yet León’s 
insurgents, both before and during the rebellion, spoke of smuggling as a necessary 
means of sustenance for the impoverished.  Descriptions of the province emphasized its 
residents as desperate.  The Caracas cabildo pleaded for the delivery of “the most 
moderate and limited clothing and necessary and indispensable foodstuffs like bread, 
wine, and olive oil.”
85
  León noted that prices for cacao had dropped so low that Isleños 
were selling off their now useless haciendas to the Company at fire sale prices.
86
  Such 
accounts displayed a powerful sentiment that the stranglehold on licit and illicit trade had 
transgressed commonly agreed-upon thresholds of economic justice.  Though he viewed 
the uprising with horror, interim Governor Julian de Arriaga seconded León’s views on 
the detrimental consequences of low cacao prices.  The magistrate asked Company 
merchants whether ruined hacendados could now afford even “a hat for themselves or a 
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shirt for their sons.”
87
  One parish priest explained the rebellion through scripture: the 
Israelites asked for relief from oppressive taxes imposed by Solomon’s son Rehoboam 
and rebelled when their demands were not met.  “The people ask for justice” wrote the 
priest.  “Allowing oppression to breathe will incline them to rebellion.”
88
  Abrogation of 
a commercial sense of fairness justified smuggling and popular protest and thus 
challenged the perceived immorality of both offenses.   
Evidence of rebel dependence on the Dutch demonstrates a third ideological 
strain: that of commercial autonomy nurtured by smuggling and material need.  Anxieties 
about the participation of Dutch forces from Curaҫao peppered royal correspondence on 
the León Rebellion.  The Dutch ferried arms, supplies, and food to the rebels via the Tuy 
River in exchange for cacao.
89
  They assaulted Caracas Company ships and broke up 
blockades at the mouth of the river.
90
  In 1751 during the height of the manhunt for Juan 
Francisco de León, Dutch smugglers combined with their English counterparts to rout 
and capture several Spanish coastguard patrols closing in on León.  The rebel leader 
escaped to safety aboard one of the Dutch vessels. 
91
 Venezuelan governors and 
Company officials alike blamed the Dutch for agitating the rebellion and sent spies to 
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Bonaire and Curaҫao to gather intelligence.
92
  Independent of Spanish imperial 
regulations, Venezuelan smugglers-cum-rebels contracted with the Dutch for trade in 
peacetime and for firepower in wartime.  The insurgents’ reliance on their non-Spanish 
Caribbean neighbors as arms dealers and naval muscle demonstrates the close, symbiotic 
relationship that Venezuelan coastal inhabitants shared with foreign traders and their 
independence from legally-sanctioned modes of trade.   
Fourth, the León Rebellion highlights smuggling’s importance in the gradual 
evolution of a place-bound creole identity.  As Venezuelan subjects began openly to 
protest the Caracas Company’s involvement, the accompanying unrest forced them to 
define more clearly who they were and what they stood for.  They identified the 
Company and Basques as a whole as outsiders to their community.  Isleños countered 
characterizations of themselves as petty criminals by demonizing the Basques.  Public 
pronouncements and correspondence of the León rebels spoke of the Basques as a 
generally immoral, arrogant and violent lot.  Their testimonies outlined moral crimes 
committed by Basques and their dependents against Venezuelans including the rape of 
women, poisoning of Venezuelan sailors working aboard Company ships with rotten 
food, and the torture of prisoners. León went so far as to place blame for the 1730 
rebellion of Andresote squarely on the shoulders of the Basques.  According to him, the 
uprising was in part revenge for an incident in which a group of Viscayans broke into 
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Andresote’s house, beat him, tied him up, and then raped his wife and daughter.
93
  “Long 
live king and death to the Viscainos” became a frequent refrain of the León insurgents.
94
   
By attempting to expel the outsiders, the revolt’s participants gained a clearer 
sense of communal self.
95
  Nicolás León, Juan Francisco’s son, wrote that “we are 
obliged to defend our homeland (nuestra patria) because if we do not, we will be made 
the slaves of all others”  Rhetorically, the rebels freely employed the term “patria” to 
denote shared rights and privileges (among them commercial liberties) that had to be 
defended.
 96
  We must resist the teleological urge to completely equate their use of this 
word with the proto-nationalism that it would come to represent during the independence 
period.  Many separate developments over the next sixty years would influence 
Venezuelan identity irrespective of smuggling or the León Rebellion.  However, it seems 
safe to assume that León’s rebellion, the largest popular protest in Venezuela before the 
independence period, nurtured a creole identity that upheld commercial separation from 
the metropole. 
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The uprising of Juan Francisco de León, though short in duration and largely non-
violent, cast a long shadow over Venezuelan commercial and political affairs.  While 
labeling the event itself a failed independence movement or even a precursor to the 
independence struggle grossly overstates its place in Venezuelan history, the rebellion did 
represent the distillation of major tensions within the province.  Smuggling informed 
creole constructions of moral economy, independent trade, and autonomous local identity 
that in turn inspired Venezuelan subjects to rise up against the Caracas Company and the 
royal government.  These salient issues continued to loom on the political horizon as 
Spanish America came ever closer to independence.   
Although most Venezuelans would identify themselves as Spanish in the grand 
scheme of empires, the León Rebellion and its aftermath affirmed a corporate 
identification bound to the province more than to the mother country.  Nicolás León, one 
of Juan Francisco de León’s surviving sons, demonstrated such an orientation years after 
the rebellion.  In 1773, Nicolás reappeared in Spanish imperial documents.  After 
nineteen years of forced service in the presidio of Oran in Spanish North Africa for his 
role in his father’s revolt, Nicolás requested his freedom to return to Venezuela.  He 
asked for clemency, but never directly apologized for his father’s actions and lionized 
Juan Francisco’s role in the foundation of Panaquire.  Nicolás continued to emphasize the 
respectability of the family line, bragging that relatives held prestigious positions as 




felt they would erase any perceived stain added the family legacy by the punishments 
visited upon his father.  Nicolás received permission to leave and to regain his family’s 
lost land.  In spite of the time that had passed, the connections he had lost, and the 
opportunity to make a fresh start in Spain, Nicolás de León chose to return to his 
boyhood home in 1773.
97
   
While the Caracas Company that had jailed Nicolás and his father faced no more 
challenges to its rule from armed masses after the 1749 revolt, grievances over the 
monopoly lurked just beneath the surface of political discussion.  In 1780, José de 
Ábalos, the first Intendant of Venezuela, summarized the anxiety produced by the 
Company’s continued disturbance of creole economic aims and subsistence practices:  
The name of the King, of his ministers and of all Spaniards is heard by the leaders 
of this country with the greatest disgust, aversion and dislike simply on account of 
the Company, which seems to them to be the original sin which gives rise to their 
wrongs.  And truly this error seems at times excusable; in a sense it is true that 
they suffer a kind of slavery, enjoying no benefit from the operations of the 
Company, and oppressed by the necessity to put through its miserly hands those 
few products which they are able to cultivate, after seeing lifeless and buried the 
multitude of other products which ought to flourish in the province of the great 
gain of the Royal Treasury, the outstanding good of the State and the immense 
profit of both continents.  The woeful and rancorous tone of their laments 
increases daily, and unless his Majesty grants them the open trade for which they 
sigh he can no longer count on the fidelity of these vassals, since they will lend 
their ears and hearts to any hint and help offered them by the Crown’s enemies, 
and it will be impossible or very difficult to cure this ill.  This is not an empty 
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Ábalos smartly argued for the destruction of the Company until its demise in 1783.  The 
intendant understood that unrestricted trade and autonomous commercial connections had 
become central to the moral economy of coastal dwellers.   
One final anecdote about the León Rebellion underscores the interconnectedness 
of Venezuelan society, smuggling, and political protest in the twilight of Spanish rule.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, one of the punitive rituals of crushing León’s 
uprising involved tearing down the leader’s house and erecting a plaque on the site to 
mark his treachery.  Almost sixty years later, on September 20, 1811, two articles ran in 
the Gaceta de Caracas detailing a request from the director of public works for the 
province to remove the plaque.  One of these articles, written only two months after 
Venezuela’s congress had declared independence from Spain, noted that the plaque had 
been erected many years before,  
to unjustly stain the memory of Juan Francisco de León.  He led those valiant men 
that tried to throw off the heavy mercantile yoke from which the avarice and 
despotism of the Spanish kings monopolized the commerce of these provinces.  
This they did by way of the unscrupulous Compañía Guipuzcoana, under whose 
exclusive privileges Venezuelans groaned for more than forty years.
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Despite the passing of more than a half century, León’s rebellion and its significance 
remained fresh in Venezuelan popular memory.
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In a recent meditation on the field of Atlantic history, Bernard Bailyn reflected 
that: 
of that economy [the Atlantic economy] much is known, in term of the 
magnitudes and chronology of the flow of goods, the size of markets and 
productive capacities.  But one wants to know more, not so much of statistical 
aggregates as of the shaping circumstances, inner processes, and patterns of 
entrepreneurship that developed in response to the opportunities that appeared.  
 
Essentially, Bailyn urged historians to focus on the traders populating the early modern 
world, rather than the size and shape of their trade.  But the influence of commercial 
actors on the communities where they operated is at least as important an omission as the 
scholarly gap Bailyn identifies.  The manner in which merchants and peddlers conducted 
business, along with how governments regulated their actions, determined commercial 
and material conditions for everyday subjects.  Through the prism of eighteenth-century 
Venezuela, this dissertation has sought to address the social dynamics of illicit 
transnational commerce at the regional and community levels. 
 Records of smuggling allow historians to see how people from all walks of life 
connected to the Atlantic World in very concrete ways.  When used without care, the 
“Atlantic World” can be a nebulous term that disregards specific historical contexts and 
circumstances in the pursuit of transnational and transcultural commonalities.
1
  However, 
the criminalized nature of unlicensed inter-imperial trade produced reams of documents 
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that trace the relationships and motivations of traders.  These records also identify the 
benefits and consequences of covert commerce for host communities.   
As representative examples of peripheral subjects, foreign and domestic 
smugglers circulating around Venezuela used Atlantic and, more specifically, circum-
Caribbean markets to satisfy tangible needs that their empires of origin failed to fulfill.  
Trade-starved Venezuelans yearned for the sustenance and comfort that European-
manufactured food and clothes provided.  Merchants from many nations hoped to make a 
profit by discretely siphoning lucrative cacao from the Venezuelan coast.  Rootless 
maritime workers conceived of smuggling as a preferable occupation to work in the 
plantations and navies of the Caribbean.   
 Additionally, participants in contraband trade utilized wide-open Atlantic sites of 
exchange to accomplish more complex objectives.  Both Spanish and non-Spanish 
subjects gained some measure of commercial self-determination to shield them from 
metropolitan designs of empire composed of extractive and unequal colonial 
relationships.
2
  Particularly for Venezuelans marginalized by the Caracas Company, 
smuggling eased the burdens of economic oppression while the foreign contact it 
provided helped sustain rebellion against Company rule.  On the other side of the 
equation, Spanish imperial administrators ambivalently relied on smuggling to pacify 
subjects, to sustain valuable merchant communities, and to line their own pockets with 
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the spoils of corruption.  Curiosity about these intricate aims has spurred this 
dissertation’s attention to the minutia of clandestine exchange.  The seemingly trivial 
details of how disparate subjects traded, in fact, helped them realize their broader 
aspirations.  
 The documented travails of international smugglers provide an appraisal of how 
little imperially-defined understandings of commercial borders influenced the interactions 
of mobile subjects.  One measure of foreign penetration into Venezuelan commerce was 
the familiarity between interlopers and Spanish subjects.  Dutch smugglers knew the 
contours of the Venezuelan coast as if it was their own dominion and counted 
Venezuelan coastal inhabitants among their most habitual business associates.  Likewise 
Spanish coastal residents found hospitality on foreign shores and collaborated with non-
Spanish traders in devising elaborate ruses to avoid prosecution.   
 In contrast to this familiarity, Spanish judges seemed largely ignorant or 
unconcerned about how Dutch, English, and French illicit traders operated or why they 
had come to the province.  The reader of prize court records notes a certain awkwardness 
in watching multiple empires come into contact.  Scribes fumbled with and egregiously 
misspelled foreign names.  In many cases, investigators immediately assumed that 
foreign traders were spies or the vanguard of an invasionary force, marching in lockstep 
with their empire’s intentions.  Ideas of what constituted contraband also varied 
tremendously between the accuser and the accused.  Mostly these misunderstandings 
sprung from the legal pluralism of the multi-imperial Caribbean.  As the political scientist 




of crime.  After all, illicit trade by definition takes place outside the rules.  But herein lies 
a complicating problem: whose rules?”
3
  The shock of crossing imperial jurisdictions and 
questions of “whose rules” infused the tenor of prize court proceedings. 
 The battle between Spanish commercial enforcement officials and smugglers over 
the traversing of artificial borders highlights the plebian cosmopolitanism produced by 
black-market trade.  Subjects of multiple empires ended up in places that they should not 
have been according to the logic of imperial and nation-state-driven historiographies. 
Through commerce, Sephardic Jews renewed family connections, which stretched across 
separate linguistic and cultural zones.  Slaves passed through multiple slave societies as 
illicit traders or as contraband cargo themselves. The Spanish penal system shipped 
condemned foreign smugglers all over the empire to begin new lives as laborers or 
soldiers.  By contrast to the English gentlemen adventurers and merchants of Allison 
Games’s work on cosmopolitans, smugglers in the seas around Venezuela came from 
much less elite backgrounds and often crossed imperial boundaries against their will.
4
   
 Yet, the many social themes of Spanish American colonial historiography that 
wind their way through tales of clandestine trade demonstrate that the practice was more 
than just a handful of rogue sailors evading taxes.  Previous treatments of illicit 
commerce have done it a disservice by marginalizing its stories as exceptional or 
analyzing it solely as a numbers game.  This dissertation’s chapters alone have touched 
on interpersonal relationships in the colonial period, including the power of kinship, the 
                                                 
     
3
 Moisés Naím, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy 
(New York: Doubleday, 2005), 184. 
     
4
 Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in the Age of Expansion, 1560-1660  




importance of material culture in criminality, and multiple interpretations of political 
corruption.  It has also situated smuggling within the legal history of slavery, freedom, 
and overlapping imperial jurisdictions.  Additionally, this study has discussed points of 
political conflict such as Bourbon efforts to strengthen the central state’s presence, 
friction between royal authority and local power structures, and the reasons for colonial 
rebellion.  Smuggling’s consequences clearly factor into how Spanish imperialism 
existed on the periphery. 
 The obfuscation of outdated, yet still powerful, Spanish commercial codes colored 
this existence.  Broken or disregarded laws that still have the force and authority of the 
state behind them can produce a strange and elaborate kabuki theater.  Citizens devise 
complicated and evasive measures to transgress legal statutes while still evading 
prosecution.  In time, common people become adept at eluding the law and come to think 
of this subversion as a normal, natural course of events.  They find law enforcement 
officials more immoral than their crimes.  Indeed, they see fines and other punishments as 
just the costs of doing business.  From paying off police officers and public officials in 
the drug trade to paying recruits in college athletics, modern citizens navigate archaic 
systems that have lost their meaning just as adroitly as early modern subjects once did.
5
             
 However, if obsolete regulations continue to be enforced by officials, their shelf 
life and human consequences can be long-lasting.  As prize court sentences demonstrate, 
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the Spanish commercial codes maintained their power to discipline offenders long after 
they became ineffective as safeguards against foreign intrusion.  Convicted 
contrabandists faced dislocation, long periods of forced labor or military service, and 
occasionally capital punishment even though their trade with Venezuelan subjects was 
commonplace.  Clashes between foreigners and royal or Caracas Company coastguards 
put these inhabitants in the crossfire of an undeclared warzone.  As this dissertation has 
shown, though inter-imperial trade was a victimless and casual practice, its 
criminalization opened up a Pandora’s Box of violence and retribution.   
 Faced with this extreme on one hand and the dearth of legal trading options on the 
other, Venezuelans, like many subjects in the peripheral Americas, negotiated their place 
within criminal structures.  They followed the tenets of what Shannon Dawdy has termed 
“rogue colonialism” by using contraband trade and other practices technically outlawed 
by the state to assure their autonomy even while they upheld their loyalty to the Spanish 
Crown.
6
  Some maritime workers became full-time professional smugglers committed to 
the business.  Other people, like petty producers, availed themselves of the black market 
only occasionally to pick up a few supplies for personal consumption.  Coastal 
communities informally settled upon acceptable levels of criminality and corruption and 
punished smugglers and officials alike who transgressed these norms.  Ultimately, 
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smuggling in eighteenth-century Venezuela illustrates the tension most characteristic of 
colonialism: mainly that replicated societies eventually become self-sufficient and self-
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